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No. 28 April-June 1959

SOVIET SURVEY

A Quarterly Review of Cultural Trends



THE MOSLEM INTELLIGENTSIA IN THE USSR

RE-EDUCATING THE LITERATI

EAST WIND WEST WIND

Letter from Calcutta

BITTER RICE IN VIET-MINH

SOVIET VIEWS ON AFRICA

THREE SHILLINGS

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SKETCHES OF CHAIRMAN MAO

Working, Studying, and Living

by Hung Ch'i (*Kung-jen Jih-Pao*, Peking, 15 January 1959)

'How busy indeed is the life of our respected and beloved leader, Chairman Mao! He spends most of his time attending meetings. Important meetings very frequently last until two o'clock in the afternoon, and are then followed by smaller ones. When these have broken up, he still keeps on talking to individual leaders. When he is working, the Chairman makes no distinction between day and night. Sometimes he works continuously for over 30 hours. When it is late at night he works attentively by lamp-light. After about one hour's work, he will stand up and walk about. After six or seven hours work, he will go to the courtyard for a stroll and take a bit of exercise.

The Chairman reads documents with the greatest attention. He carefully analyses every sentence and every word. He draws a lot of strokes, circles, and dots on the documents. He divides some of the sentences into several sections by means of different signs and adds figures, 1, 2, 3, 4, etc. Sometimes he will delete a few phrases. Very often he enriches the content by numerous additions.

Each year the Chairman spends a great deal of time in visiting factories, co-operatives, government offices, schools, and the armed forces. He approaches the broad masses of people, tries to understand their work and life, asks for their opinions, raises many problems in discussions with them, and helps them in various ways.

The Chairman also pays great attention to physical exercise. His most frequent forms of exercise are walking, mountain climbing, and swimming. In 1953, he climbed 35 mountains, and did not give up even when it rained. He was already a good swimmer in his childhood. Even though he is over 60, this has not changed. Everywhere he goes, if conditions permit, he always spends some time swimming. During the period of the Nanning Conference in January 1958, though he was so busy that he had to eat his meals in the conference hall, he still found time to swim twice in the Yung River, where the water temperature was only 17 degrees. He has swum many times in the southern rivers, including the Yang-tze River, the Pearl River, the Ch'ien Tang River, the Kan River, and the Yung River.

Though he works till late at night, he usually plays table tennis before going to bed. He seldoms misses the ball, and his returns are fast and powerful. He often wins. Once, during a game, Comrade Lin K'e, one of our good table tennis players, served a tricky ball. When Chairman Mao quickly hit it back in a manner quite unexpected by his opponent, he scored a point. The Chairman then said by way of encouragement : "Comrade Lin K'e, do not let that dishearten you!" The room was then filled with laughter and the game continued.

One winter night in 1953 it snowed and the roof of our house, the trees, the frozen ground, in fact everything seemed to be dressed in white. The Chairman attended a meeting at Huaijen Hall, and did not return till almost midnight. When he got out of his car and looked at his watch, it was exactly ten minutes to 12. He said cheerfully : "I still have ten more minutes for my stroll." He walked on the snow-covered ground, and the snow squeaked under his feet. He seemed to enjoy his exercise.

The Chairman likes nothing better than snow. Every time it snows, he will take a walk on the snow-covered ground and kick the snow with great joy, as if nothing in the world was more pleasant. We know the Chairman's weakness for snow, and every time it snows we make it a point not to sweep away the snow in the courtyard . . . .

On 6 January 1958, after a long voyage by air, Chairman Mao arrived at Nanning, Kwangsi. On the second day, despite his fatigue from the travel and the cold weather, the Chairman decided that he would swim in the Yung River. We thought we would test the temperature of the water first in order to tell the Chairman. But we had not been in the water long when the Chairman himself came after us . . . .

(*Continued on page three of cover*)

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No. 28 April-June 1959

Editor: *Walter Z. Laqueur*

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Introductory Note

THE current issue of *Soviet Survey* (and the issue which is to follow) is largely devoted to an examination of two central themes: The Soviet impact on the intelligentsia in various parts of Asia and Africa, and the problems facing the Soviet intelligentsia at home—ideological questions, economic and social issues, the status of the intellectual in Soviet society, the origin and implications of Khrushchev's recent educational reforms.

These two central themes are perhaps the most important issues for the student of Soviet affairs (and incidentally for the Soviet leadership); they are certainly the most interesting. Most observers agree that communism and the example of the Soviet Union, its industrial progress in particular, have made a profound impression in Asia and Africa. But so far the Soviet Union and the communist parties have found it easier to attract Asian and African nationalists than to hold them. A great many African nationalist leaders have at one time or another been members of the communist party or have collaborated with it, but very few have remained faithful. In both Asia and Africa, and particularly in the Middle East, Soviet policy has been confronted with a dilemma that has recently assumed a highly topical character; its very success in one country has alarmed and mobilised counter-forces in others. The conflict between the communists and Colonel Nasser may well be a pointer to future developments in Africa, India, or Indonesia.

The deeper causes of affinity and of competition between communism and nationalism in the East are discussed in several contributions. In this issue considerable space is given to documentary evidence on the state of affairs in China; some of it may occasionally seem tedious and repetitive, although the description of Chairman Mao's working day and general style of life certainly makes fascinating reading. But there can be no doubt that these documents present a more faithful and a more convincing picture of the intellectual climate in China and of the fate of the Chinese intelligentsia than any outside observer, however well informed and capable, could possibly offer.

Questions concerning the Soviet intelligentsia have pre-occupied students of Russian affairs for several years. Is it really 'Die Macht im Hintergrund,' as one writer has argued? It is not a subject that lends itself easily to generalisation; even though the very word intelligentsia is of Russian origin, it has now come to include a wide variety of people in occupations with a markedly different social, political, and economic status. An assistant teacher in a kindergarten in a Tajik *kolkhoz* and a member of the Communist Party Presidium do not really have much in common, apart from the fact that they are both classified as members of the technical intelligentsia. To what degree is the new Soviet intelligentsia the heir to the traditions of the old Russian intelligentsia? Is it, or will it be, an agent of change in Soviet society and policy? These are some of the questions that deserve closer study.

In China in 1956 the complaints and the criticism of the intellectuals provoked consternation among their party's leadership. Since then therapy by manual labour, mainly in agriculture, has been prescribed for the Chinese intelligentsia. It is, however, too early to determine whether this interesting experiment has been a success. The fact that the intellectuals spend a considerable part of their time in the fields rather than in their laboratories and studies may have a beneficial effect on their bodily health and their peace of mind, but it is uncertain whether this practice is conducive to an improvement in scientific standards. Nor has it yet been demonstrated that manual labour in itself permanently dispels intellectual doubts; the mortification of the flesh, practised in other ages and by other means, never entirely suppressed sin and sinners.

In the Soviet Union the problem presents itself in a somewhat different fashion; the articles published in this (and in particular in the coming) number of *Soviet Survey* will, it is hoped, make a contribution to a dispassionate discussion of this intricate question.

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Central Asia Comes of Age

THE MOSLEM INTELLIGENTSIA IN THE USSR

A. Bennigsen

FOR nearly forty years the Soviet purpose in the Moslem territories of Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Middle Volga has been to *integrate* the national élites into the socialist system. What the communists desire is a total integration—political, intellectual, and spiritual; and this involves destroying the old pre-revolutionary Moslem élite and creating in its place a new intelligentsia of Marxist formation, detached from Islam and exclusively devoted to the Soviet regime.

The relation between Russians and the non-Russian peoples is one of the key problems of the Soviet Union, and its solution undoubtedly depends upon the success or failure of the Moslem experiment. Although reliable documentation is scarce, we have collected in this article some information which throws light on the experiment, about which too little is known in the West.

The traditional Moslem intelligentsia

In the Moslem lands of Russia before 1917 there was a large and often brilliant national intelligentsia, whether of the old traditional type (in Turkestan and Daghestan) or Westernised (the modernist *djadids* of Kazan, Baku, and the Crimea); and this intelligentsia played a most important role both culturally and in the Moslem national movements at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century. Today there remain only a few scattered remnants of this generation, which was destroyed in the terrible period from 1928 to 1938.

The old religious élite is now represented by a very small group, which is not, however, negligible, because it is the sole repository within the Soviet borders of the traditional Islamic culture. It includes the officiating personnel of the Moslem cult, organised from the four religious centres of Tashkent, Baku, Ufa, and Buynaksk. Their precise number is unknown, but it must certainly be small. A Soviet estimate of 1942-3 gave the number of 'mullahs' as 8,000, but there is reason to believe that this figure is too high.

Most of them belong to the older generation and only a very few of them are young, because there is only one *madrasseh* in the whole USSR from which they can be recruited. The *Mir-i-Arab* at Bukhara was opened in 1949, to be closed in 1957 and replaced by the *Barak Khan* at Tashkent. The Bukhara *madrasseh* in 1956 had 105 students taking the seven-year course of medium-grade classical Moslem studies. Only a small proportion of them (five in 1955) go on to higher studies at the university of Al-Azhar.

This tiny nucleus of mullahs is, therefore, the sole group of traditional Moslem intellectuals in the service of a population of some thirty million.[1] They appear to be recruited solely from the dispossessed classes—clergy, aristocracy, or bourgeoisie—and they play no part at all in the country's social, cultural, and political life, since Soviet society allows only a marginal existence to religious personnel. Their activity is strictly confined to their religious function and their flocks consist, with few exceptions, of the old. There are no Moslem 'religious' publications in the USSR;[2] but the Mufti of Tashkent,

[1] And yet the communist authorities consider it too large and are scandalised by the continued attendance at Koran schools. S. Babaev, first secretary of the CC of the Turkmen CP, declared at its 4th Plenum (25-26 February 1957): 'Only the low level of our anti-religious propaganda can account for the attendance at Moslem religious establishments of certain young graduates from Soviet schools.'

[2] The only Moslem religious works published since 1925 have been: the *Koran*, issued for the first time since 1917 at Tashkent in 1955-6 by the Central Asian Religious Board; a religious calendar, *Dini Kalindary*, issued in the Uzbek language in an edition of 10,000 by the same Board at Tashkent; and a catechism, *Islam and the Moslem rite*, a little manual of 69 pages printed in Arabic, in the Tartar language, at Ufa.

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Ziautdinov Babo-Khanov, however, is exceptional in enjoying a certain political influence.

The Sovietised intelligentsia

The word 'intelligentsia' is understood in the Soviet Union in a very wide sense. It includes almost everyone who is not a manual worker or peasant. Thus the 'kolkhoz intelligentsia' includes not only chairmen and book-keepers but also foremen and sometimes even 'tractor operatives.' But in this study we shall use the word only for the higher-educated class. This Moslem Soviet intelligentsia has several characteristics in common with the Russian intelligentsia and in distinction from those of other Moslem countries. The three most important are:

1. Its *quantitative and qualitative importance* in the life of the Moslem populations of the USSR. Whereas the intelligentsias of other Middle Eastern countries, except Turkey, are only a thin social stratum, the intellectual élite of the Moslem Republics in Russia is a numerically large social class. It has a very wide field of recruitment provided by the higher and secondary technical schools which are the product of the Soviet regime's titanic effort in the sphere of public education. In Uzbekistan, for example, with a total population in 1956 of 7,300,000, there were in 1958 no less than 31 institutes of higher education with 78,300 students and 99 technical schools with 57,900.[3] Of course these figures include a large number of Russians. In 1940 the proportion of Moslems in the University of Central Asia in Tashkent was only 32.5%.[4] But the percentage of Russians is continually falling while that of the young national *cadres* increases.

2. *Its* '*youthfulness*.' The overwhelming majority of the Moslem intellectuals belong to the post-revolutionary generation, and graduated from the universities in the thirties, after the substitution of Latin alphabets for the Arabic.[5] They have therefore grown up without contact with the external Moslem world and are cut off from the Moslem cultural past. With rare exceptions, therefore, they are a 'Soviet' intelligentsia, to whose formation the traditional culture of Islam has contributed nothing.

3. *Its* '*monolithic*' *character*, due to the uniformity of public education. Although each Moslem Republic in the Union possesses its own ministry of education, the organisation and the educational programme is exactly the same in all of them. The young Moslem intelligentsia is fashioned in a uniform mould and racial differences tend to disappear in a 'Soviet Moslem' intellectual type whose reactions and whose psychological, social, and political attitude are almost everywhere the same.[6]

On the other hand, there is a certain difference between the Moslem and the general Soviet intelligentsia, due to its social origin.

The Soviet intelligentsia, that latest product of the 'classless society,' is supposed to combine the élites from all strata of the population; and in the *Russian* intelligentsia this does seem to be more or less the case. But it is less so in the Moslem regions. Although higher education is now generally open to all strata of society (including children of the old dispossessed classes), the social basis of the Moslem intelligentsia presents certain special features. Because there was no industrial working class before 1917 in the Moslem lands, except for Azerbaijan, the majority of the young Moslem intellectuals are the children of peasants, less detached than the children of industrial workers from the family background and traditions of the past;[7] and, further, a comparatively large number of them come from the former 'privileged' class (the landed nobility).

And there is another factor, peculiar to the former nomad territories (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Karakalpakistan): namely, the strong survival of the 'clan' spirit which would link the

[3] R. Gulamov, *Under the Leninist Flag of Friendship between Peoples* (*Kommunist*, No. 15, 1958).

[4] 20 *let Sredne-Aziatskogo Universiteta* (Tashkent, 1940), pp. 20-21.

[5] The Latin alphabet everywhere replaced the Arabic between 1926 (in Azerbaijan) and 1929 (in Tatarstan); between 1938 and 1940 it was in turn replaced by the Cyrillic alphabet, suitably modified.

[6] The projected extension of the *boarding-school* system, to remove children from parental influence, will have the effect of assimilating the next generation still more closely to the 'Soviet' type.

[7] One of the chief reproaches addressed by Soviet writers to the young Moslem intellectuals is the persistence of '*aksakalism*' (from the Turkish *ak*: white and *sakal:* beard)—that is to say, of 'exaggerated respect' for parents.

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creation of new intellectual cadres with the status of the family or clan.[8]

Thus the Moslem intelligentsia, in spite of its 'youthfulness,' seems more closely linked to the older generation, more 'conservative,' and also less fluid than the Russian. And, finally, thanks to the persistence of Islamic customs, the Moslem intelligentsia differs from the Russian by the modest position it accords to women. We learn from the Soviet press that very few Moslem girls go beyond the ten-year school: in Kirgizia not more than 20%,[9] and in Uzbekistan[10] between 1947 and 1952 the six higher schools of Samarkand awarded only 172 diplomas, or an average of 29 a year, to Uzbek girls. The Tajikistan newspaper, *Kommunist Tajikistana* (25 November 1955) discloses that in 1955 there were only five Tajik girls at the Institute of Agronomy at Stalinabad, and not one in any of the Republic's veterinary or hydraulic establishments. And this phenomenon does not seem to be a mere survival of old customs, because the local Soviet press reveals that, since the end of the war, there has been a *decrease* in the number of women in responsible positions. For example, in the Osh district of Kirgizia in 1955[11] there were:

In 193 *kolkhozes* only 3 women presidents (as against 7 in 1945); 30 women *kolkhoz* foremen (as against 70 in 1945); 25 women farm overseers (as against 89 in 1945).

Education

The education of the new Moslem intelligentsia is not 'free.' It is 'planned' and 'oriented' by the regime, and its objective in the minds of the Soviet leaders is twofold:

The intelligentsia must be trained to active participation in the building of a communist society, and must therefore be 'technical' rather than 'literary,' it must therefore be politically oriented and detached from Islamic influences.

It must be an auxiliary and mediator of the Soviet power to the Moslem masses; in other words, it must be 'Russified.'

The intellectual and moral education imparted in the universities and Komsomol organisations is directed to this twofold objective and leaves little or no place to the traditional Moslem culture. It differs scarcely at all from the education of Russian students. The young Moslem is indoctrinated with materialist atheism and communist morality, but the chief emphasis is laid upon two points: technical and scientific training, and cultural Russification.

Technology

In all Moslem countries the major weakness of the intellectual classes is their almost exclusive devotion to literary and clerical activities. There is a plethora of lawyers, journalists, and politicians, and a dearth of engineers and technicians. Before the revolution the Moslems of Russia shared this weakness. The Soviet authorities have tried to correct the disproportion and have succeeded up to a point, though the available statistics show that up to now the Moslems in technical colleges are still outnumbered by the Russians. Thus, at Alma-Ata in 1952, only 16 out of 98 science lecturers at the Kazakh Academy were Kazakhs;[12] and in the same year there were only 38 Turkmens among the 67 *graduates* at the Ashkabad Academy of Sciences.[13]

But the proportion of Moslems pursuing scientific studies is constantly increasing. In Uzbekistan, for example, in 1936 it was very small:[14]

Institute of Irrigation (Tashkent): 10% of 'national' students
Institute of Agronomy (Tashkent): 21% of 'national' students
Institute of Agronomy (Samarkand): 44% of 'national' students
Institute of Textiles (Tashkent): 21% of 'national' students
Institute of Finance (Tashkent): 36% of 'national' students

and the percentage of diplomaed 'nationals' was lamentable:

[8] The frequent attacks in the Soviet press of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan on the persistence of the clan spirit in these former nomads confirms the survival of the ancient 'feudal' structure in the midst of fully established Sovietism.

[9] *Sovetskaya Kirgiziya*, 21 May 1952. On ten Kirgiz girls who passed out from the ten-year school in the town of Osh, only two went on to higher schools.

[10] *Pravda Vostoka*, 6 October 1955.

[11] *Sovetskaya Kirgiziya*, 6 October 1955.

[12] *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda*, 11 April 1952.

[13] *Turkmenskaya Iskra*, 20 September 1952.

[14] Bogdanov and Agishev, 'The Creation of Cadres in Uzbekistan' (*Revoliutsiya i Natsionalnosti*, No. 7, 1936, pp. 54-57).

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Institute of Transport (Tashkent): 7%
Institute of Irrigation (Tashkent): 10%
Institute of Agronomy (Samarkand): 0% (out of 362)
Institute of Education (Fergana): 0% (out of 93)

By 1940 the proportion of 'nationals' in the universities had somewhat increased, but it was still small, for in the University of Central Asia at Tashkent, only 32.5% of the students and 12% of the teachers were 'Turkmens.'[15]

By 1958, however, if a recent survey may be trusted, 80% of the 2,500 students in the Faculty of Science at Samarkand University were Uzbeks. So the Soviet authorities can be said to have obtained already spectacular results in this domain, and to have given the Soviet Moslems a unique place in the general picture of *Dar-ul-Islam*. For they alone possess a national élite of scientists and technicians which, although small as yet, will before long be able to dispense with 'foreign' (meaning Russian) assistance and make itself solely responsible for the future of an industrialised country.[16]

Russification

In the Moslem Republics, secondary and higher education is a powerful instrument for the linguistic and cultural russification of the young national intelligentsia. Russian is a compulsory subject, from the fifth class upward, in primary and secondary schools, and it is necessary to pass an examination in Russian before entering the university. And although the teaching in higher institutes is, theoretically, in the majority-language of the students, in practice Russian predominates everywhere. The national languages are, in fact, only used in the study of certain literary and juridical subjects, whereas Russian is used in the scientific courses, both from habit and for reasons of convenience (its more suitable vocabulary, the availability of textbooks in Russian but not in Turkish, and so on). Further, wherever there is a mixture of students of different nationalities, the national languages are supplanted by Russian.

In this way, Russian is becoming more and more the language of the universities, and an administrative or scientific career is open only to those who know it perfectly. As Mukhitdinov, first secretary of the Uzbek Central Committee, has put it:

'Russian is the second tongue of all the peoples of the Soviet Union; to know it is the best way for the Moslem peoples to raise their cultural level and the only way to achieve a true scientific culture.'[17]

Not only is the Moslem intelligentsia unquestionably russified in language, but its way of thinking is often russified also. And this puts it in the peculiar condition of being neither entirely 'national' nor yet really 'denationalised.' It is a sort of isolated group between the Russians and the mass of non-Russian-speaking Moslems.

The place of the intelligentsia in the life of the Moslem Republics

Strong in numbers, and with a technical competence comparable to that of their Russian colleagues and a Marxist political education, the national intelligentsias should be capable, in theory, of occupying the principal positions and exercising political and economic leadership in the Moslem Republics. But is it so in fact? To answer this question, we must briefly examine the position of the Russian and the national cadres in the various political and economic sectors.

I. Moslems in the governmental system of the National Republics

In the Moslem Republics there is an almost invariable tacit rule which allots to the 'nationals' those ministries which confer the appearance of authority and the posts which involve direct contact with the population (Health, Justice, Social Security, etc.), while the *key positions*, which confer real power, are reserved for Russians. The President of the Council of Ministers is *always* a 'national,' while the first Vice-President is *compulsorily* a Russian.

[15] *Twenty Years of the University of Central Asia* (Tashkent, 1940), pp. 20-21.

[16] Ubai Arifov, director, and Sadyk Azimov, assistant-director, of the Uzbekistan Institute of Nuclear Physics (founded in 1956) are both of them Uzbeks (vide *Pravda Vostoka*, 25 August 1956). In October 1956 the Uzbekistan Academy of Sciences had nine active members, including seven 'nationals', and 13 corresponding members, including five "nationals"; its President, Abdullaev, is an Uzbek (*Pravda Vostoka*, 7 October 1956).

[17] *Kizil Uzbekistan*, 22 August 1956.

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Except in Kazakhstan, where the nationals are no longer the majority, there is always a big majority of nationals in the Council of Ministers. In 1955 the proportions were as follows:

Uzbekistan	..	21 ministers,	5 of them	Russian
Kazakhstan	..	24 ,,	14	,,
Kirgizia	..	20 ,,	6	,,
Turkmenistan		19 ,,	6	,,

But the distribution of portfolios is such as to leave the *key sectors* in Russian hands. These are:

1. *The political police:* The director of State Security (formerly MGB and possessing also, since the fall of Beria, the principal attributes of the MVD) is *always* and *everywhere* a Russian.

2. *Planning:* In three out of the five Central Asian Republics the director of the Planning Commission, which is a sort of Super-Ministry of Economic Affairs, is a Russian.

3. *Communications:* This is a political as well as an economic portfolio. All the ministers of communications in the Central Asian Republics are Russian.

4. *Local Industry:* This is a republican ministry, with a certain degree of independence from Moscow. Four of the five Central Asian ministers of industry are Russian.

In addition, Russians are heavily preponderant in the army and the police of the Moslem Republics.

II. Moslems in the Communist Party

In the Soviet diarchy, as is well known, the *real power* belongs to the Communist Party and the *appearance of power* to the apparatus of Soviets and Government. It is therefore not surprising that the proportion of Russians and other non-Moslems is particularly high in the apparatus of the communist parties of the Republics. These parties are in any case not autonomous but are simply regional organs of the CPSU, and they are therefore very strictly controlled from Moscow.

Before the war, Russians and other 'Europeans' were in the majority in the communist parties of the Republics. In 1930 in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan the percentage of 'national' communists was 45 and 28, respectively;[18] in 1933 in Tatarstan, Azerbaijan, and the Crimea, the percentages were 42, 46·3 and 14·6.[19] Has the situation changed? It is difficult to be sure because, since the war, statistics of racial composition are no longer issued. In the Kazakhstan CP, however, the Russian element must have increased through the influx of new Russian colonists who were settled in the unoccupied lands of Kazakhstan in 1955-58. But in the other parts of Central Asia it would seem that the relative proportion of Russians and nationals in the CPSU is stable, though with a slight preponderance of Russians.

We have more information about the racial composition of the party congresses of the Republics which, since the war, assemble every two years. In Uzbekistan, at the XXIst congress (15-18 February 1954) there were 614 delegates, of whom 189, or 31% were non-Moslems.[20] The number of Europeans is in this case *less* than at the preceding congress (September 1952), which was attended by 612 delegates of whom 40% were non-Moslems. At the VIII Kirgiz congress (January 1956) there were 465 delegates, of whom 236, or 50·7%, were non-Moslem, and here the non-Moslem percentage has *increased* by 3% over the percentage at the VIth congress (August 1952).[21] In the central committees and secretariats, which are the controlling bodies of the Communist Party, the proportion of non-Moslems is even higher. In the central committees of the five Central Asian Republics in 1956 it ranged from 58·4% in Kazakhstan to 25·3% in Tajikistan.[22]

The structure of the central committee secretariats, which are the controlling party bodies,

[18] P. Rysako, 'On the XIVth Anniversary', *Revoliutsiya i Natsionalnosti*, 10 November 1931, pp. 1-18.

[19] Aronshtam, 'The Purge of the Party's national organisations', *ibid.* 6 May 1933, pp. 7-18.

[20] *Pravda Vostoka*, 17 February 1954.

[21] *Pravda Vostoka*, 24 September 1952; 29 January 1956.

[22] *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda*, 27 January 1956; *Sovetskaya Kirgiziya*, 27 August 1956; *Turkmenskaya Iskra*, 22 January 1956; *Kommunist Tajikistana*, 31 January 1956. The detailed figures of central committee membership at the congresses held in January 1956 were:

	Total		*Non-Moslem*		*Percentage of non-Moslems*
	Members	*Candidates*	*Members*	*Candidates*	
Uzbekistan ..	199	55	62	21	31·0
Kazakhstan ..	178	55	104	34	58·4
Kirgizia	116	37	40	11	34·4
Turkmenistan	135	40	55	20	38·5
Tajikistan ..	154	57	39	13	25·3

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has followed an unvarying rule since the war. The first secretary, who is the prominent figure, is *always and everywhere* a 'national' (again with the exception of Kazakhstan, where the Moslems are now a minority in their own Republic), while the second secretary, who is also *secretary of the cadres* and thus in control of the entire Party hierarchy, and therefore the real head of the Republic's Party, is *always and everywhere* a Russian. The same rule applies on the regional level. In Kazakhstan in December 1955 there were 10 Russian first secretaries and 16 Russian second secretaries in the regional committees of the 16 regions of the Republic.

III. Moslems in the Economic Sphere

Soviet sources are almost completely uninformative about the distribution of professional work in the different spheres of economic activity in the Moslem Republics. Nevertheless the observations of foreigners who have succeeded in visiting Central Asia and the rare occasional information in the local press make it clear that there is a quite definite division between the Russian and the Moslem spheres of activity. Thus the sovkhozes, irrigation, communications, transport, building, finance and banking, as well as certain industrial sectors, are, in most of the Republics, dominated by Russians. This can be explained both by the Russian authorities' desire to keep control of the key sectors of regional economy and also by the dearth of indigenous technical cadres.

When Russians and Moslems are employed together on a large-scale undertaking it is noticeable that the former tend to monopolise the organising and technical posts while leaving the subordinate jobs to 'nationals.' As an example, when 100 workers at the 'Friendship between Peoples' hydro-electric station of Kairak-Kum were decorated, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Tajikistan issued in a decree of 28 December 1956[23] a table showing the distribution of jobs among them. It was as follows (57 Russians, 30 Moslems, and 13 Germans):[24]

Political and administrative posts: 19 Russians, 1 German

Engineers: 9 Russians, 3 Germans

Foremen: 5 Russians, 4 Moslems

Skilled workers: 17 Russians, 7 Germans, 5 Moslems

Labourers: 6 Russians, 2 Germans, 17 Moslems

Cooks and Chauffeurs: 1 Russian, 4 Moslems

Our brief survey has shown that, while there are a great many openings for the Moslem intelligentsia, and there will be still more as new technical cadres are created, their scope is nevertheless restricted by the political exigencies which withhold from Moslems, in every case, the leading positions in politics and in the key sectors of the economy.

The rise of the Moslem intelligentsia is carefully controlled by the communist authorities, lest the independence of the Moslem Republics should reach the point where separatist ideas might begin to awaken. This control is still too discreet to be noticeable in the administrative and economic spheres, but it is all too obvious in the sphere of what the Soviet authorities call 'national culture' which is turned into something lifeless and rootless and slavishly modelled on the lines of Russian culture. Only its innocuous 'folklore' and picturesque historical aspects are encouraged and it is purged of all living content and relevance.

Attitude of the Moslem intellectual

The Soviet authorities have certainly succeeded in turning the Moslem intellectual into a 'socialist' who regards himself as a 'European,' with a contempt for his country's recent past and for foreign 'Asiatics,' and decisively opposed to any return of the pre-1917 capitalist or religious regime. This looks like a fundamental break with the past and seems to justify all the hopes of the Russian authorities. But the situation is more complex. Before deciding whether the Moslem intellectual is a true russified and de-Islamised *homo sovieticus*, for whom proletarian class interests are supreme over those of his national group, we need to examine his behaviour in two important matters: his relations with Russians, and his attitude towards Islam and the national culture.

Is the Moslem intellectual russified? To all appearance, he is; and the evidence of all superficial observers agrees on this. He is a 20th century

[23] *Kommunist Tajikistana*, 4 January 1957.

[24] Either volunteers from the GDR or, more probably, Volga Germans deported to Central Asia.

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technician, very proud of the regime's successes. He also appears grateful to the Russian people, 'elder brother' of all the Soviet peoples, for the education which has brought him, in an external and intellectual sense, closer to Russians and Westerners than to his Asiatic brothers.

Yet, in spite of his more or less perfect knowledge of Russian, the Moslem intellectual has not forgotten his mother tongue, but on the contrary is deeply attached to it. He is bilingual and he never uses Russian apart from his work. There is, therefore, no linguistic assimilation, any more than there is cultural assimilation.[25]

But there is a more reliable test for judging the degree of russification of the Moslem intelligentsia: namely, the racial intermixture between Russians and nationals. In spite of the wholesale influx of Russians into the Moslem Republics, the perennial dream of the Russian authorities that the two communities will melt into one has not been realised. Russians and Moslems live side by side but do not mix. They retain their own separate characteristics. At the bottom of the social scale, segregation is total; and even in university and administrative circles Russians and Moslems keep as far apart as they can. The Soviet press does not conceal the fact that mixed marriages are extremely rare. Before the Revolution, marriage between a Russian girl and a Moslem was unusual, but possible, because not forbidden by the *Shariat* law; today it is still an exceptional event, even among the intellectuals, however 'de-Islamised.' We may instance the reply of a D.P.—a typical Moslem intellectual, former *Komsomol* and Party member, completely de-Islamised and apparently russified—to the question whether nationals in the USSR married Russian girls: 'We would never consent to marry a *Kafire* (infidel).' And marriage between a Moslem girl and a Russian man, which was formerly forbidden by Moslem law, is still impossible, as it was before the Revolution.

Is the Moslem intellectual de-Islamised?. Although the sovietised intellectual resists interracial mixture he is not strictly a 'Moslem' either, because he is not a practising one; yet neither is he a real atheist. Rather, he is indifferent; he ignores Islam, or has forgotten it. This is confirmed from such different sources as the Soviet press, which complains that the intelligentsia is only indifferent to religion and not definitely hostile to it, and the unanimous testimony of visitors to Central Asia, who report crowded mosques, though the crowds are composed only of the old and of the poorest sections of the population.[26]

We shall, however, misunderstand the intellectuals if we fail to see their attitude towards the faith of their ancestors in its true perspective. What they are indifferent to is the dogma, the faith in the strict sense. But on the other hand they are attached to the nexus of customs and traditions which constitute the specific Moslem *way of life*. How can we doubt this when we see that intellectuals who are completely de-Islamised nevertheless retain the ancestral attitude towards women (the Soviet press is explicit about this) and that they still practise polygamy and enforce seclusion and the wearing of the veil upon women, in spite of all the official prohibitions. Moreover, the consciousness of belonging to the *Umma*—the community of believers as opposed to the 'world of infidels'—is deeply rooted in all of them. And their feeling is not merely platonic; it is expressed in the rite of circumcision, which is practised by almost the entire Moslem population including the communist intellectuals.

If, then, there is no obvious attachment to Islam as a faith, it is nevertheless true that the attachment to a traditional culture deeply tinged with religious feeling is very powerful. The most striking proof of this is the quarrel between Russian and national communists which broke

[25] The slightest relaxation of ideological pressure by the authorities is followed in the Moslem Republics by measures whose real significance can only be the desire to escape from the Russian tutelage. For example, the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR issued a decree on 21 August 1956 making the Azer language the only official language of the Republic, to the exclusion of Russian. This measure was hailed, according to the local paper *Bakinski Rabochi* (28-29 August 1956) with 'waves of enthusiasm' whose meaning can only have been 'nationalist' if not overtly anti-Russian.

[26] The Moslem cult is no longer observed in the USSR. Of the five basic elements of the faith, the *zakat* is prohibited; pilgrimage to Mecca has been permitted since the war but there are not more than about 20 pilgrims a year; the five-fold prayer is observed only by the old; but fasts seem to be observed fairly faithfully in the rural districts. (The fifth element, the *shahada* or confession of faith is a mental act.) The number of mosques open for services is derisory; according to the Mufti of Tashkent there are not more than 60 in Uzbekistan and 27 in Kazakhstan.

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out in 1952 over the national heritage of the Central Asian Turks. It will be remembered that the Russian authorities, with the aim of purging the national heritage of the Moslem peoples of its 'reactionary' elements (religious and feudal), made a wholesale attack upon the national epics of the Turkish people. The national intellectuals perceived the significance of this attack and detected in it a grave peril: the practical liquidation of the whole national culture and its replacement by what the authorities euphemistically call *Soviet*, though they really mean *Russian*, culture. The resistance of the nationals was embittered, especially in Kirgizia, where the crisis provoked by the condemnation of the national epic, *Manas*, caused a profound schism not only in university circles but also in the local Communist Party. The result was a spectacle unique in the history of the USSR: Kirgiz communists accusing their Russian comrades of 'chauvinist imperialism,' while the latter retorted with accusations of 'bourgeois nationalism.'[27]

The paradox is curious. It is the new *communist* national cadres in the Moslem Republics who, in the name of Marxism-Leninism, rise to defend the national heritage of their peoples with its deep and perdurable tinge of 'nationalism' and, above all, of Islam. Beautiful as they may be, it cannot be said of epics like *Dédé-Korkut* (Azeri), which hymns the victories of Turkish warriors over Georgian or Armenian Christians, or *Alpamych* (Uzbek) and *Manas* (Kirgiz), whose heroes are *ghazis*, champions of the Moslem faith against the 'infidel,' that they are calculated to consolidate 'proletarian friendship among socialist peoples.' From the Marxist angle these epics are undeniably 'feudal' and 'religious' productions, and yet they were defended, often heroically, and to a victorious conclusion, by Moslem intellectuals of authentic Marxist formation. Evidently their *national sentiment* and loyalty to the national culture is infinitely stronger and deeper than their allegiance to Marxism. And there is more to it than this. The Marxist Moslem intellectual has not forgotten that he belongs to the native population, to which he is bound by culture, speech, and customs. He naturally regards himself as its representative and champion against the growing Russian pretensions. Faithful to his compatriots, the Moslem intellectual is not seen by them as a renegade, even though he has become a communist, but rather as a defender.

What conclusions may be drawn from this brief survey? First, that the 'nationalism' of the Moslem peoples has not disappeared, as the Soviet leaders hoped it would, with the arrival of the socialist society. So far from that, it has even become more conscious and more deeply felt, because its mouthpiece is now the young intelligentsia instead of the pre-revolution church and feudal nobility. The Moslem intellectual, even when apparently 'de-Islamised,' cannot be assimilated to the Russians and the efforts of authority to create a *super-national* Soviet patriotism have had no success. On the contrary, by a process familiar in all 'colonial' countries, the Central Asian or Caucasian intellectual emerges as the representative of his people, and his national consciousness is at once more acute and more rational, and in the last resort more hostile to the Russian influence, than that of any other social class.

Nevertheless, the Moslem intellectual is aware that the independence of the Moslem lands before the Russian conquest, or of the Emirate of Bukhara before 1917, was a sham because there was no élite capable of really leading the country. But today there is such an élite, and with every year that passes the Moslems of the USSR draw nearer to a real independence, when their countries will be in the sole control of their own 'nationals.'

The Moslem intellectuals are perfectly aware of this, but they also know that the Russians will never voluntarily abdicate from the role of 'elder brother of the Soviet peoples.' In the meantime, they walk hand in hand with the Russians on the road that will lead to their independence—and the road is still probably a long one. For the moment, friction with the Russians is limited to a few matters essential for the defence of their national integrity, and the storm that will break out when the young Moslem intellectuals demand political and cultural autonomy is still beyond the horizon.

[27] See, in this connection, our study in *L'Afrique et l'Asie*, 2ème trimestre, 1952.

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Letter from Calcutta

EAST WIND WEST WIND

Sibnarayan Ray

ONE striking fact about the impact of communism on the Indian intelligentsia is its curious regional distribution. It is not accidental that its influence is most pronounced in the coastal regions and gets dimmer as it moves away from the seas to the heart of the Indian landmass. It is a growing ideological force in Bengal, Andhra Pradesh, Madras, Kerala and Bombay, but almost unknown in Bihar and Rajasthan, scarcely significant in Madhya Pradesh, and in Uttar Pradesh its progress has been halting and slow. In these latter states the intelligentsia is very much under the influence of one form or another of militant Hinduism, represented by such organisations as the Bharatiya Jan Sangh, the Hindu Mahasabha, the Ram Rajya Parishad, and, most formidable of them all, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (with an actual membership of over 500,000, and supporters running to 5,000,000). This polarisation, which is both ideological and geographic, constitutes a major threat to the stability and democratic development of the young Indian republic.

This phenomenon can not be explained merely in terms of unequal industrial development. The great industrial town of Jamshedpur, for example, is scarcely affected by communism. The communist state of Kerala has hardly any industry. Some consideration of the reasons for this polarisation will be helpful in understanding the nature of the influence of communism in India and in assessing its strength.

IN the course of over 2,000 years Brahminism developed into what many cultural anthropologists would call the Great Tradition of Indian society. It gave some kind of unity and cohesion to what otherwise was a country of many peoples, languages, and cultures. Originally evolved in the heart of north India, it gradually spread out, affiliating to itself many 'Little Traditions,' some much more ancient than itself. But while in the north this process of integration was relatively smooth, Brahminism, as it reached the coastal communities, met with increasing resistance. Committed to an uncompromising hierarchic *weltanschauung*, Brahminism had made all vertical social mobility (and, with it, individual enterprise) almost impossible by devising its metaphysic of karma and by building on it the unique structure of caste system. The coastal communities, being open to the sea, were relatively more dynamic, and they reacted to Brahminism as to an alien and inhibitive culture. Even when they were ultimately brought within its fold, they strove to maintain their discrete existence. Without this native subterranean resistance to Brahminical domination, Islam would not have made such quick headway in Bengal nor Christianity in the South.

Thus, historically, the sea-shore communities have always been relatively more receptive to ideologies and cultures opposed to orthodox Hinduism. Their geographic position encouraged traffic with the outside world. When, during and after the Renaissance, Western Europe re-established contact with India, its traders, explorers, and soldiers of fortune came along sea routes and made their first settlements among the coastal communities. In the second half of the 18th century and the first quarter of the 19th the British, after defeating their European rivals, established themselves as the supreme authority in the country. Their piecemeal conquest of India started from their three main strongholds in Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay. It is at these three points and their neighbouring areas that the impact of the West on the East has been of the longest duration in modern history and has had the most far-reaching consequences.

One result of this confrontation was the rise of a new Indian intelligentsia in these regions, with ideas and aspirations very different from the traditional intelligentsia. Under the closed hierarchical system of Brahminism, all intellectual activity was the exclusive privilege of the Brahmins. And since the Brahmins were not a class

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or a mere occupational group, but a closed caste into which entrance was possible only through the accident of birth, their thinking became increasingly inbred and divorced from the experience of the rest of the community. The principal pre-occupation of the traditional Indian intelligentsia was either that of devising elaborate laws and codes of conduct to justify their privileges, or that of conceiving esoteric abstractions which, being unverifiable, could not be refuted, but which successfully awed the non-intellectual majority into uncomprehending obedience. Non-empirical and dogmatic in their thinking, adepts in spinning verbal structures without existential reference, obsessed with reified abstractions, the Brahmins slowly but inexorably brought about the attenuation of language and creative thinking, and very nearly succeeded in killing the arts and the sciences.

From this auto-hypnotic state the Indian intellectuals were released by their sudden confrontation with the civilisation of Europe, which had itself experienced a similar liberation from the stranglehold of scholasticism. During the major part of the 19th century the confrontation was limited mainly to the three presidencies of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay. While in the rest of India sterile orthodoxy continued to maintain its sway, in these sea-shore states, thanks to the introduction of the printing press and the spread of western education, a new intelligentsia began to emerge. In place of the traditional Indian pre-occupation with the eternal and absolute, these new intellectuals were curious about man, nature, and history. Instead of delighting in verbalism and hypostasis, they wanted to study the actual and concrete. For the first time in Indian history the duty-oriented ethics of Brahminism was unambiguously challenged by a social philosophy which derived obligation from rights. The identification of virtue with self-mortification now came to be disputed. Under the inspiration of Rousseau, Paine, and others, many Indian intellectuals began to proclaim the doctrine of human equality in open defiance of caste hierarchy.

This awakening manifested itself in many ways —in the founding of the three Universities at Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay in 1857, and a number of other institutions for scientific and historical research; in the spectacular development of modern Indian vernaculars and the birth of Indian prose literatures; in the rise and rapid growth of Indian journalism; in movements of social reform (including female emancipation and inter-caste marriage); in struggles against economic exploitation and institutional inequity; and finally in the demand for political independence and for democratic rights and liberties. In all these activities the leadership came entirely from the new intelligentsia.

UNFORTUNATELY, however, this belated liberalisation of the Indian mind was not allowed its normal course of development. It was trammelled and distorted by a combination of factors, of which only three may be mentioned here. In the first place, the liberal values of individual freedom and equality to which the West had introduced the Indian intelligentsia were found to be constantly repudiated by the West itself in its conduct towards the Indians. This was inevitable, since liberalism came to India under imperialist auspices. The British through whom these values were introduced had a dual and self-contradictory rôle in India. As teachers they roused aspirations in their disciples which as rulers they had to repress systematically to maintain their economic monopoly and political domination. In the consequent frustration the intelligentsia recoiled not only from their English mentors but from the West as a whole, which the English represented; they took to extreme nationalism, to anti-western pan-Asianism, and to communism. Secondly, western education was restricted to very small sections of the Indian people; the vast majority, even in the coastal regions, continued to live and think in their traditional ways. This gave to the educated minority a sense of estrangement from the community. But since the new values were essentially egalitarian, such alienation, instead of making them glory in their privilege (as the orthodox Brahmins would have gloried), deepened into a sense of guilt and anguished impotence. By the end of the 19th century a section of the new intelligentsia were already advocating retreat from liberalism and rationalism in their longing for reabsorption into the community; but, being modern, they demanded the sacrifice of the individual at the altar not of caste privilege but of the collective solidarity of

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'the masses.' Thirdly, the first quarter of the 20th century was marked by the phenomenal decline of the West and by the resurgence of totalitarian ideologies and systems on the European continent. To orthodox Indian intellectuals this appeared to justify their original indifference to and later scepticism of the liberal-scientific culture of modern Europe. It gave them a new sense of superiority. Untormented by intellectual doubts or misgivings, and strong in their feeling of cultural oneness with the majority of the Indian people (who, living as they did in stagnant villages, had hardly ever been exposed to modern ideas), they tried to forge national unity under the banner of a revivalist-populist-nationalist ideology.

The new Indian intelligentsia, mainly coastal and urban, who had been longer exposed to modern Western culture, were, however, placed in an extremely difficult position. Alienated from the majority of the people and at the same time betrayed by their mentors, lacking the integrity to hold steadfastly to their newly acquired outlook and values and yet genuinely reluctant to see their achievements swamped by revivalist resurgence, they looked desperately for some avenue of escape. Their education had not prepared them for original thinking. It was imparted through the medium of English, a language basically different in its vocabulary and syntax from their native tongue. This had required a great deal of cramming and memorising, hampering the integration of the new ideas into the personality of the recipients. Western education had impressed on them the superiority of the scientific outlook to the metaphysical without, however, properly training them in empirical inquiry or the disciplines of experimentation and analysis. It had attracted them to democratic values, but had not given them a true appreciation of the creative rôle of the individual or of personal responsibility. India did not pass through the long historic process which had given empiricism and individualism such deep roots in, for example, England. The western educated Indian intelligentsia had never been able to bridge the gulf between what they learnt from their books or at school, and their daily lives in their homes. The decline of the West in the 20th century sharpened in them this sense of impotent ambivalence and set them searching for some formula which would justify their aspirations, resolve their conflict, rescue them from the torment of alienation, and restore their self-confidence and faith in the future.

To this bewildered new intelligentsia communism came as a great windfall. Thanks to its dialectical combination of scientific verbiage with dogma, collective dynamism with personal irresponsibility, internationalist pretensions with radical nationalism, egalitarian ideals with authoritarian methods, the new ideology offered them a most excellent means to self-deception. They were genuinely moved by its secular and anti-hierarchical outlook; at the same time, its authoritarian-collectivist ideas found a powerful echo in the subconscious recesses of their ancient beliefs and habits. Its recklessly violent critique of liberal civilisation corresponded with their own bitter feelings; but its prophetic historicism spared them recognition of their escapist choice. When, after the Bolshevik revolution, Russia founded the Communist International and from both strategic and ideological considerations began fomenting and actively supporting revolutionary movements in the colonies against the imperial powers of Western Europe, the frustrated intelligentsia of the Indian sea-shore towns and cities turned to it as its long-awaited saviour. The soil was ready for the seed.

THE first Indian to be converted to communism was a young Bengali Brahmin who had been for nearly a decade prior to his conversion an outstanding leader of the underground revolutionary nationalist movement in Bengal. The ideology of this movement had been furnished by some of the most thoroughly western-educated Hindu intellectuals of Bengal and Bombay (Bankimchandra, Tilak, Aurobindo Ghose, etc.) who had put their bitter disillusion with the West into words of great passion and power. Its techniques of struggle, however, were derived from assiduous study of the literature about revolutionary secret societies in Italy, Russia, Ireland, and Japan. Its membership came almost exclusively from the educated urban lower middle class. However, its secretive ways and terroristic methods prevented it from securing much public support, and its organisation was almost completely destroyed during the

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first world war by the police forces of the British government.

The defeat of the insurrectionary movement drove this Bengali youth, Narendranath Bhattacharya, to flee his country, and brought him to the United States in the spring of 1916. Here he adopted the name of M. N. Roy. Significantly enough, it was here (as he later recorded in his incomplete *Memoirs*) that he made his first acquaintance with communism. A question put by a worker in a meeting set him wondering whether national independence would necessarily lead to emancipation of the common people from economic exploitation and social injustice. In March 1917, in Mexico, he met the bolshevik agent, Michael Borodin, and became a communist. Towards the end of 1919 he left for Russia, at Lenin's invitation, to participate as a delegate in the Second Congress of the Communist International.

From the Second to the Sixth Congress, that is, from 1920 to 1928, Roy played a key rôle in bringing the Indian intelligentsia under the impact of communism. He served on the colonial commission of the Second Congress, was appointed a member of the Comintern's Asiatic Bureau, and, at its Fourth Congress (1922) a candidate member of its Executive Committee (ECCI); finally, in 1924, he became a full member of the Presidium and Secretariat. His main task was to build a communist movement in India. The first step was taken when, soon after the Second Congress, he went to Tashkent, where he helped to train in communist ideology a group of about 40 educated Indian Muslims who, with other muhajiruns (pilgrims), had left India to join Kemal Pasha's army in Turkey. Then, in 1921, with the foundation of the communist University of the Toilers of the East in Moscow, he conducted indoctrination courses there for Asian revolutionaries in exile. Next he tried to establish contact with his old revolutionary colleagues in Bengal and to draw them to communism. From 1921 onwards he began sending to India one emissary after another to bring together all those forces in the nationalist movement who were dissatisfied with the leadership of Gandhi, and to create out of them the core of an Indian Communist Party.

Of historically more far-reaching significance than these efforts, however, was the large body of communist literature which Roy wrote, published, and sent out to India through clandestine channels all through the twenties. His first major piece of communist writing, *India in Transition* (1922), was a seminal influence on Indian revolutionaries and alienated intellectuals in the twenties; it was followed by a steady stream of books and pamphlets from the same pen. From 1922 he began publishing a bi-monthly periodical, *The Vanguard of Indian Independence*, most of which he wrote himself. It came out fairly regularly till 1928, under various names, and was sent out from various European ports through Indian seamen.

IN so far as the building of an Indian Communist Party was concerned, Roy's efforts were not particularly successful. By 1922 five small communist groups had been formed at Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, Lahore, and U.P. But even at the time of the Sixth Comintern Congress in 1928 there were only few members and hardly any organisation. Roy's activities were hampered by many factors—by the efforts of other Indian revolutionaries in exile to undermine his position, by the manoeuvrings of the British Communist party for control of the Indian communist movement, by the enormous difficulties of communication and the regular interception by the Indian Intelligence Service of the funds and instructions sent to India, and most of all by the extraordinary ambiguity in official Comintern policy vis-à-vis the colonies. The Second Congress had adopted two virtually contradictory theses on the colonial question, the first formulated by Lenin, and the second by Roy; and till the Sixth Congress neither was officially repudiated, which resulted in much confusion.

Nevertheless, study of contemporary records and of the many accounts of the period published in recent years, clearly indicates that the impact of Roy's writings on the Indian intelligentsia, both directly and indirectly, was much wider and deeper than might be inferred from the slow growth of the CPI in the twenties. They left their mark on groups of liberal Congressmen, who were dissatisfied with Gandhi's obscurantism, on those nationalist revolutionaries who dreamt of complete independence and who, largely because of their introduction to communist ideas, began

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to demand not only the end of foreign rule but also of indigenous economic and social exploitation, on the newly developing trade union movement, and on several influential newspapers and periodicals (like *Amritabazar Patrika* and *Atmasakti* in Calcutta, *Independent* in Allahabad, *Induprakash* in Bombay, *Navajug* in Guntur, *Hindu* in Madras, etc.). Largely under the inspiration of these writings a Labour Swaraj party was founded in Calcutta in 1925 which brought out a vernacular weekly, *Langal*, and which transformed itself the following year into the Workers' and Peasants' party of Bengal.

The impact of the new ideas on the non-political section of the intelligentsia, especially on the writers, was even more profound and extensive. The Indian literary tradition had for many centuries been idealist, formal, and religious, and (barring a few folk-tales and ballads, which before the present century had remained largely oral and unwritten), devoted almost exclusively to gods, incarnations, holy men, and members of the upper castes and privileged classes. It reflected the *weltanschauung* of a closed and stratified society which had also created a wide gulf between the written and the spoken language, and which had prevented the rise of any prose literature in the Indian vernacular languages. Contact with the West and the introduction to European literature inspired the first revolt against this tradition in some of the Indian languages in the 19th century, but for reasons already mentioned the new Indian liberals were soon forced to retreat. The creative imagination of Indian writers, now roused from long slumber, felt starved and stifled. Even the most talented among them found it beyond their personal competence to break the overpowering spell of tradition.

AFTER the first world war this sense of futility was greatly enhanced by the spectacular mass movement launched by Gandhi. But Gandhi's populism was markedly anti-intellectual; it sanctified tradition and positively discouraged independent explorations. It was at this point that communism entered the Indian scene with an alternative ideology of populism which was emphatically secular, and it naturally appealed to those Indian writers who had been hungering for freedom from ancient stranglehholds. Its liberating impact was shown in the growing interest of novelists and short story writers in the lives of peasants, workers, artisans, village craftsmen, or persons belonging to the lowest strata in the caste hierarchy, or even the long neglected Muslim community, and in the consequent expansion of the area of their explorations; in the recoil from ideal human types and rules of propriety in favour of uncompromising realism in the portrayal of characters and situations; in the rejection of the traditional Hindu view of women either as goddesses or as the source of sinfulness and every suffering, and in the first earnest efforts to grapple with the reality of sex; in the emancipation of poetry from religious themes and mystic symbolisms, and in heightened perception of the bio-social aspects of human emotions; in radical satires on orthodoxy, bureaucracy, and on the native trading and business communities; in the spirit of internationalism; and finally in the persistent and widespread endeavour to fuse the stratified levels of the literary language and the conversational by freely drawing upon spoken idioms, slang, dialect, and the racy profanities of the culturally dispossessed. The beginnings of nearly all these developments might be traced, and quite justifiably, to the earlier phase when European liberalism had impinged for the first time on tradition-bound India; but it was during the interwar decades that they assumed the proportions of a genuine literary revolution.

Communist influence was for some time indirect, and few of these modern Indian writers became members of the CPI. While they were deeply moved by the new ideas, they were not called upon to justify every communist dogma or to defend every shift in the party line. The CPI possessed neither the organisational strength nor the cohesion to make that attempt. Not till the forties did it try to impose doctrinal discipline on writers sympathetic to communism. During the interwar decades communism played, on the whole, a liberating role in Indian literature. The point can be amply illustrated, but for the purpose of this essay it should suffice to mention a few representative instances. Thus, in Bengal, two major literary movements, one in the twenties and the other in the thirties, centred respectively on the periodicals *Kallol* and *Parichaya*, were very fruitfully influenced by

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communism but had no relation with the CPI. (In the forties, *Parichaya* changed hands and degenerated into an organ of propaganda.) The same is true of many of the most prominent creative writers in Bengali of this period: Nazrul Islam, Sailaja Mukherjee, Premendra Mitra, Sivaram Chakrabarti, Manik Banerjee, or Bishnu Dey, for example. Even Tagore and Saratchandra Chatterjee, the two most gifted Bengali writers of this century, were not altogether unaffected. There were similar movements in some of the other Indian literatures (e.g., purogamana vadam in Malayalam, Kerala; pragativad in Hindi, etc.); and quite a number of really talented writers in various Indian languages who genuinely profited (though only temporarily) from the impact of communism (e.g., Vallathol, Sankara Kurup, Srirangam Srinivasa Rao, Josh Malihabadi, Sachi Rautray, etc.).

Communism, of course, did not remain for long a liberating force in Indian literature. As the world communist movement under Russian control became increasingly more centralised and as the Indian CP grew in strength and organisation, its totalitarian and dogmatic character began to repel the writer's imagination. The caste-prototype came in the end to be replaced not by unique and multi-dimensional human beings but by an even more rigid class-prototype. Communist realism, after a while, revealed itself as a blind and tyrannical variety of idealism which would force the totality of existence into preconceived moulds and proscribe any kind of independent exploration. Its propagandist obsessions were fatal to lyricism, style, and objectivity.

The transformation of communism from a liberating to a strangulating force in Indian literature has become increasingly obvious in the course of the last two decades. But while this has led a few writers of integrity (like the Prayogavadis in Hindi or the humanists in Bengal) to discard communism and to experiment in new directions, the great majority of the young generation of writers (especially in the coastal states of India) do not appear to have perceived the deadly significance of this change. Frustrated in their aspirations, they have no confidence in their creative individuality. Communism continues to fascinate them with its illusory promise of power; they must be 'with the people' and 'on the winning side of history'.

COMMUNISM in India had its first major setback between 1928 and 1934. The sudden shift to an extreme sectarian line at the Sixth CI Congress, Roy's break with the Comintern, the arrest of nearly all the Indian communist leaders, Gandhi's civil disobedience campaign—all these resulted in temporary disorganisation. The adoption of popular front tactics at the seventh Comintern congress in 1935, however, re-opened opportunities which Indian communists did not fail to utilise. Between 1935 and 1942 communists in India not only built up a strong party organisation; by forming various associations of students, writers, journalists, lawyers, teachers, etc., they rapidly extended their influence on the Indian intelligentsia. They also partially rehabilitated themselves in the peasant and the trade union movements. During the later thirties highly enthusiastic and generally inflated accounts of the achievements of the Soviet first five-year plan began to reach India and were widely displayed in the Indian press. What impressed the Indian intelligentsia most was the legend that Russia, from being an economically and culturally backward country like India, had become, under communist leadership, almost overnight one of the most advanced and prosperous countries of the world. The belief grew that India, by adopting communism, would be able to perform the same miracle. Most educated Indians were totally unaware of the Stalinist reign of terror, and those who did know preferred to explain it away as a passing phase.

In 1942 communism in India was plunged into a severe crisis when, after Hitler's attack on Russia, the CPI decided to support the British war effort, trying to compensate for the loss in public support which this entailed by greater organisational discipline, intense ideological indoctrination, and tremendous propaganda activity. After the war the CPI sought to regain popular favour by advocating a national front of all anti-imperialist forces. But it was not until 1949 that the CPI was rescued from the doldrums by the spectacular coming to power of the Communist Party in China. From the mid-thirties the Indian intelligentsia had been watching with sympathy and admiration the struggle of the

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Chinese people against the Japanese. During World War II the leadership of the struggle passed from the Chinese nationalists to the Chinese communists. After the war the communists appeared to most people as the real liberators of China from Japanese imperialism. Their aggressive anti-western attitude also raised them in the esteem of the 'progressive' intelligentsia in the neighbouring countries. While the Stalin-Tito exchanges had shocked many Indian admirers of communism by their exposure of Soviet neo-imperialism, Chinese communists appeared to have preserved their anti-imperialist character.

During the fifties Russian prestige suffered further decline thanks to the naked struggle for succession which followed Stalin's death; it was even more badly hit by Khrushchev's revelations at the 20th congress of the CPSU, and later by the brutal repression of the nationalist uprising in Hungary. The CPI itself was badly shaken by these developments. That neither growing disappointment with the Soviet Union nor domestic organisational confusion (recorded in the secret report of the Palghat Congress of the CPI in 1956) did not more deeply prejudice communist influence on the Indian intelligentsia was due primarily to the growing prestige of communist China. Her part in the Korean War was taken by most educated Indians as proof of her military prowess, which appealed to their deep-seated pan-Asianism, characteristic of their recoil from the West from the beginning of this century.

Moreover, the points of similarity between India and China are far more numerous and striking than between India and Russia. In the antiquity of its civilization and the consequent deadweight of tradition, in the bitter memory of exploitation and humiliation by Western Powers, in the vastness of area and population and the pressing task of rapidly industrialising an essentially agricultural economy, India resembled China more closely than possibly any other country in the world. Apart from communist propaganda, these points are insistently underlined by Mr Nehru and his colleagues, who also exhort Indian intellectuals to remember the ancient cultural traffic between the two countries. Cordial relations between the two governments have greatly facilitated the importation of Chinese propaganda literature and the regular exchange of cultural delegations. The Indian intelligentsia, dissatisfied with the unavoidably slow rate of improvement in their national economy, listen with willing credulity to tales of spectacular economic developments in the neighbouring country. Success is naturally credited to the ideology of communism, in the acceptance and application of which the Chinese appear to be more thorough than the Russians themselves.

Thus, although in the top leadership of the CPI the pro-Russian section is still quite strong, among rank-and-file communists and (what is more significant) among the general body of the disaffected Indian intelligentsia, communist China would appear over the last ten years to be gradually usurping the role of mentor from the Russians. This is reflected in the news items, editorials, and feature articles in the vernacular newspapers, in meetings and discussions among students, teachers, lawyers, and journalists, in the books and pamphlets and translations from foreign languages. There is now in India far greater curiosity and publicity about the progress of agrarian revolution in China (especially the 'commune' experiment) than about the Soviet seven-year plan. Despite the Russian setback, therefore, communism continues to be a growing influence in India.

This, of course, does not mean that Russia has suffered anything like a complete eclipse in India. The USSR may no longer be the principal guide of Indian intellectuals in communist theory and practice, but since nearly all Indian intellectuals are at heart nationalists, they feel genuinely grateful to Russia for her tactical support of the Indian position on Kashmir and for her hostile attitude to Pakistan. The extremely favourable terms of her technical and economic assistance to India have also helped to tone down the Indian reaction to events in Eastern Europe. And the vast amount of beautifully produced literature at incredibly cheap prices with which she has been flooding the Indian market is an almost irresistible bait to educated Indians starved for reading matter.

INTERNAL developments in India since independence have also been generally favourable to the spread of communism among the educated. The two five-year plans have brought some improvement (though nothing spectacular)

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in the conditions of Indian peasants and industrial workers. But they have also tended to pauperise the educated lower middle class. Squeezed between inflation (inevitable in a developing economy) and an income which is virtually fixed (and which has never been sufficient even for their most essential needs), they now face extinction. Moreover, accent on rapid industrialisation has greatly reduced the importance and social usefulness of persons educated in the humanities, while opportunities of technical training continue to be extremely limited. It is hardly surprising that Indians possessing a liberal education but no private means should turn to communism as their only hope of radical change.

Moreover, the main trend of development in India since independence has been towards greater centralisation of power and responsibility in the hands of the state in the name of economic improvement and social justice, and if centralisation is really essential for the rapid economic and social development of a backward country, then what ideology is more thoroughly and consistently centralist than communism as practised in China and Russia?

Does it then mean that the eventual triumph of communism in India is more or less assured? That dismal possibility can not, of course, be ruled out; but there are also a number of powerful counteracting factors. The appeal of communism in India is still limited primarily to persons having western education who, though influential, are few. The peasantry remains by and large tradition-bound, and a very considerable section of organised labour is under the leadership of the anti-communist INTUC. The strength of the militant Hindu organisations of Northern and Central India is certainly not negligible. The Praja Socialist party, though lacking in cohesion and leadership, still commands a not insignificant following. The Congress Party is committed to the democratic constitution. With a little more efficiency and less corruption, and a more generous measure of financial and technical assistance from the Western nations, the present Indian government can achieve considerable social and economic improvement without rejecting democratic norms.

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Bitter Rice in Viet Minh

HO CHI MINH AND THE INTELLECTUALS

P. J. Honey

OPPOSITION to the existing regime by intellectuals has been a feature of a number of communist countries during the course of the past few years. The root cause is not difficult to identify: The modern state, whether it is communist, democratic, or anything else, needs to have a well educated intelligentsia if it is to function, and highly educated people must be granted a certain measure of intellectual freedom if they are to be of use to the state. But when this freedom is granted by a communist state, some of the intellectuals inevitably begin, sooner or later, to question communist theory and practice. This phenomenon has been visible in countries as different as Vietnam and Hungary, but although the underlying cause is the same in all communist states, the circumstances leading to the outbreak of opposition, and the treatment of that opposition by the communist authorities have differed from country to country. In order fully to understand the conflict between the North Vietnamese intellectuals and the communist regime there, it is first necessary to know something about the background of communism in Vietnam.

At the outbreak of the second World War, the only well organised political party in Vietnam was the Communist Party, which was used by the Allies to provide intelligence about the Japanese in Indo-China, and which was supplied with arms in the hope that it would carry on an effective guerrilla war against them. In the event, that party did supply some intelligence information but, with the exception of one or two isolated and small-scale attacks made to impress the Allies, it took no military action against the Japanese. The arms were being stored for use against France and the other Vietnamese nationalist parties in the independence struggle which most Vietnamese knew was soon to come. During the independence war the communists seized control of the national resistance movement, setting up an ostensibly all-party front, the Viet-Nam Doc-Lap Dong-Minh Hoi (League for the Independence of Vietnam) or, more briefly, Viet Minh,[1] which was completely dominated by the communists.

As a result of the Geneva agreements, signed in the summer of 1954, Vietnam was divided into two halves, the northern half being given to the communists to govern, and the southern half to non-communist nationalists. At that time, communist prestige in Vietnam was at its peak as a result of the major military victory at Dien Bien Phu and the granting of complete and unqualified independence to Vietnam. The Viet Minh communists took over the whole of North Vietnam in 1955, but even at that early date about a million refugees fled to the non-communist south, while only a few thousand, mostly Viet Minh soldiers, went to the north.

The Geneva agreements, which ended the war in Indo-China and divided Vietnam in two, contained an unsigned 'Declaration of Intent' which laid down that the two halves of Vietnam should be reunited by means of free national elections to be held on 20 July 1956. Since the Viet Minh, throughout the whole of the war, had pledged themselves to continue the struggle until they had liberated the whole of Vietnam, and since, under strong pressure from Russia and China, they had nevertheless signed the Geneva agreements while the French still held South Vietnam, the Viet Minh, as explanation for their change of policy, declared that they had ended the war early so as to avoid unnecessary bloodshed, but in the sure knowledge that the country would be reunited under their leadership after the elections. It is in fact unlikely that the Viet Minh really believed that elections would be held; this was the impression gained by some Vietnamese at Geneva from conversations with the Viet Minh delegation, but their propaganda continued to inform the people of North Vietnam that the elections would

[1] Although Viet Minh no longer exists, I have used the term from time to time in this article to refer to the Vietnamese communists, since it will be more familiar to readers than the more correct Viet Cong.

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take place, and many in the north accepted with patience the disagreeable measures of the communist regime in the hope that there would be a different government of reunified Vietnam after the elections.

One of the earliest Viet Minh undertakings after they assumed control of North Vietnam was the completion of the agrarian reforms. This was carried through with extreme ruthlessness and ferocity. Tens of thousands of completely innocent Vietnamese were classified as landlords—most of the landlords had, in fact, already fled to South Vietnam—and were executed after the farce of trial by people's courts. So appalling was the conduct of this campaign that the communist government was later obliged to carry out a 'Correction of Errors' campaign to redress, in some measure, the terrible wrongs committed. Truong Chinh, the man responsible for the campaign, was then demoted and some of the agrarian reform cadres were punished. But the damage had already been done, and there was no way of restoring to life the tens of thousands of corpses.

WHEN 20 July 1956 came and went without any national elections, the people of North Vietnam realised for the first time that they were destined to be ruled by a communist regime for an indefinite period, and that their country had become simply another satellite state. Resentment and despair flared out in peasant revolts and disorders, such as that at Quynh-Luu, but these were crushed with much bloodshed. This was the situation in North Vietnam when a group of intellectuals, writers, artists, poets, and university professors, began their revolt.

Immediately after its accession to power, the communist government had despatched large numbers of intellectuals to army camps, factories, production units, and so on, where they were placed under the supervision of uneducated but trusted members of the communist party and were made to write specified propaganda pieces couched in the usual communist jargon. The officially sponsored Arts and Letters Association, whose function is to control literary and artistic work, remained in the capital, Hanoi, thus losing touch with most of the writers, and itself became a hotbed of intrigue and incompetence. All literary works produced during this early period were so disfigured by the enforced adoption of communist formalism as to be virtually unreadable. The newspaper *Nhan Van* (The Humanities) deplored 'the use of slogans to replace the description of human life' (30 September 1956).

In August 1956, 300 writers and artists attended a study meeting organised by the Arts and Letters Association. At first, this was no different from any of the previous meetings, but soon the whole atmosphere changed and the participants began to criticise. The meeting made five demands which it put to the National Congress of Arts and Letters. Among these demands was one calling for greater freedom, and for the immediate publication and application of Mao's Hundred Flowers policy. For a short time nothing happened; then the officers of the Arts and Letters Association who had been criticised began a public self-criticism, and the permanent committee of the Association undertook to correct its past mistakes.

In September, a new newspaper appeared in Hanoi. It was called *Nhan Van* (The Humanities) and its editor was Phan Khoi, a well known journalist of independent views who had been imprisoned for years by the French colonial authorities. Its tone was openly critical of the Government and the Party, and the very first issue contained a vigorous article on the Tran Dan[2] affair as well as an attack on the Arts and Letters Association leadership. Not unnaturally, this new paper was immediately attacked by the Communist Party newspaper *Nhan Dan* (The People), but the first important blow had been struck and support came from many quarters. The semi-official Hanoi newspaper *Thoi Moi* (New Times) praised *Nhan Van* and went on to advocate the freedom of the press. The students of Hanoi University welcomed the new freedom and complained vociferously about former restrictions. It was clear that a new spirit was abroad in North Vietnam.

The second issue of *Nhan Van* was even more outspoken than the first, and was again attacked by the Party newspaper, but it was sold out on the day of publication and its circulation was limited only by its rationed supply of newsprint. Moreover, other papers such as *Giai Pham Mua*

[2] Tran Dan was a poet who was criticised by the communists for one of his poems and sent to a re-education camp where he was brutally tortured.

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Thu (Autumn Literary Works) and *Tram Hoa* (Hundred Flowers) were also publishing criticisms, and the public was snapping them up eagerly from the news-stands. The implications were too compelling to be ignored. During the month of October 1956 a succession of meetings took place, of the Party Central Committee, the cabinet, and the Central Military Committee, and the outcome of all these was the decision to make the Central Land Reform Committee the scapegoat. Truong Chinh, the Secretary-General of the Party, resigned his position and made a public self-criticism. This, in itself, seemed to vindicate the writers of *Nhan Van*, for they had criticised very severely the mistakes and the brutalities of the agrarian reforms.

The Party attempts to stifle *Nhan Van* were not only clumsy and ineffective but were also described in full and denounced by the paper itself. An official of the Press Office tried to persuade the editor of *Tram Hoa* to publish an article attacking *Nhan Van*, offering him money, but the offer was turned down and a report about it was sent to the editor of *Nhan Van*.

IT was at this time that the tenor of the articles began to change. What had begun as a movement for intellectual freedom was fast developing into a movement for political freedom, a vastly more dangerous commodity in the eyes of the communists. The Party decided to despatch the editor, Phan Khoi, to China, to represent North Vietnam at the 20th anniversary celebrations of the Chinese poet Lu Hsun, and the editorial chair was handed over to Tran Duy. This latter proved to be still more intransigent than his predecessor, and he launched an outspoken attack on those who were creating difficulties for *Nhan Van*; the struggle for freedom, he said, 'will be impeded, if not completely blocked, by the vicious and backward elements now in power'. It was a new experience for the regular Party hacks to find that their attacks, published in the Party newspaper, were not only producing no effect, but were ably answered in print and made to look ridiculous.

Nor was this criticism restricted to the newspapers. It was making itself felt in the universities and schools, at the Hanoi meetings of the People's Congress, at meetings of the Fatherland Front Organisation, and so on. One of the most devastating attacks on the Party leadership ever made in a communist state was the speech delivered by the lawyer Nguyen Manh Tuong at the National Congress of the Fatherland Front held in Hanoi on 30 October 1956.[3] The intellectuals were carrying the fight into the Party's own territory, and the Party leaders appeared to be unwilling to stop them.

Then, in December 1956, they struck back. The Central Press Office first issued a veiled warning by taking disciplinary action against *Nhan Van* for a trifling procedural error. When no heed was taken of this, hurriedly organised complaints and petitions from printing workers and other groups demanded the suppression of the paper, with the result that, on 18 December, the President of the Executive Committee issued a decree suspending publication of *Nhan Van* and making it illegal to circulate old copies. Four days earlier, President Ho Chi Minh himself had signed a decree which was an unmistakable warning to the press that it must do precisely what the Party wanted, or be prepared to accept the unpleasant consequences. It is worth citing briefly some of the provisions of this decree which, although it began with the statement that 'All the press enjoys liberty of expression', later enumerated a list of prohibitions. Among the things the press was forbidden to do were 'to carry out propaganda against Government laws', 'to persuade the people to disobey or to oppose the Government laws or its political line', and 'to publish articles aimed at opposing the people's democratic regime and the people's power.' On the positive side, article 3 of the decree bluntly laid it down that the press was to be an instrument for 'instructing the people and mobilising them to carry out Government policy'.

The offending *Nhan Van* had been suppressed and was no longer publishing criticisms of the regime; but what was to be done with the writers who had produced it, and with the large number of educated people who supported the views it expressed? The Party newspaper *Nhan Dan* stated the problem frankly in the course of an article published in its issue of 13 December 1956. 'It is impossible', it wrote, 'to build socialism without the intellectuals . . . Three

[3] A full English translation of this speech may be found in *The New Class in Viet Nam*, by Hoang Van Chi.

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workmen cannot do the work of one engineer, nor all the nurses in a hospital replace one doctor.' Unable to throw all these intellectuals into prison, or to execute them, the Vietnamese communists decided to re-educate them by subjecting them to propaganda and to courses of lectures on democratic dictatorship. At the same time as this re-education was going on, their past writings and their ideas were subjected to continual attacks. But even after this new campaign had opened, their ideas were still being voiced by the people who had been influenced by them. After a lecture by the Rector of Hanoi University, Ho Dac Diem, on 10 January 1957, he was asked by the audience to explain why there was no opposition party in North Vietnam.

Nevertheless, with the suppression of *Nhan Van*, the political surface of North Vietnam appeared less ruffled, although the currents of opposition continued to flow with undiminished force beneath. The Party was unhappy without a literary paper, one of the essentials of any communist state, and set to work to devise a successor which could be relied upon not to cause any trouble. The result was *Van* (Literature), which made its first appearance on 10 May 1957. The fact that all members of its editorial board were fervent supporters of the Communist Party was regarded as a sufficient guarantee of its harmlessness, and the Party's confidence was not misplaced. The paper caused the regime no political worries, but one unforeseen defect soon made itself apparent. It was so uniformly dull that nobody would read it. Even the Party, to which the editorial board was so loyal, became dissatisfied with *Van*. The September issue of the publication *Hoc Tap* (Study) attacked it, writing that 'throughout its first ten issues the spirit of the paper *Van* has remained low'. Nettled by this, the editorial board of *Van* published a furious reply, completely rejecting the criticism. But it was clear to all that new blood would have to be introduced if *Van* were to survive.

IN a desperate effort to save the magazine, the Party invited some members of the Nhan Van Giai Pham group, the name by which the critics who had earlier attacked the regime were now known, to help to make the publication more interesting. These men, it was argued, might be politically unreliable, but at least people liked to read what they wrote, and in any case they had, by then, been subjected to a long period of re-education. Whatever education had been given to them soon proved to be ineffective, for they quickly resumed their attacks on the Arts and Letters Association, the Party, the regime, and all their previous targets. The issue of *Van* for 29 November 1957 published a cartoon by Tran Duy, satirising the Arts and Letters Association. This produced an attack from *Nhan Dan*, which called it 'distorted, sabotaging propaganda', and it led to Tran Duy's arrest. (He was released shortly after.) Phan Khoi rejoined the fray with an allegorical story, 'Ong Nam Chuot' (Mr Five Mice), written in a style reminiscent of George Orwell, which was published on 10 January 1958. This was followed in the next week's issue by a story written by Minh Hoang entitled 'Dong May' (A Heap of Machines), which attacked incompetence, corruption, and waste, and contrasted the wretched living conditions of the Vietnamese workers with the luxury enjoyed by the Party officials and the foreign communist advisers.

There was no difficulty in finding readers for *Van* while it continued to publish material such as this. However, violent counter-attacks by the Party appeared in *Thoi Moi*, *Nhan Dan*, and *Quan Doi Nhan Dan* (The People's Army), in which Phan Khoi was accused of a wide variety of crimes, and *Van* was alleged to be reproducing the views of the suppressed *Nhan Van*. The most interesting feature of this exchange was that Tran Thanh Mai, a member of the Executive Committee of the Writers' Association, who had always been a staunch Party supporter, defended Phan Khoi in an article which he wrote for *Thoi Moi*. But the end was inevitable, as it had been earlier in the case of *Nhan Van*. On 17 January 1958 it was officially announced that the publication of *Van* was temporarily suspended because of reorganisation. This was followed on 6 February by an announcement from the Arts and Letters Association to the effect that the special number of *Van* for the Chinese New Year would not appear as promised. Since that time, *Van* has never reappeared.

After the closing of *Van*, the Party increased its attacks on the recalcitrant intellectuals, and a number of them were arrested. In its issues of 2 and 12 March 1958, *Nhan Dan* published two

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pieces of self-criticism by contributors to the now defunct *Van*, and shortly afterwards published a long article entitled 'Revisionism in Arts and Letters'. Three people came under fire in this article, Phan Khoi, Tran Duy, and Nguyen Huu Dang, who had been a member of the editorial board of *Nhan Van*. This article was published to coincide with the conference of 300 artists and writers from all parts of North Vietnam which was meeting to discuss the Moscow Declaration and Peace Manifesto, and also the tasks to be faced in 'the new stage of Vietnam's revolution'. Summing up the results of this conference in its issue of 13 April 1958, *Nhan Dan* said that it was time to 'unmask before the masses' the activities of the Nhan Van Giai Pham 'sabotage group'. It also announced the arrest of three members of the group, Nguyen Huu Dang, Tran Thai Bao, the publisher of *Giai Pham Mua Thu*, and a woman named Thuy An.

In fact, during the months of April and May, 1958, not a single day went by without newspaper attacks upon the Nhan Van Giai Pham group collectively, or upon individual members of the group. The campaign was run along all too familiar lines. There were the usual 'revelations' by former friends and acquaintances, the allegations that members of the group led lives of debauchery, and the customary crop of readers letters demanding that the group should be exposed and punished. What the campaign did reveal was the very wide influence exercised by these intellectuals in North Vietnam. The following are a few brief extracts from newspapers published at that time which are, I think, self-explanatory and require no comment:

Thu Do (The Capital), 11 April 1958: 'Student circles have been greatly contaminated by the venom of the Nhan Van Giai Pham group's ideas.'

Nhan Dan, 28 April 1958: 'After graduation, students dispersed throughout the country and became primary schoolteachers, keeping in their minds the venomous and reactionary ideas of the Nhan Van Giai Pham group. The authorities in rural areas have been faced with very many difficulties caused by the pernicious influence of the group.'

Nhan Dan, 29 April 1958: 'A number of schoolboys, too, claimed freedom in their school. They considered their school life to be like that of fishes in a tin.'

Nhan Dan, 29 April 1958: 'Copies of *Giai Pham* were used as text books in schools.'

PARTY leaders appear to have despaired of the older intellectuals and to be pinning their hopes on the younger students now in the schools and the universities. At the second National Congress of Students in Hanoi, the importance of which may be gauged from the fact that it was addressed by Prime Minister Pham Van Dong and President Ho Chi Minh, the Minister of Education stated that the 'duty of universities is to train working class intellectuals who will be loyal to socialism'. The older intellectuals are still under fire, subjected to still more re-education. Severe pressure was obviously exerted upon the Writers' Association Conference held in April 1958. Several members of the Nhan Van Giai Pham group were summoned to attend, including Tran Dan and Hoang Cam, who were said to have 'confessed about themselves, about the ringleaders, and about the other members of the group'. At the end of the conference a letter was sent to the Central Committee of the Party in which the writers pledged themselves to follow the Party's policy in literature and art, and to 'serve more efficiently the rule of the revolution in this new phase'.

Hoc Tap (*Study*), in its issue of April 1958, advocated that intellectuals should be sent among the masses to perform manual labour. 'Our duty is not only to eliminate the bad seeds, but also to rehabilitate the fields.' It suggested that this might be accomplished by drawing up two plans. The first of these would be to 'encourage writers and artists to go to the bases of production, to visit workers, farmers, and soldiers, and, if possible, to take part in their labour so that the writers and artists may be closer to reality and to the people'. The second plan would 'organise classes for artists and writers so that they may regularly study current events and policies, improve their knowledge of Marxism-Leninism, and systematically reform their thoughts'.

May 1958 saw the opening of a five-month study course in Hanoi, attended by many prominent persons, and similar courses were held in the other cities and provinces. May also saw

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a literary event which was becoming all too familiar in North Vietnam, the publication of a new literary paper to replace the one which had been suppressed. This new paper is called *Van Hoc* (Literary Studies), and appears every ten days. Its editor is Nguyen Dinh Thi, the Secretary-General of the Writers' Association and a safe Party man, who achieved considerable prestige in North Vietnam, if not in Russia, when he addressed the Union of Soviet Writers in 1955 on the subject of 'The Progressive Literature of Vietnam'. The temptation to speculate how long it will be before *Van Hoc*, too, is suppressed is almost irresistible.

Hoc Tap's suggestion was taken up on 4 June 1958 by the Writers' and Artists' Union, which passed a resolution urging writers and artists to 'go to the masses of workers, peasants, and soldiers'. This was endorsed, on 6 June, by a further 800 writers and artists who were only just in time, because an official announcement on 9 June read: 'Beginning on 1 August 1958, all cultural workers at all levels throughout North Vietnam will take turns in going to the countryside, factories, mines, and army units, to perform manual work and to study the practical life of the people.' The term 'cultural workers' embraced more categories of people than just the writers and artists, for it was announced on 17 June that 300 actors and actresses from state theatres would be going to the countryside, and two days later the Deputy Minister of Culture said that between a quarter and a half of the Ministry's leading personnel would perform manual labour 'to improve the Ministry's future work through practical experience'.

The reform of education has been undertaken with no less vigour. On 17 June 1958, Hanoi Radio announced that schools must be reorganised to give priority to political education and productive labour, and the teaching staff rearranged to give loyal Party members the key posts in education. Teaching staffs were to be required to take part in public self-criticism following 'a conscience hour, during which they must sit motionless and examine themselves for anti-socialist thoughts and actions'. A political course opened in Hanoi for over 1,100 primary schoolteachers on 11 July, followed on 24 July by a similar course attended by over 3,000 junior and senior secondary school teachers. *Thu Do* (22 July 1958) proclaimed that a reallocation of school places was taking place, in the hope that 'enlightened socialist workers will emerge'. Priority was to be given to the 'children of famous patriots, labour heroes, army heroes, outstanding workers and servicemen, poverty-stricken peasants, coolies, etc.'

AN echo of the earlier spirited press battles was heard in *Hoc Tap* (August 1958) in an article vigorously attacking the literary critic Nguyen Thanh Long. This critic had praised the novel *Being About to Get Married*, and had described it as a 'most successful work'. The novel criticises the conduct of the agrarian reforms, and contains passages such as the following: 'There are so many families still suffering injustices because there are so many people, like us, who did not dare, during the recent troubled period, to stand up and speak in defence of justice'. The author of the novel, Vu Bao, has been hailed in South Vietnam as the 'Vietnamese Pasternak'.

The results so far of the effort to reform the intellectuals through labour among the masses do not appear to have satisfied the Party leadership. At any rate, at a meeting held in October 1958, the writers and artists themselves were said to have 'voted unanimously' to extend their stay by three months and to work harder 'so as to enter into the realities of life more deeply'. More and more of the intelligentsia are being sent out of the cities to work in the countryside. On 13 November 1958 it was announced in Hanoi that 1,300 professors and students of the Hanoi Medical and Pharmaceutical College had left the capital for the province of Haiduong to take part in rice cultivation and other labours of the countryside.

For the past six months, virtually nothing has been heard from the intellectual critics of the communist regime in North Vietnam. They are engaged on their enforced labour in the country. 'Socialist Realism' is being vigorously imposed upon literature and art, and this has now come to be regarded by the regime as 'vigilance against the Rightists'. The October 1958 issue of *Hoc Tap* went even further and argued that China's 'forward leap' could be undertaken only because the 'Rightists' had first been eliminated and the

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The Year the Flowers Withered

RE-EDUCATING THE LITERATI

Merle R. Goldman

THE Chinese communist treatment of intellectuals has shown a constantly shifting combination of two contrasting policies, a drive to mobilise intellectuals for work and a drive to reform them. Since the intellectuals are indispensable for China's modernisation, it has been necessary to make use of their skills, and since a new generation of intellectuals could not be cultivated overnight, the older intellectuals had to provide for current needs, for the education of the younger generation, for the propagation of party policy through cultural media. Prior to and directly after the consolidation of communist power, the intellectuals enjoyed a certain latitude. In 1951 the first nation-wide drive for ideological conformity was launched, aimed particularly at Western-educated professors. From 1953 to 1955 the campaign to enforce stricter orthodoxy took on wider dimensions. It began with an attack on Yu Ping-Po's critique of *A Dream of the Red Chamber* and ended with an onslaught on Hu Feng's heterodox literary views. However tortuous the course, one theme was constant, that the function of culture was to serve the party and the construction of socialism.

Throughout 1956 and the first half of 1957, the Chinese communists, in the belief that they could make fuller use of their professional people, scientists, and technicians by inspiring more willing co-operation, embarked on a policy of limited liberalisation and relaxation. The party's decision was related to crises in many areas of China's economy and the plans to accelerate the pace of modernization. Support of the intellectuals was essential to China's immediate problems and was given in anticipation of the greater demands to be made on their talents. It was apparently believed that the earlier drives on the ideological front had resulted in a changed intellectual outlook, and the regime felt secure enough to permit some intellectual freedom. This, it was hoped, would stimulate industrial progress, and at the same time, while providing a safe outlet for the expression of discontent, would also bring unhealthy ideas out into the open. The forcible method of transforming bourgeois intellectuals into proletarian intellectuals was rejected in favour of persuasion and ideological re-education.

Several speeches throughout the period, particularly those of Chou En-lai on 4 January 1956, and Mao Tse-tung on 2 May 1956, plus numerous press statements, set the stage for the campaign. Taken as a whole, these pronouncements asserted that the passivity and increasing isolation of the intellectuals were due to unreasonable features in their treatment. To harness their minds and energies for the cause of socialist construction they should be given freedom for independent, creative thinking, and the right to adhere to or reserve their opinions. Ideas, not men, were to be criticised. Intellectuals were to be given the opportunity to air their grievances and criticise the party where it was guilty of bureaucratism, sectarianism, and subjectivism. Since strict orthodoxy was no longer demanded, non-party members were not to be excluded from work on political grounds. Simultaneously certain material incentives were offered, such as a more rational system of promotion, less teaching, fewer compulsory political activities, and higher social standing.

The speech of Lu Ting-i, Vice-Minister of Propaganda, on 26 May 1956, further defined the form this new policy was to take in the academic field. He admitted that rigid adherence to Marxism-Leninism and regimentation promoted intellectual sterility. History had shown that unless independent thinking was encouraged, academic life stagnated. Though the arts, social sciences, and science were connected with politics, it was wrong to equate them with politics. He therefore recommended more independent thinking in various fields, particularly science and literature. For example, although literature must continue to serve the workers and peasants, there might be alterna-

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tives to the forms of socialist realism. Literary values could now be determined by mutual competition and free discussion.

FROM the first, however, this movement, which came to be called the Hundred Flowers, abounded with contradictions which gave the relaxation of control an equivocal character. While permitting greater freedom of discussion and study, the Communist Party at the same time sought to impose its will and to wipe out harmful ideas, although in more subtle ways than hitherto. The campaign itself was used as a means of further indoctrination. Since party personnel continued to occupy strategic positions, decisions in all domains still were the prerogative of the political leadership. Though Mao called for a society which included dissenting groups, it was still to be dominated by the Communist Party, which in the end would win these groups over by ideological argument. Dissent was to be disposed of by the formula of thesis, antithesis and synthesis. Errors and contradictions were to be eliminated by the process of discussion and pressure. Although university courses were expanded to include so-called Western subjects, the aim of studying Keynes or Bertrand Russell, for example, was to deepen the understanding of bourgeois economics and idealism and so to be able to criticise them more forcibly, and those teaching these subjects were to deal with them on Marxist lines and to stand firmly on the side of the proletariat.

Because of the contradictory and undefined nature of this new freedom, intellectuals were slow to participate. Guided by past experience, many of them feared that the movement was designed not so much to enrich culture and science as to investigate minds. The tentative nature of their response in 1956 is believed to have been the reason for Mao's speech of 27 February 1957, in which he called for more vigorous criticism and expounded the theory that contradictions can exist in a communist society. It was the signal for a big expansion of the campaign. Prodded from above, intellectuals and students finally spoke out.

The first public criticisms of the party were mild. They were levelled against some party members for individual bureaucratic acts. Soon the flood of criticism swelled into a series of overt attacks on the party, its doctrines, and some of its basic policies, reaching its crest in May and the beginning of June, 1957. It revealed a deep conflict between the intellectuals and the party and indicated that the party's past efforts to integrate the intellectual into its system had not been successful.

The intellectual's challenge to communist rule rested on the claim that the party was not professionally qualified to guarantee fulfilment of long-range objectives. Intellectuals, old and young, in the party and out, criticised the rigidity of the communist monopoly of power and sought to remove the party's direct control in education, science, the social sciences, and the arts. Typical for the creative arts were the criticisms advanced by members of the film industry. Its output was dismissed as meagre, dull, and lacking in individuality because administrative leadership had been substituted for artistic leadership, and arbitrary decisions imposed without regard for the peculiar nature of artistic expression. Organisational measures and Marxism-Leninism were indispensable in the political sphere, but could not solve the problems of creativity. In almost every academic field the non-academics in charge of higher educational institutions came under fire; they hampered research because they lacked understanding and were unwilling to trust the intellectuals, who were deprived of authority in favour of newcomers from the village. Such criticism clearly had personal as well as ideological roots. For the first time discontent with Soviet interference in China's intellectual life was openly expressed. Chinese scientists deplored the mechanical application of Soviet scientific skills and the emphasis on technical training without solid theoretical foundations. As a constructive proposal, teachers in all academic disciplines suggested that the party and intellectuals share power in the universities and that preference be given to professional talents over political reliability.

THE use of the word counter-revolutionary in an editorial in *The People's Daily* in June 1957, the main organ of the Communist Party, immediately changed the whole atmosphere. An avalanche was set in motion with unexpected speed and violence against leading intellectuals,

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who were labelled rightists. The new movement was meant to serve the dual purpose of discrediting the intellectuals and reaffirming the party's position, repeating the earlier combination of thought reform and the firm imposition of orthodoxy upon the intellectuals, with the emphasis shifting from the first to the second as the movement progressed.

The Hundred Flowers movement was an experiment which got out of control. In attempting to enlarge the rôle of the intellectual, the party opened a channel for demands and dissatisfactions that constituted a challenge to its own competence. The recognition of differences of opinion did not enhance the harmony of Chinese society, but rather the reverse. Mao and his colleagues had misjudged the effectiveness of their earlier reforms. Since free discussion could not be confined to specified areas, the flood of criticism went well beyond the permitted limits. Although most of these intellectuals were only asking for a greater degree of freedom to pursue their own interests, the acceptance of their demands would have undermined the system of controls by which the party maintained its position, and shaken the foundations of the regime itself. The movement towards liberalisation had been impeded by the party cadres. It was they who had been attacked for their failure to trust the intellectuals, and their determination to defend the positions they had won on the basis of political merit was incompatible with the demands of intellectuals for an increased rôle in national affairs by virtue of their abilities.

The abrupt reversal in policy may also have been due in part to China's economic development. The regime was confronted with difficulties arising from lack of experience in planning, but these were attributed largely to the harmful effects of criticism, which weakened the single-minded zeal required for economic construction. It is not unlikely, moreover, that pressure to minimise ideological differences was exerted from Moscow, where the repercussions of autumn 1956 in Eastern Europe were still acutely felt. China, no less than the Soviet Union, was concerned to maintain the solidarity of the communist bloc.

Thus from tolerance and relaxation the Chinese CP turned to persecution and intransigence. The intensity and scope of the campaign indicated the seriousness with which the leadership regarded the opposition. Although the Hundred Flowers movement was said to be continuing, it was now only a formality. Rectification of the Communist Party had developed into rectification of its critics.

SWEEPING attacks were directed against those who had been outspokenly critical and had not whole-heartedly accepted communist leadership. The campaign followed the pattern of earlier thought-reform drives. A few important targets, representative of certain groups, were singled out as instigators, and they and their disciples were summoned to attend meetings and subjected to accusations until they at last confessed. The charges were made by colleagues within the accused's own institution or political group. The majority of those attacked were professors, university students, writers and officials of minor parties, usually western-educated intellectuals. The heaviest fire, however, was directed against rightists within the Communist Party, whose offence was the greatest. One prominent scapegoat was Ting Ling, a famous novelist and party member. Ting was not only an independent thinker but also represented a growing number of trained individuals who had welcomed the communist regime, but had become more and more disillusioned by its ideological rigidity and bureaucratic ways. These intellectuals, who under the Nationalist regime stood well to the left of the Kuomintang and prepared the way for the communists, were now classified as rightists.

The case brought against Ting is more or less typical of those brought against a large and important group of Chinese intellectuals. Her most serious offence was to have detached herself from communist leadership, both in her thoughts and in her actions. She was a revisionist, because although she followed Marxism-Leninism outwardly, she retained the bourgeois belief that culture need not serve political goals and that art and politics were distinct. Arrogance and the desire for personal fame had caused her to disregard party supervision. She had edited a magazine, *Literature*, which became independent of the party, and she had contemplated withdrawal from the

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party-controlled Writers Union. Moreover, Ting's followers had planned to publish a literary periodical without the party's knowledge. All these actions were interpreted as steps towards seizing leadership among the intellectuals, detaching them from the party, and leading them in an all-out attack on the regime.

Another group which came in for severe, if not so sharp reproof, were the students. The large number of students who had staged demonstrations and joined in criticism alarmed the leaders. While they may have realised that intellectuals were chafing under restraint, they were hardly prepared for the indignation shown by the students, who had been among the most enthusiastic supporters of the regime. The reports on students refer repeatedly to the effect of external and internal events over the past year. They had clearly been disturbed by the Polish and Hungarian revolts, for they were reprimanded for failing to understand their significance. They, like their teachers, were charged with the desire to cut themselves off from politics and the discipline of the party.

THE accusations against the intellectuals were true only in part. It appears that they were guilty of a certain independence of thought, but it does not necessarily follow from this that they represented a counter-revolutionary movement. No evidence of an actual conspiracy was uncovered. Statements were taken out of context and past actions emphasized to prove the charges, but the results were not convincing. The accusations against Ting Ling harked back to an article published in 1942 as proof of her present hostility to the party.

In fact the greatest crime of the rightists seems to have been over-zealousness in carrying out party policy, carrying it beyond the limits envisaged. This was considered to show independence of thought, and since independent thinking is regarded as erroneous thinking, which in turn is considered the source of erroneous action, it requires only a short step to link this kind of thinking with counter-revolutionary action. So the labels of rightist and counter-revolutionary came to be bracketed together as the campaign progressed.

The charge of counter-revolutionary was designed not so much to fix responsibility as to lend further weight to the campaign. The confession of rightist error did not put an end to the attack but brought further charges of deception. By keeping the leading rightists under fire, it was hoped both to educate the public and to split the rightist ranks. In the end, threats and pressures caused most of them to recant, and communist superiority was demonstrated.

The purpose of the anti-rightist campaign was not only to eliminate heterodox ideas and tendencies but also to reintegrate the intellectuals and reimpose the current ideological orthodoxy. As the weight of the movement gradually shifted from its negative to its positive purpose, this latter became a new movement in its own right. To understand this phase, which is still continuing, it is necessary to relate it to economic developments. In mid-1957 the communists embarked on a great production drive. The idea of gradual economic progress yielded place to a programme envisaging big leaps forward in industrial and agricultural production. These required similar leaps in science and education, and intellectual life was again dominated by utilitarian purposes.

Beginning in the latter half of 1957, a new slogan was advanced which called on people in all walks of life—scientists, university professors, and professional people in particular—to become 'red and expert.' In contrast to the Hundred Flowers period, emphasis was placed on political reliability rather than professional skill. Intellectual ability of itself had no objective value. It was essential to have people whom the party could trust to carry out its policy. The intellectual had to conform ideologically or face denial of an opportunity for which he had been trained.

Several methods were used to produce a body of 'red and expert' intellectuals. Many had been used before—revivalist mass meetings, recruitment into the party, greater party activity in academic institutions, and a heightened emphasis on the cultural leadership of the Soviet Union. One new ingredient was added, the elevation of the cult of the masses and a corresponding belittling of the work and prestige of the intellectuals. The initiative and intelligence

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of the masses was accepted as an article of faith. Intelligence, now defined as political consciousness, was no longer the monopoly of a few. Peasants just emerging from illiteracy were commended as scientists, philosophers, and poets, and held capable of almost any achievement. The working class could achieve results because they approached all questions as proletarians, whereas intellectuals were bound to fail because they were imbued with the bourgeois concepts of individualism, liberalism, and anarchism.

Another expression of this 'mass line' is seen in the stress placed on the educative value of manual labour. The study of Marxism-Leninism was merely pretentious when not accompanied by work in the countryside or in a factory. Intellectuals had previously been strongly encouraged to engage in practical work; now they were compelled to do it for certain periods of time. In this way the intellectual would discard his sense of superiority and adopt the attitude of the common labourer.

IN education the effect of this new line was to make the goals purely functional. All subjects were taught with production needs in mind. Academic study was to be co-ordinated with industrial practice. The importance of engineering and science grew still more, that of the social sciences diminished further. Everything pertaining to schools, students, and teachers had to be produced in great quantities as fast as possible. As a result academic standards were lowered; even the five-year course in mathematics, a basic subject for technical progress, was reduced to four years, and in science theoretical studies were reduced in order to concentrate attention on mastering technical skills.

Literature and art also were harnessed for the economic leap forward. Writers were to give up esoteric pursuits and to reinforce and inspire the efforts of the people. Like others, writers also had plans to be fulfilled on schedule; there was no time to create slowly. One of China's most prolific writers, Pa Chin, who had produced little since the communist accession to power, pledged himself to write one long novel and three medium-length novels in the next year, as well as several translations. Again form and content were prescribed; writing was to be easy to understand and to reflect the heroic personages and new phenomena of the leap forward. There was to be an increase not only in the number of works produced but also in the number of writers, by the incorporation of loyal amateurs. The quality of this kind of production-line writing may not challenge the classics, but it fulfilled the needs of the regime. Most of the works were written under party supervision and were little more than propaganda. As the amateur writer increasingly served the regime's needs, the value of the professional began to diminish. Publishers in Peking and Shanghai reduced royalties by 50 per cent.

In December 1958 economic dislocation and difficulties in the communes led to some backtracking in which a large number of officials and intellectuals were recalled from work in the countryside. Nonetheless there appears to have been little modification in the 'mass line.' In every field the rôle of the layman and quantitative output continue to be exalted, the rôle of the professional and the quality of the product slighted.

The policy pursued from 1956 to 1958 has consolidated the power of the Chinese CP but appears to have weakened rather than strengthened its intellectual hold. Intellectuals and intellectual ideas have gone through a cataclysmic two years, falling from relative freedom and high prestige into strict conformity and low esteem. Their position has now come round full circle to the extreme rigidity of 1955. Little has been accomplished in the interval; if anything, the problems of ideological control and disaffected intellectuals have been aggravated by the change. Forced co-operation is still possible, but experience has shown that, as the physical hold over the intellectuals becomes firmer, their creative capacity declines. The party claims that it is rapidly reaching the stage where it will no longer have to depend on the old professors, writers, and scientists. The Hundred Flowers interlude showed, however, that even the younger generation who had gained their education with the party's help are capable of producing their own heterodox thoughts and demands. The Chinese Communist Party must still discover how to compel thinking individuals into strict orthodoxy and still give their best.

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DOCUMENT

Occupational Therapy in China

During the past eighteen months the attitude of the Chinese Communist Party towards the intelligentsia has been widely discussed in the Chinese press; a short but fairly representative selection from these articles is given in the following excerpts. They deal with such subjects as the political attitude of the Chinese intelligentsia, their relations with the party and the state, the need to re-educate and remould the intellectuals, and the benefits of manual labour in purging the intelligentsia of dangerous political and cultural deviations.

Writing on the 'Ideological Remoulding of Intellectuals' in the Peking Kuang-ming Jih-pao (4 *October* 1958), *Chang Chih-yi said:*

From the large number of facts revealed in the attack launched against the Communist Party by the bourgeois rightists in 1957, in the resultant struggle against the bourgeois rightists, and in the rectification campaign as a whole, it was proved that the majority of the intellectuals were still bourgeois in their political ideology, that their political ideal was to take the capitalist road towards bourgeois 'democracy' and 'freedom', since they admire the capitalist material civilisation and way of life as a whole. They were not used to and disagreed with the socialist system, and there are even those who hid in their innermost hearts their marked hatred for the Chinese Communist Party and the socialist cause of the Chinese people. This class contradiction is reflected not only in the departments of social science, but also in the departments of natural science; it is reflected not only in the struggles in the political and ideological realms, but also on the economic front, where struggles exist even today. Facts also prove that bourgeois individualism is basically incompatible with socialist collectivism . . .

In the second place, there is contradiction between the ranks of the intellectuals and the demands of industrial and agricultural construction in a socialist society. Before the working class acquired the leadership, it could not foster its own intellectuals in large numbers. Since the Chinese people's revolution at a very early stage established bases as 'laboratories' or 'experimental plots' in the rural areas, a group of working class intellectuals has been trained; some who had originally been illiterate have become great intellectuals, both red and expert; some who originally were deeply influenced by capitalist thoughts have been changed into courageous warriors fighting resolutely for the Communist cause. During the more than nine years since liberation, a portion of the intellectuals accepted the leadership and education of the Chinese Communist Party, clearly saw the future, and accelerated their process of self-remoulding. Some have been changed into intellectuals of the working class, while at the same time a group of intellectuals of the new age has also been fostered. These two types of intellectuals, together with the old cadres, have thrown themselves enthusiastically into the socialist revolution.

Nevertheless, such persons are still in the minority among the ranks of all intellectuals, and considering the colossal force of intellectuals required for socialist construction, they are far from sufficient . . .

From the facts revealed in the various movements, particularly in the current anti-rightist struggle and rectification campaign, it is clear that among the ranks of the bourgeois intellectuals, only a small number really possess knowledge and talent. Some are informed but not well-versed (their knowledge is shallow), or they are not expert (they possess only a smattering of knowledge). Others tend to 'drill the horn of the ox' (their knowledge is one-sided) and are impractical (they are bookworms). Some can only take up literary games and 'assist others in idling away time'. There are even a few who 'sell dog meat while displaying the head of a goat as advertisement', and are 'adventurers in society' with no knowledge at all.

Those who possess real knowledge and talent are truly valuable assets left behind by the old society, but if we do not 'let politics assume command' in handling them, then these people will constitute a capitalist 'white flag'. Those without deep knowledge and those who are not experts, naturally can contribute much less to the socialist cause than those with real knowledge and talent. But in our country, which was originally backward in culture, science, and technique, where the big leap forward is being

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promoted in all fields of socialist construction, and where talent is urgently needed, such people can still be considered an 'asset'. Only those who 'sell dog meat by displaying the head of a goat' and those 'adventurers in society' may threaten danger to our socialist cause . . .

The intellectuals' idea that 'the mental worker rules other people and the physical worker is ruled by other people' is of course incompatible with the principles of socialism or communism. More than that, the desire of the intellectuals to monopolise knowledge and to divorce themselves from physical labour is also in conflict with the socialist or communist principle calling for the combining of physical and mental labour. Knowledge and mental labour have their origin and develop out of physical labour. In primitive communist society there was no division of labour between mental and physical labour. Only when the class society was reached were the two kinds of labour separated from each other, and knowledge became monopolised by the ruling classes. In addition to knowledge about the struggle for production, knowledge about the class struggle was increasingly gained. By the time capitalist society was reached, a sharp antagonism was developed.

This division of labour led the intellectuals not only to belittle physical labour, but also to belittle the masses of workers and peasants who engage in physical labour. Because the views of the intellectuals were restricted by the prejudices of the exploiting classes, their theories often became divorced from reality, becoming subjective and one-sided. The old Chinese saying that 'they do not move their four limbs and cannot distinguish the five kinds of grain' was a good satire on such people. Comrade Mao Tse-tung was also describing these people when he said, 'Many so-called intellectuals are, comparatively speaking, the least informed'. Marxists-Leninists consider that physical labour must be combined with mental labour, and the wisdom of the masses is the greatest wisdom . . .

However, their present political attitude and ideological condition show that the intellectuals still stand on the side of the bourgeoisie, and that they are 'completely soaked in the world outlook of the bourgeoisie.' This is not beneficial to the new 'skin'—the socialist economic base and superstructure. They may not only disseminate capitalist influences in the social sciences and philosophy, but also peddle capitalist poisons in the realm of the natural sciences. Idealism in academic studies, and the subjectivism and one-sided nature of the intellectuals, will also impede the search for the truth and obstruct the development of science. Accordingly, we must work for the prompt and basic remoulding of the political thoughts and world outlook of the intellectuals if this contradiction is to be removed, and if they are to play a beneficial role in the education of the masses and the development of scientific enterprises.

Similar views were expressed by Ting Yang in an article in the Shanghai Wen Hui Pao (24 *June* 1958). *The writer dealt in particular with the 'dual character' of Chinese intellectuals and complained that they are still 'linked with the ghost of the bourgeoisie in their world outlook, their academic thought, and their style of living':*

We know that intellectuals have never been an independent class. In a class society the intellectuals would always attach themselves to the exploiting class that happens to be in a ruling position, serve this or that exploiting class with their knowledge, and in effect become part of the exploiting class. During the feudal ages in our country, the intellectuals were united with the feudal dynasties and the landlord class. 'Scholars' in those days were no more than cultured slaves kept by kings and princes, the aristocracy and the landlords. During the semi-feudal, semi-colonial age, some of the intellectuals were united with the imperialists, feudal landlords, and bureaucratic capitalists, and became extremely reactionary; others were united with the bourgeoisie and became bourgeois intellectuals. Of course, there was also a small number of awakened intellectuals who denounced the stand of the exploiting class to which they had belonged, deserted the camp of the reactionary rulers, and were united with the working class and the working people and became intellectuals of the working class or revolutionary intellectuals. In short, intellectuals living in a class society can never be 'above class.' They will inevitably be branded with the mark of class.

Of course, we should make our diagnosis of the class affiliations of intellectuals on the basis of their family background and financial status, and, more important still, on the basis of their political stand and world outlook, and the fact that they serve the interests of certain classes.

Most of the intellectuals left over from the old era in our country have come from bureaucratic, landlord, and bourgeois families or upper petty-bourgeois families. In the past, their income consisted of left-overs from the table of imperial-

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ists, feudal landlords, and bourgeoisie. Outwardly it seemed to be fair pay for their services, but in reality it was a kind of exploitation in disguise. The education they received was the education of feudal compradores and the bourgeoisie. They were steeped in the bourgeois world outlook. Politically, they always stood on the side of, or inclined towards, the ruling powers and the bourgeoisie, and they often acted as spokesmen for the ruling exploiting class. No relations of direct exploitation existed between them and the working people, but their way of life and conditions of labour were entirely different from those of the working people. As a result, they are ideologically and psychologically opposed to the working people. Their thinking and feelings are incompatible with those of the working people. Most of them served the exploiting classes for long periods. Part of them became intellectuals of the reactionary ruling class while the majority have remained bourgeois intellectuals. We say, therefore, that the old intellectuals in general belong to the category of the bourgeoisie and that they are an appendage to the exploiting class . . .

The majority of the intellectuals stand in the 'middle of the road'. Steering a middle course between capitalism and socialism, they are wavering and unstable. They may accept or refrain from opposing socialism, but they have not really abandoned their bourgeois stand. Many of them are still steeped in the bourgeois world outlook. They still resolutely persist in the academic viewpoints of the bourgeoisie and long for the bourgeois way of life. The majority of the bourgeois intellectuals of our country still have a dual character politically; they have not yet accomplished a basic change in their world outlook. Therefore it is legitimate to continue to regard them as part of the exploiting class.

There are people who disagree with the foregoing argument. They give a one-sided, mechanical interpretation to the famous saying, 'If the skin no longer exists, where will the hair be?' They argue that, since the economic basis of the exploiting class to which the intellectuals attached themselves in the past has already been, or is being, destroyed, and since all intellectuals are now following the socialist road under the leadership of the Party and are serving socialism from their various posts, they can no longer be linked with the bourgeoisie and the exploiting classes. Obviously, those who maintain this view have ignored the essential character of the question. We say that the destruction of the economic basis of the exploiting classes, to which bourgeois intellectuals attached themselves in the past, makes it possible for the bourgeois intellectuals to change their attitude and their world outlook. The fact, however, is that most of them have not yet attached their 'hair' to the 'skin' of the working class. They are still linked with the ghost of the bourgeoisie in their world outlook, their academic thought, and their style of living. As to whether they are really following the socialist road and are whole-heartedly serving socialism, a clue can be found in the innumerable facts that have been brought to light during the recent rectification movement among the intellectuals.

An interesting discussion as to whether members of the medical profession are exploiters was reported in the Shanghai Wen Hui Pao (5 *December* 1957)*:*

For the current study, a method has been adopted which is more readily accepted by the participants, and that makes the discussions more lively and practical. General discussions usually begin with the actual ideological situation of the participants, and battles of ideas are gradually developed. As a result, the participants are able to delve deeper and deeper into the subject, and to enlighten and educate one another. Someone in the group of writers, artists, journalists and publishers once spoke about his own fruitless visits to factories and to the countryside, to find out about life in those places, and asked how intellectuals could really mix with the workers and the peasants. Fu Ch'uan-hsiang and Shih Hsiao-ying thereupon told the group of their own experiences of the agrarian reform, in which they had taken part, and of the shows they had given in the countryside. They concluded that since the intellectuals had come into their own politically and were now much better off, they should not be ungrateful. They said the intellectuals should learn humbly from the workers and peasants and remould themselves, and should not take a superior attitude towards the workers and peasants or regard their low cultural level with disdain. The animated narratives of Fu Ch'uan-hsiang and Shih Hsiao-ying greatly moved those writers and actors and actresses who had similar experiences. In the group of members of the medical profession, some one asked whether a doctor with a private practice is an exploiter, and the question greatly intrigued members of the group. Many medical doctors and professors, including Su Tsung-hua, Ku K'ai-shih, Hsueh Pang-ch'i and

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Lin Kuo-hao, spoke at length of their experience in serving the bourgeoisie, so that members of the group realised that although doctors might not be direct exploiters, they nevertheless had to face the question of what stand to take and whom to serve. The great emphasis on purely technical matters, which exists generally among the medical profession, was criticised, and it was recognised that to be really an intellectual of the working class one must thoroughly change one's stand and serve the workers, peasants, and the soldiery whole-heartedly.

'Break the blind belief in specialists and experts' has been one of the chief slogans in recent months, and the Peking Chung Kuo Ching Nien Pao (16 *June* 1958) *predicted that under communist party leadership thousands of people would be produced whose achievements would surpass those of Newton and Einstein:*

Some people often say, 'Science has always been making progress, and had produced such men as Newton and Einstein before socialism and communist parties came into being'. That seems to be a powerful argument against Party leadership over scientific work. It is true that there were science and scientists when there was neither socialism nor communist party, but it is also true that science has been developing faster and there have been more scientists since socialism and the communist party came into being. The absence of the socialist system and communist party leadership in the past was a misfortune due to the limitations of history . . .

Under the socialist system and communist party leadership not only a single Newton or a single Einstein is produced, but thousands of Newtons and Einsteins are produced. Owing to the favourable conditions under which they work and the rapid advances made in science, the present-day scientists will surpass Newton, Einstein and other scientists of old in both the theoretical and practical fields.

The masses have taken an enormous 'leap forward' in the cultural field. Some statistics about the number of budding writers and painters in the provinces were given in a New China News Agency Bulletin *on* 24 *September* 1958*:*

Besides songs and poems, painting has become a favourite art form of the working people. Everywhere, from the plateau in the west to the sea coast in the east, in the remotest villages, there are white-washed walls on which huge coloured pictures have been painted. The number of amateur painters in Peihsien *hsien*, Kiangsu Province, alone reaches 15,000, and they include carpenters, old women, paper cut artists, and Young Pioneers. They have already produced some 110,000 items; one group of 70 peasants painted 500 in a single night, some of which were selected by the Association of Fine Arts for display at the recent exhibition of rural art in Peking.

In Sulu *hsien*, Hopei Province, half of the county's population of 400,000 is engaged in some form of writing or other artistic creation. There are now creative groups in every village and every family has its writers. They have already produced 1·4 million items—from poetry, ballads and short stories to paintings, the best of which have been displayed at exhibitions in almost every village and in *hsien*. Twenty-six collections have already been published.

In the 'Steel' People's Commune of Suiping *hsien*, Honan Province, everybody has acquired the art of singing 'quick ballads'. Visitors are often greeted with rhyming ballads and even a 13-year-old Young Pioneer there can improvise 'quick ballads' for five minutes at a time.

In Kiangsu Province, there are 300,000 workers and peasants in regular creative groups. They have turned out ten million items in the past six months. Shanghai workers in the three months up to July produced 80,000 pieces and held a modern drama week during which they acted plays written by themselves.

Much scorn was poured, on the other hand, on the 'great intellectuals' who could not fulfil menial tasks. The following illustration is taken from an article by Li Tzu ('Ideological Obstacles to Cultural Revolution') published in Cheng Chih Hsueh Hsi (*Political Study*), 13 *June* 1958*:*

Knowledge comes from production activities; those intellectuals who have only a book knowledge are actually the most ignorant and stupid. Rightist Chien Fu-chang was formerly a 'famous professor' and 'prominent scientist'; he took pride in himself and won the respect of many people. Today, working in a laboratory, he does not know how to use an apparatus which even a freshman knows how to handle. Termite expert Li Shih-men, whose cultural standard is not high, has invented a scientific method of wiping out termites. What does this contrast show? It shows that the alleged ignorance of the working people was a lie spread by the bourgeoisie. To believe in this lie is to fall into the

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trap of the bourgeoisie. We must break down superstition, set minds free and think, say, and do things with daring. Our cause is an epoch-making one and we must boldly invent. At the same time, we must study culture hard and capture the fortress of culture by exerting our utmost efforts and pressing ahead consistently.

There was general agreement in the party leadership that manual labour, especially in agriculture, was an excellent cure for the doubts and the waverings of the intellectuals. But not all intellectuals revealed the measure of enthusiasm displayed by Liu Tzu-chiu (Vice-Minister of Labour) in an article in the Peking Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien Pao (29 *December* 1958)*:*

Today, as far as the worker and peasant masses are concerned, the mastering of cultural and scientific knowledge and the participation in production management require chiefly, ideologically speaking, the destruction of superstitious beliefs and the discarding of the inferiority complex. But things are different with intellectuals and intellectual cadres. Contempt for physical labour and physical labourers still exists among them, although many are as eager to participate in physical labour as workers and peasants are to study culture. Their contempt for physical labour is due partly to the fact that they do not understand the importance of physical labour, and do not know that work, ploughing, fishing, livestock-raising, and other forms of labour are the foundation of the existence and development of human society, which would have perished without them; and partly due to the fact that they are detached from production practice, and thus have not experienced the complexity and difficulty of physical labour. They do not know that every article is produced only with the knowledge of a specialist in one or more fields. Chairman Mao once said, 'Since the beginning of class society, there have been only two branches of knowledge in the whole world'. Knowledge of the production struggle is one of them. Even Confucius, the ancient sage of China, admitted that where the cultivation of crops and vegetables was concerned, he was far inferior to the old peasants. The intellectuals know still less about the hardships of labourers ploughing the fields, for they have never 'worked in the field under the noonday sun, or sweated when seeds were planted'. They do not know that each grain of rice has cost much hardship. The importance of productive labour and its complexity and difficulty can be experienced and understood only by those who personally participate in production practice. And only those who understand from personal experience the importance of productive labour and its complexity and difficulty will change their sentiments about the common labourers, will feel proud of productive labour, and will know that these common labourers, these workers, peasants, herdsmen, and fishermen are respectable and lovable. Only those with such experience can forget their vanity as intellectuals and cadres, and can serve the workers and peasants whole-heartedly with their knowledge. Only intellectuals and cadres of this description are the intellectuals and cadres badly wanted by the Party and the state. As for those so-called intellectuals and cadres of old—who 'do not exercise the four limbs and cannot distinguish among the five grains', who 'know neither how to slaughter a pig nor how to cultivate a piece of land', and who for the little book knowledge they possess, look down on the common labourers—they are not qualified for the great cause of socialism and communism. That is why our Party lays special emphasis on everyone becoming a common labourer.

Judging by the concrete conditions now prevailing in China, the keypoint in discussing the question of everyone being a common labourer is to overcome the contempt for physical labour cherished by intellectuals in general and higher institute students in particular. These young people, because of their record of studies, consider themselves as having embarked on the road of mental labour, and consequently being in a position to detach themselves completely from physical labour. Some among them cherish great antagonism to the directive of combining education and productive labour, and to being common labourers. The greater the antagonism, the more it needs to be overcome. They must not adopt the attitude of liberalism. Nor should they be given a free rein. Naturally, when solving this purely ideological question, we must persist in the attitude of patient persuasion. We must not resort to simple violence or force.

While the question 'Why should everyone be a common labourer?' was being discussed, some people regarded common labourers as something entirely different from red experts. They all seem willing to be red experts of the best kind, but unwilling to be common labourers. Thoughts and views like this are improper. Countless historical facts tell us that even in feudal society and capitalist society, some people from poor families and of low position, in other words, some common labourers, became inventors and

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creators in scientific and technical fields. This was possible in the old society, and should be far more possible in socialist society and especially in the communist society to be. Common labourers and red experts should and can be identified with each other. Is it not a fact that today many common workers, peasants, and herdsmen have been appointed research fellows or faculty members by our Academy of Sciences and the scientific research institutes and higher institutions of many localities, and have thus become red experts? Do not these research fellows and faculty members of worker and peasant origin often address and lecture experts and scholars of great renown? In our Party, government, and armed forces, there are many statesmen and strategists who are thoroughly red and profoundly expert in name as well as in fact. Most of these experts were originally common workers and peasants. And in order to make these statesmen and strategists retain their original nature of common labourers, our Party has laid down a system for their participation in physical labour. On the other hand, are there not many experts, scholars, professors, writers, and actors who, in response to the Party's appeal, go to the mountains and rural areas, factories and mines, for labour training and self-reformation? Facts have shown that among these intellectuals going to the mountains and rural areas, factories and mines, some have really undergone complete transformation. The main purpose of our Party's directive of combining education and productive labour is to transform workers and peasants into intellectuals, and intellectuals into labourers, and gradually to reduce and finally to eliminate the difference between physical labour and mental labour. Experience has shown that participation in physical labour is not only an efficacious method for the transformation of people's non-working class ideology, but also an important prerequisite in heightening scientific and technical standards, and promoting scientific and technical research. The recent exhibition in Peking in connection with the directive of combining education and productive labour eloquently and forcefully testified to this truth. Thus it is clear that common labourers and red experts are not contradictory to each other, but are identifiable with each other. In our society, it is the duty of everyone, including the red experts, to be a common labourer. And only those experts who adopt the attitude of common labourers toward the labouring people, and who serve the labouring people whole-heartedly, deserve the name of red experts . . .

Among certain intellectual youths who fail to understand correctly the question of everyone being a common labourer and the directive of combining education and productive labour, various misconceptions are in evidence. Some university students believe that having to be common labourers means lowering the university teaching standard, and consequently lowering its cultural and scientific standards; in other words, lowering the university student's standard of cultural and scientific knowledge to that of the common workers and peasants of today. They think their prospects gloomy, that the future has not much in store for them. This, of course, is pure misunderstanding. It must be borne in mind that the cultural and scientific standard of China's university graduates has fallen lower instead of rising higher than before, and that our Party and state are resorting to every possible means to raise this standard as soon as possible. As has been said before, our Party's directive of combining education and productive labour will, in addition to tempering and reforming the students' ideology, and raising their political level, also serve another purpose; namely, to raise more effectively the students' standard of knowledge and culture, and convert them into labourers with both culture and socialist consciousness, and into new persons in whom physical labour and mental labour are combined.

Most of the Chinese students were sent to the countryside, either to become peasants themselves or to spend several years in the communes to purge themselves of the rightist ideas they had advanced during the 'hundred flowers' period. The Peking Jen Min Jih Pao (11 *November* 1957) *reported their experiences:*

Some of the students worked very enthusiastically when they first came to the villages; but, after a period, their enthusiasm for labour gradually cooled, because they could not suffer hardships and endure fatigue. It should be pointed out that, since our country's industry and scientific technique are comparatively backward and within a short period cannot supply agriculture with any large quantities of modern machinery, for a considerable period to come our agricultural production will still have to rely mainly upon relatively simple tools and heavy manual labour. This is a historical phenomenon of our country in its transformation to socialism. Our task is to change this phenomenon, and to

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change our country into a great, modernised industrial country as well as a modernised agricultural country; in other words, in future we will replace the present heavy manual labour by large-scale mechanical power. To reach this goal, the people of the whole country have to strive hard, suffer hardships, and endure fatigue. conscientiously perform agricultural manual labour, raise labour productivity, and increase agricultural output. For this reason, intellectual youths should not waver in face of hardships and difficulties, but should inherit and amplify our people's excellent tradition in struggling against hardships, engage in labour without shirking hard work, and overcome difficulties courageously. There is a Chinese saying: 'Iron cannot become steel without undergoing smelting.' Intellectual youths with a promising future should be able to withstand the cold wind and hot sun and all other tests, and should throw themselves into the great melting pot of productive labour so as to become steeled labourers.

Some junior and senior middle school graduates go to the villages with a sense of 'superiority', considering that since they have a certain basic knowledge in culture and science, they are going to 'reform' the villages. Thus, some of them disregard assignments and pick their work overcarefully, and some do not mingle well or talk much with the peasants, and even look down upon the peasants. In some places it has been found that among the students joining in production in the villages, primary school graduates were better than junior middle school graduates, junior middle school graduates were better than senior middle school graduates, and senior middle school graduates were the most difficult to deal with. Take the case of a senior middle school graduate in Yungyang, Honan, for instance; when the people in the village asked him to be vice-director of the agricultural cooperative, he shook his head and refused; when he was offered the accountant's job, he walked away without even shaking his head. This attitude of regarding oneself as a 'reformer', priding oneself on being out of the ordinary, looking down upon the peasants, and disobeying the leadership, is a sign of arrogance and ignorance.

It should be understood that although peasants of the older generation are poor in cultural and scientific knowledge, they are rich in experience of production. They lack scientific knowledge because they were oppressed and exploited in the past; it is something left over from the old society. The young students of today have the chance to study in schools and acquire some knowledge only because the older generation of workers and peasants, under the leadership of the Party, conducted and won a hard revolutionary struggle. Young people acquire basic knowledge in culture and science in order to render service to developing production, and should never become conceited because of their knowledge. Comrade Mao Tse-tung said long ago: 'Ever since class society came into existence, there have been only two kinds of knowledge in the world; one is called knowledge of the production struggle and the other is called knowledge of the class struggle.' Middle school students beginning to take part in production, even if they have indeed got some basic knowledge in culture and science in school, gained this knowledge after all from books. As to tilling the land, they are absolutely ignorant; they are far inferior to the peasants and therefore have nothing to be proud of. To participate in agricultural production is to render productive labour and is also a sort of study—a most vivid lesson in socialist labour education. If they want to 'reform' the countryside, the young intellectuals should first reform themselves and politely learn from the peasants. They should study the peasants' experience in production, and their excellent quality of being diligent and frugal and suffering hardships and enduring fatigue. They should cultivate the socialist labour viewpoint; and, by living and working together with the peasants, reform their own thinking and feeling, get rid of the evil habits of many intellectuals, and gradually become both in name and in reality modern peasants possessing culture, awareness, and ability in production . . .

The concrete contents of ideological and political education for these graduates should be centred on 'fervently loving the motherland, the countryside, and labour; and loving the cooperative as one's own family'. We should organise the students to take part in the great socialist debate now in process in the countryside, so that we can, through this debate, clarify these students' muddled thinking concerning such questions as agricultural co-operativisation, the future of the countryside, the unified purchase and unified sale policy, and the difference between the living standard of workers and that of the peasants. In this way we can raise their socialist awareness, and strengthen their zeal to make agricultural production their life-long career. At the same time, based upon the students' characteristics, and ideological problems, we should organise them to conduct a

(*Continued on page 45*)

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SOVIET VIEWS ON AFRICA

THE following survey reviews the changing Soviet attitudes towards Africa in recent years. While all the major, and many minor Soviet sources have been perused in the preparation of this essay, and while the main problems facing Soviet African experts in their studies are indicated, it is intended only as a short introduction to a little-known subject of considerable political importance, and not as an exhaustive treatment.

Russian interest in Africa and the systematic study of the dark continent go back farther than is generally realised. The first known Russian description of Egypt, a sketchy and unsatisfactory one, it is true, was given about 1630 by a pilgrim, Vasili Gagara. The North African Surveys of M. G. Kokovtsov, an officer in the Russian fleet (published in 1787), are more systematic and of much greater value. Russian explorers went to Africa during the 19th century: some were hunters and botanists, others had wider geographical and historical interests. But on the whole there was little support for these expeditions; with the possible exception of Abyssinia, the dark continent held little interest for Russia. Tsarism saw its civilising (or colonial) mission in Asia; those who regarded Africa as a possible outlet for Russia's colonial energies (such as for instance the poet Gumilev, Anna Akhmatova's husband) were a small minority.

For reasons that need not be elaborated in detail, Africa did not feature prominently in communist blueprints after 1917. It was expected that one day a strong nationalist anti-imperialist wave would sweep across the continent, but during the early twenties only the first faint shadows of such a movement could be detected. There were virtually no direct contacts in the shape of political ties, or economic or cultural relations, that could be used to help train a generation of Soviet experts. Communist publications in those years were both rare and amateurish.[1] Political activities were carried out by the League against Imperialism, in which for a time African nationalists participated. Since it was difficult to find reliable Negro cadres in Africa, it was hoped that Negro party members in the United States would provide leadership in organising the national liberation struggle of their African brethren. However, the various zigzags of Comintern policy, and the political proposals and slogans advanced were considered quite unsuitable by both American and African Negroes (such as the idea of a Negro Republic in the Black Belt of the southern United States, and a native [Bantu] republic in South Africa). These suggestions made little appeal to communists, white or black, in either country.

Africans were neither prominent nor numerous in the various Moscow institutions that dealt with 'Eastern affairs', i.e., with the situation in the under-developed countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Nor was there any specific centre for African studies or a periodical devoted exclusively to their pursuit. Books were written on Egypt and the French colonies in North Africa, but these countries were not really considered part of Black Africa; they had their own specific problems, and had little in common with Africa south of the Sahara. Of the very few studies that did deal with Black Africa, none was of outstanding interest, and all were directly affected by the changing party line with regard to the course of the colonial revolution.[2] Neither historians nor economists showed much interest in Africa, and the void was filled in the early thirties by a group of anthropologists and ethnographers such as I. I. Potekhin and D. A. Olderogge, who gradually became the recognised experts not merely in their specific field of study but on African affairs in general. Between the middle thirties and the middle fifties *Sovetskaya Etnografiya* all but monopolised whatever there was of Soviet African studies,

[1] *Cf.* M. L. Veltman, *Mirovaya Voina i borba za razdel chernogo kontinenta* (The world war and the fight for the partition of the Dark Continent), Moscow, 1918.

[2] *Cf.* G. Kreitner on Abyssinia (1932), A. Zusmanovich on forced labour and trade unions in Africa (1933), and I. G. Popov-Lenkii on agrarian questions in East Africa (published in *Novy Vostok*, 23/24, 1928).

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most of the work being sponsored by the Institute of Ethnography of the Soviet Academy of Sciences.

A SHORT survey of the current organisation of African studies in the Soviet Union may be useful at this point. The Institute of Ethnography of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, with its two branches in Moscow and Leningrad, has in the past been the main centre. It has concentrated and co-ordinated research on Central and South Africa, whereas the position of North Africa has not been clearly defined. Both Egypt and French North Africa have been included in the regional surveys published by the Institute, but most of the monographs on North Africa have been sponsored by other institutions. In addition there has been since 1956 an African subdivision of the Academy's Institute of Eastern Studies, which though small at present is apparently eventually to take over most work hitherto done by the Institute of Ethnography. There are also African subdivisions in the Institute of World Economics and International Relations, and the Institute of Geography.

Soviet African studies are now in a process of reorganisation. At a co-ordinating meeting of the Soviet African experts convened under the auspices of the Academy of Sciences in February 1958, the creation of an all-Union association of Africanists was proposed, as well as the publication of a periodical to co-ordinate research in the various institutions of higher learning.

A resolution was also adopted to establish a chair of African studies at Moscow University, and to introduce special courses on the history, economy, and literature of African countries, in the faculties of other universities.

Though enrolment at the universities is small at present (ten students took African languages last year at Leningrad, hitherto the main centre of African studies), substantial efforts are now being made to enlarge the scope and extent of African studies. The USSR Ministry of Higher Education decided in May 1958 to invite foreign experts to Leningrad, and to send several Soviet teachers and graduate students abroad to raise their language proficiency. Swahili, Amharic, and Haussa are already taught at Leningrad, and Luganda, Luba, and Yoruba are to be introduced during the next three years. According to the same project the training of specialists at Moscow University is to be initiated after the start of the African language programme at Leningrad.

The research programme of African studies for 1958-61 is more ambitious. It comprises about 35 titles on subjects from 'The Economic Development and Struggle of the Peoples of Nigeria against Imperialist Enslavement after World War II' to 'The Population and the Dwellings of the Bantu People' and 'Essays on Swahili Syntax'. It may be useful to note in this context that between 1917 and 1945 some 113 books and pamphlets on Africa were published in the Soviet Union, while 100 were issued between 1945 and 1956; the great majority of these were pamphlets, not books; they included a number of translations from the English and French, and philological and geographical studies. On the political history of Africa no more than two or three original books of interest were published in the Soviet Union during the two decades before 1956. The new research programme, on the other hand, has already produced some solid studies on a much bigger scale, and this progress is undoubtedly to be kept up.

THE Soviet line vis-à-vis the national movement in Africa (and in the East in general) has been subject to marked change since the second world war. Up to 1955 the attitude, briefly summarised, was that the present leaders of the movement, the national bourgeoisie, could not be trusted, that their struggle against colonialism was 'a mere sham', and that sooner or later they would betray the national cause. Only the working class or, to be precise, its vanguard, the communist party, could lead the anti-imperialist struggle to its logical conclusion and to victory. The urban proletariat, it was true, was numerically weak, but so were the bourgeoisie, and Soviet authors saw reason for optimism with regard to the outcome of the struggle for leadership in the African national movement. 'The experience of the national liberation struggle in the colonial countries shows that the national bourgeoisie are incapable of representing consistently the national interests. They are inclined towards compromise and collaboration with the imperialists, towards

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restricting the national movement for independence within the narrow framework of their own class interests. And when the imperialists are willing to make concessions—and they invariably do make concessions (however insignificant) in order to maintain their rule in the colonies—the big bourgeoisie cease to play the "opposition game" and become reliable pillars of the ruling circles of the colonial power.'[3] These observations, made with regard to the situation in French West and Equatorial Africa, are fairly representative of the general attitude at the time; it may be useful to show in some detail how the 'hard line' of the early fifties was applied in different parts of Africa.

There was considerable mistrust of the movements and countries that had attained, or were about to attain independence. Such independence, it was argued, could not possibly be genuine; it was a British imperialist manoeuvre carried out with the help of the native bourgeoisie; England had given the same 'sham independence' to India, Burma, Pakistan, and Ceylon; although economic, financial, and military power had remained in British hands, the petty-bourgeois nationalist organisations had been satisfied with this purely formal independence.[4] Throughout Africa the working class was now the leading force in the struggle against imperialism, and the alliance between the working class and the peasants under the leadership of the former was the precondition for the success of the national movement. In some areas the national bourgeoisie also participated in the struggle, especially where capitalism had developed comparatively fast. But they were merely *one* section of the national bourgeoisie—those capitalists who were materially interested in an expansion of the domestic market.[5]

In West Africa, for instance, the national movement was said to show weakness and instability because the national bourgeoisie heading it were fairly influential. Soviet observers were emphatic in their condemnation of the People's Party in Ghana, which had taken 'a big step to the right, towards collaboration with British imperialism'; Nkrumah, *horribile dictu*, was calling for constructive action on the basis of a constitution.[6] And two years later: 'The People's Party has become *bien-pensant*. It owes its successes solely to the working class but it has not justified the support of the people for it represents only the interests of the big bourgeoisie.'[7]

Soviet commentators expressed dissatisfaction with the leadership and the policy of practically all political organisations in Nigeria. That they would criticise the 'monarchist-reactionary views' of Obalemi Owolowo and denounce the marionettes of Yorubaland was only to be expected.[8] But Dr Azikiwe fared not much better in Soviet writings: He hailed from an aristocratic family, and had been educated at a Negro University in the United States (in itself sufficient cause for suspicion).[9] 'His political views and line clearly reflect the inconsistency of the national bourgeoisie. He is in favour of self-government for Nigeria but this formula in itself is somewhat nebulous and allows many different interpretations; the British Labour party too is in favour of self-government of the colonies.'[10] Further on we are told that Azikiwe advocates peaceful methods alone in the struggle for Nigerian independence, and he is denounced for having worked out the so-called Azikiwe constitution, a mere bourgeois democratic draft.[11] The deepest bitterness, however, was provoked by the non-communist leadership of the Nigerian trade unions, for it was argued that the working class was the only force that could unite all the Nigerian peoples in one all-Nigerian anti-imperialist front and head their struggle for independence. Instead of following the lead given by the communists and their local sympathisers, the Nigerian trade unionists had split and betrayed the working class (i.e. left the communist WFTU). In French West Africa

[3] S. Datlin in *Imperialisticheskaia Borba za Afriku i Osvobozhditelnoe Dvizhénie Narodov* (The Imperialist Struggle for Africa and the People's Liberation Movement), (Moscow, 1951), pp. 258/9.

[4] I. Potekhin in *Sovetskaia Etnografiya*, 1950, 2, p. 26.

[5] I. Lemin in *Imperialisticheskaia Borba . . .*, p. 301.

[6] I. Pokekhin, *ibid.*, p. 228.

[7] *Narody Afriki* (Moscow, 1954), pp. 250, 252.

[8] I. Potekhin in *Imperialisticheskaia Borba . . .*, p. 230.

[9] Azikiwe is also charged witu developing a specific Ibo bourgeois nationalism, having declared that God created the Ibo nation to lead the children of Africa out of bondage.

[10] *Narody Afriki*, p. 344.

[11] *ibid.*, p. 345.

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the independence movement had, according to the same Soviet sources, suffered a similar heavy blow as the result of the treason committed by the 'reformist bourgeois nationalists'. The RDA (Rassemblement Démocratique Africain) had been warmly supported by the communists while it collaborated with them in 1946-1948, but when in 1949 it ceased to follow the communist lead there was pained surprise backed by reports about the 'tremendous anger aroused among the toilers by the treason of the Houphouet Boigny group that had unmasked itself at last.'[12] 'The shameful deal with the colonisers' was said to have caused grave damage to the national movement. The reason for this defeat was given as follows: The rank and file of the RDA were peasants, but since the urban proletariat was not yet strong enough to give a lead to the peasant movement, and since it was itself not yet very efficiently organised, leadership had passed to the national bourgeoisie. Most of the 'national bourgeois' represented the old aristocracy or the compradores, or at best wanted mere reform in order to 'expedite the growth of capitalist relations in the colonies, to obtain equal rights with the French companies in exploiting the natural resources and the population of the country'.[13]

THESE few illustrations will suffice to illustrate the negative attitude revealed in Soviet writings on Africa in general, whether they dealt with the Naguib-Nasser regime in Egypt, the Neo-Destour in Tunisia, the Sudan, or the national movement in Central and South Africa; the few exceptions referred to communists, or fellow travellers who had obtained positions of command in the national movement. The line changed only in 1954/5, with the general modification of Soviet and communist policy in the underdeveloped countries, described at some length in a previous issue of *Survey* ('Eastern Policy and Eastern Studies', No. 26, October-December 1958, pp. 74-77). The new features of the line on Africa may be summarised as follows:

1. While it had been argued before that the concessions made by the colonial powers were 'sham' and designed to 'enslave Africa more efficiently', it was now admitted that the logic of events *compelled* the colonial governments to make concessions.[14] This reappraisal of the policy of the colonial powers caused some confusion.[15]

2. Previously it had been understood that no importance should be attributed to the fact that a number of African countries had already attained independence or were soon to reach that status, for it was not real independence. According to the 1956 view, however, 'the acquisition of political independence is only the first step towards real independence, but it is a very important one. State sovereignty is an important means in the development of an independent national economy. The very fact of the creation of a sovereign state limits the power of the imperialists and binds their hands.'[16]

3. Before 1955 the working class, or to be more accurate, its vanguard, the communist party, had been regarded as the only force able to liberate the African countries. In 1956, on the other hand, it was discovered that all the principal national organisations were 'either bourgeois parties or organisations of the united national front. The leadership is in the hands either of the national bourgeoisie or of the intelligentsia. Communist parties are far from existing in all parts of Africa . . .'[17]

4. Hence the new emphasis on the role of the national bourgeoisie. Not only should the communists collaborate closely with the national bourgeoisie: the imperialist West too would try to find its supporters among that class, whereas

[12] S. Datlin, *loc. cit.*, pp. 257-264; *Narody Afriki*, pp. 353-357.

[13] The communists' main allies at the time were, however, themselves typical 'compradores'.

[14] I. Potekhin, 'Politicheskoe Polozhenie v stranakh Afriki' (The political situation in Africa), in *Sovetskoe Vostokovedenie*, 1956, 1, p. 28. (This was the first number of this periodical to be published after the 20th party congress, and Potekhin's article can therefore be regarded as 'programmatic'.)

[15] Potekhin argued, for instance, that to talk of the industrialisation of Africa was pure moonshine. 'There has been in effect no industrialisation whatsoever in the real meaning of the word.' But ten lines further down on the very same page he says that 'the working class has increased rapidly in numbers'. (*Sovetskoe Vostokovedenie*, 1956, 1, p. 35). It would be interesting to have a Marxist explanation of this growth that is *not* based on industrialisation.

[16] *ibid.*, p. 32.

[17] *ibid.*, p. 25.

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in the past it had relied mainly on feudal elements, semi-feudal kings, shaikhs, emirs, and chieftains.[18]

In keeping with these new insights, the attitude to the national movements in Africa was modified in 1955/6, recent history was rewritten, political, social, and economic conditions depicted in a somewhat different light. In what follows, a brief summary is given of how the 'new insights' affected the appraisal of the situation in various parts of Africa.

SOUTH AFRICA has attracted less Soviet interest than other parts of the dark continent. A few dissertations have been written about it, and a few studies of historical and ethnographic character.[19] Soviet authors argue that the formation of a Bantu nation has been disrupted by imperialism. Two of the problems they deal with are Bantu nationalism and the transition to socialism. Bantu nationalism is admittedly a ticklish problem, for while Soviet commentators support its manifestations, they advocate at the same time the establishment of a single national front and the amalgamation of all 'progressive forces regardless of colour and race'. The African National Congress, originally formed as the organisation of the leadership of the African population, heads of tribes, and the emerging petty bourgeoisie, is said to have been 'permeated with the spirit of reformism' up to the second world war. Since 1945, however, 'democratic forces have more and more taken over the leadership'.

(The Indian National Congress, too, is said to have been dominated until 1943 by 'reformist elements'.)

Up to 1955 it was argued that the transition to socialism in South Africa was relatively easy (at least from a theoretical point of view), for there was a comparatively large Bantu proletariat, while the Bantu bourgeoisie was small and uninfluential.[20] Since 1955, however, little has been heard about 'transition to socialism' and other such 'radical' slogans, and comment has been concentrated on the 'united fight against racialism and for the equality of all nationalities'. The documents of the 'Congress of the peoples of South Africa' (June 1955) have been given wide publicity; all 'progressive organisations' are described as fighting for the attainment of the 'Freedom Charter'.[21]

The general situation in South Africa is, not unnaturally, painted in the darkest colours. One Soviet expert maintains that economic growth during the past decade is a myth, although elsewhere the same author mentions a 'rapid growth of industrial activity'.[22] It is interesting to note that this contradiction was, for once, realised by a Soviet critic, who tried to resolve it by arguing that since this rise in production in South Africa did not relate to heavy industry (the production of means of production) it was not important after all.[23] The white political parties are described as reactionary, though in varying degrees. The Labour party, for instance, while 'representing the interests of the upper layer of the workers of European origin', has of late been criticising apartheid.[24] 'The Liberal Party, though bourgeois, has been attacking the more extreme forms of racial discrimination.'[25] The victory of the Nationalists in 1953 has been described as the 'victory of American imperialism'[26] and during 1953-55 the Malan government was reported to be 'feverishly preparing for a new world war'.

While there is no lack of subject matter for criticism and attack as far as the present state

[18] *ibid.*, p. 35.

[19] M. B. Rabinovich, *The Jameson Raid* (1941); L. D. Yablochkov, *The Bantu of British Central Africa* (1955); I. I. Potekhin, 'The military democracy of the Matabele' in *Trudi Instituta Etnografii*, New Series, vol. XIV (1951); and A. B. Davidson, *The Matabele and the Mashona in the struggle against British colonisation* (Moscow, 1958). Also, I. I. Potekhin, *The development of a national community of the South African Bantu* (1955).

[20] The fact that national independence in Africa predates nationhood has intrigued Soviet observers. It has been argued that 'national independence is by no means an obligatory prerequisite for the final formation of a certain nation' (*Sovetskoe Vostokovedenie*, 1955, 5, p. 152).

[21] See the translation in *Afrika yuzhnee Sakhary* (Africa South of the Sahara), 1958, pp. 249-255.

[22] A. Yastrebova in *Imperialisticheskaia Borba . . .*, pp. 136, 156.

[23] B. Ya. Golant and A. M. Goldobin in *Sovetskoe Vostokovedenie*, 1955, 5, p. 154.

[24] *Ezhegodnik Bolshoi Sovetskoi Entsiklopedii*, 1958, p. 358.

[25] *ibid.*

[26] Yastrebova, *loc. cit.*, pp. 155/5.

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of affairs in South Africa is concerned, Soviet critics have weakened their case both by distorting their picture of conditions in that country and the real roots of South Africa's malaise, and above all by ignoring the racial problem and by avoiding any attempt to come to grips with South African realities.

SOVIET literature on tropical East Africa is almost non-existent; the phrasing of the few references that do exist are largely identical (for instance the treatment of the Mau-Mau problem in *Narody Afriki* and *Imperialisticheskaia Borba*). Even now, when much more attention is paid to African studies in the USSR, the Eastern regions continue to be neglected. With the exception of historical studies on the Arabic colonisation and the ethnic composition of Tanganyika and Uganda, no major projects are apparently under way or envisaged. This lack of interest is, of course, as Soviet writers themselves frequently admit, largely due to the backwardness of the national movement in Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, etc. Soviet observers have noted the appearance of a national bourgeoisie in East Africa (though so far few in numbers and economically weak), a growing working class (which they believe much stronger numerically than the official figures would suggest), and they are also convinced that the differentiation between poor and well-to-do peasants has progressed far, though there are no statistics to prove it.[27] They have dealt with the peculiarities of the anti-imperialist movement in backward areas, where it is limited by the tribal framework and represented by 'religious-sectarian groups'; they refer in this context to the Mizambwe sect in Uganda. Mau-Mau, on the other hand, 'while having religious overtones', is said to have been an agrarian movement 'that never displayed any particular activity'.[28] On their reading, Mau-Mau was a mythical danger, a pretext for the British colonial authorities to strike out against the 'modern anti-imperialist movement', the national organisations that have sprung up in various regions. 'The unforgivable lie about the Mau-Mau danger was however soon unmasked.' In connection with the events in Buganda it is said that for the first time in the history of East Africa a working class organisation appeared as the organiser and the leading force of a movement embracing all the people. The idea of a Federal Union in Central Africa is, of course, opposed, and 'even the feudal leaders of the Buganda and the Kabaka' are said to have joined the opposition.

As to Ethiopia, it was maintained up to 1955 that the Addis Ababa government 'collaborated with the American warmongers in turning their country into an aggressive military base'; conditions in the country were described as extremely bad; the absence of freedom and the 'double yoke of medieval feudalism and imperialism' was deplored.[29] More recently it has been discovered that the Abyssinian government does after all possess a certain measure of independence; it was 'concerned about the strengthening of American influence', 'it wanted to lessen its dependence on the United States', etc.[30] It is said to have encouraged the development of a national industry and agriculture, and the absence of democratic freedoms, while not entirely omitted, is nowadays relegated to second place.

As far as can be ascertained, there is no major research project on Ethiopia under way at present, ethnographic research apart. This is somewhat surprising, for Soviet interest in Ethiopia goes back to the 19th century, and continued in the twenties and thirties.[31]

Soviet interest in the former Italian colonies in East Africa persisted for a while after the second world war. More recently, there has been only infrequent comment on events in these parts; Eritrea and Somalia are apparently regarded, for the time being at any rate, as part of the Egyptian sphere of interest.

The Sudan has been more fortunate than other regions of Africa in attracting Soviet attention and interest. There have been three books on

[27] *Narody Afriki*, p. 449.

[28] *ibid.*, p. 458.

[29] S. Datlin, *Afrika pod gnetom Imperializma* (Africa under the yoke of Imperialism), (Moscow, 1951), pp. 29/30; *Narody Afriki*, pp. 391-396.

[30] D. R. Voblikov, 'Anglo-Amerikanskoe Soperničestvo v poslevoennoi Efiopii' (Anglo-American competition in post-war Ethiopia), in *Sovetskoe Vostokovedenie*, 1957, 4, pp. 36-38.

[31] See, e.g., *Materialy po natsionalno-kolonialnym problemam*, No. 7 (31), Moscow, 1935. This collection of essays was devoted entirely to Ethiopia; there has been no such publication since the second world war.

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this subject since 1950,[32] and a number of shorter studies. In Smirnov's account of the Mahdist rising, its economic, social, and political background, the Mahdist movement originally had a popular character, but the feudal slave-owning aristocracy of the Baggara tribes emerged gradually as the new ruling class, seized power, and thus exacerbated the class war. Dmitrevskii provides an economic-geographical outline; his political *obiter dicta* are in accordance with the spirit of the times (1951)—the Sudan is treated primarily as a potential *place d'armes* for NATO in a coming war against the Soviet Union; the Umma party is described as an agent of British imperialism. Kiselev traces the Sudanese national liberation movement (in its modern form) back to the early twenties. Though a Sudanese proletariat developed and on some occasions waged an anti-imperialist struggle, the 'national bourgeoisie' maintained its paramount position over the masses.[33]

The competition between various political factions is described as the Achilles heel of the liberation movement in the country and the Sudanese national bourgeoisie is accused of 'irresolution and inconsistency' in dealing with the many racial and religious differences in the country. More recently, the Umma party has been described as having a narrower social basis than the Ashiqqa (representing the progressive part of the national bourgeoisie, the urban lower middle class and enjoying the support of many workers). The Umma is said to have wanted 'independence under British sponsorship' and to have opposed the slogan of 'Unity of the Nile Valley'. These criticisms, however, are moderate in tone compared with the attacks of five or ten years ago—perhaps because there have been second thoughts in Moscow about the desirability of complete unity of the Nile valley under President Nasser.

MOST of Soviet African research is at present devoted to the problems of West Africa. Studies on the 'Economic Development and Struggle of the People of Nigeria (and French West Africa) against Imperialist Enslavement after World War II' are now in progress, as well as monographs on 'Liberia under the Yoke of American Monopoly', 'The struggle for independence of the peoples of Ghana', etc. It has been noted that the greater competence and volume of the material brought together makes it more difficult to discover where the picture has been distorted by omission, emphasis, or direct falsification. Thus in quoting the famous passage from El Bekri describing the Ghana kingdom, three references to Islam in the original text are omitted without indication.[34] There have been discussions among Soviet experts about such subjects as the prevalence of class divisions in parts of Central Africa, the existence of feudal relationships in French West Africa, etc.[35]

On current affairs, however, the change in the attitude of Soviet authors is marked. Dr Nkrumah and his party, who were violently denounced only four years ago, are now praised for their militancy and consistency in the struggle against British imperialism.[36]

The Ghana opposition, on the other hand, is described as fighting for the perpetuation of the old, semi-feudal, patriarchal social and economic order, and as being supported by the local English.[37] When Mr Potekhin visited Ghana in 1957 he found the country in a difficult position, to quote his travelogue, for it had to cope with the heritage of British colonialism—economic backwardness, one-sided development of agriculture, illiteracy, and general dependence on the imperialist powers. 'The domestic market is extremely small because of the general poverty, and to conquer a place on the world market is not merely a difficult task but almost impossible.' Many in Ghana have realised the importance of diminishing the country's economic dependence, 'but for the time being the development of the national economy is impossible without foreign

[32] S. R. Smirnov, *The revolt of the Mahdists in the Sudan* (Moscow, 1950); Y. D. Dmitrevskii, *Anglo-Egyptian Sudan* (Moscow, 1951); and V. I. Kiselev, *Sudan on its Way to Independence* (Moscow, 1958).

[33] V. I. Kiselev, *loc. cit.*, p. 179.

[34] 'Soviet Interest in Africa', in *World Today* (London), September 1956, p. 357.

[35] G. E. Skorov, *Franzuskii Imperializm v zapadnoi Afriki* (French Imperialism in West Africa), (Moscow, 1956), and the review by A. Orlova in *Sovetskaia Etnografiya*, 1956, 4, p. 181.

[36] A. Zusmanovich, 'Proletariat Afriki boretsia protiv imperializma' (The African proletariat fights Imperialism), in *Sovremenny Vostok*, 1958, 5, p. 32.

[37] I. Potekhin, 'V osvobozhdenoi Gane' (In liberated Ghana), in *Sovremenny Vostok*, 1958, 3, p. 37.

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investments'.[38] (Which brings up a number of ticklish questions, for Soviet economists have always maintained that foreign capital investment was undesirable for the backward countries.[39])

In a recent Soviet study it has been observed that it was not accidental but deeply significant that the peoples of the new state established on the territory of the former Gold Coast colony have called it Ghana. 'With this act they declared themselves the heirs of the culture and the glorious historical past of one of the oldest African States of the Sahara—namely Ghana.'[40] In a similar way the Mali, Songhai and Monomotapa empires have been recalled in Soviet writings; after all, were not the colonial boundaries arbitrarily drawn by the European imperialist powers? The new states were arising not in accordance with natural ethnic boundaries but as multi-national states and therefore encountered a great many difficulties.[41] Hence the preoccupation of Soviet specialists with the past (and future) internal demarcations in Africa, the study of the ethnic composition of various regions, the investigations into the growth of tribes into nations, and similar problems.

The Soviet reaction towards recent attempts to establish African unity has by no means been uniformly favourable. 'There is much in Pan-Africanism that is quite alien to our world outlook', Potekhin declared in his comment on the Accra conference in December 1958.[42] He chided the RDA for not having participated in the conference and he expressed scorn for the socialists of Equatorial Africa who had only a short while previously in Brazzaville adopted a resolution calling for the establishment of a United States of Central Africa. He criticised the 'extremely reactionary and feudal government party' of Northern Nigeria, and many other groups and political parties that now take a prominent part in African affairs. But he was not less critical of Tom Mboya's handling of the Accra conference: and especially his insistence on the use of peaceful means in the struggle against colonialism. Mboya's line, according to the Soviet expert, made an 'unfavourable impression'.[43]

SOVIET students of Africa have frequently accused Western historians (not always unjustly) of not being interested in Africa and the African peoples *per se*, but merely in Africa as an object of colonisation. The history of Africa, they argue, thus became identical with the history of the relations of the native peoples and tribes with the colonisers, whereas the inner, real history of Africa was ignored or dismissed as unimportant. *Mutatis mutandis*, Soviet African experts have been guilty of the same offence. In years past the peoples of Africa were described, in Soviet literature, as mere pawns in the struggle between various Western imperialist powers. Recently a more active role has been attributed to them, but again the main criterion is not the inner development and the national interest of the peoples, but their potential usefulness in the global struggle against the West. (Soviet writers argue, of course, that their struggle coincides with the national interest of the African peoples.) The great cultural heritage of the African peoples is praised in general terms; it is said to be equal to or even more important than the Western tradition. These friendly sentiments are however confined to the abstract sphere, and Soviet students of Africa have so far made no great effort to write what they consider the real history of Africa; nor have they revealed any particular interest in African culture. Very few contemporary African writers have been published in Russian, despite the many cultural conferences sponsored by the Soviet Union for the benefit of the underdeveloped countries: there is no 'Black Orpheus' and no 'Présence Africaine' in the Soviet Union. The growth of Soviet interest in Africa is gratifying and it would be wrong to assume that all of it is of a seasonal character, a mere concomitant of the cold war. (Some of it, however, undoubtedly is.) Since it is virtually certain that the Soviet leaders will sooner or later run up against the same difficulties in their relations with the African national movements

[38] *ibid.*, p. 39.

[39] See, e.g., G. Mirskii, L. Stepanov, '*On the prospects of economic co-operation between the countries of Asia and Africa*' (Moscow, 1958), pp. 35-40.

[40] A. S. Orlova, *Afrikanskie Narody* (Peoples of Africa), (Moscow, 1958), p. 98.

[41] I. Potekhin in *Sovetskaia Etnografiya*, 1957, 4, pp. 103-5.

[42] I. Potekhin, 'Africa throws off the chains of Colonialism', in *Mezhdunarodnaia Zhizn*, 1959, 2, p. 118.

[43] *ibid.*

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and national governments as they have in non-communist Asia and the Middle East, those elements in Soviet African studies that are based on a specific but transient political constellation, are bound to disappear. There are limits to the 'spirit of Bandung', and if the African governments come out in favour of real neutralism in world affairs, and refuse to facilitate the growth of communist movements at home, a certain cooling off in Soviet enthusiasm for Africa seems inevitable. As a result Soviet interest in the great historical and cultural heritage of Black Africa may likewise tend to diminish. There are additional difficulties. Many, probably most prominent African leaders have at one time or another been either members of the communist party or sympathisers, but few have remained in its ranks. It can be assumed that the Soviet Union and the communist parties will not repeat the mistakes they made in dealing with Garveyism (and the more modern forms of Pan-Africanism) or their errors in dealing with Bantu nationalism. Even so there are narrow limits to Soviet co-operation with the newly independent countries and the nationalist forces conducting the movement for independence. For there are irremovable sources of conflicts of interests: The Soviet Union wants African neutralism and national independence only as a transitional stage towards the victory of the communist parties in Africa, whereas the leaders of the national movement in Africa have quite different intentions with regard to the future of the continent.

The increase in Soviet interest in Africa and in Soviet activities is designed to bring about closer relations between the Soviet bloc and Africa. This will undoubtedly result in closer cultural, political, and economic ties, but it also means potential friction and conflict. Involvement is a dialectical process with consequences in various, and sometimes unexpected directions.

(*Continued from page 36*)
debate. The Young Communist League organisation in Changan, Shensi, organised some 130 intellectual youths in Fuchumiao *hsiang* to debate the following questions: Does one 'have one's talent humbled' by taking part in agricultural production? Can one study and advance while working in the field? The result of the debate was very good, and when it was concluded one primary school graduate said: 'Formerly I was bewitched, and always considered there was no future in being a farmer; now I have seen the happy future of the countryside. From now on I will settle down with a composed mind, and use my own hands to build up a beautiful home.'

Some of their professors, on the other hand, expressed a great desire to spend the rest of their lives as agricultural labourers in order to remould their thoughts. The following account is taken from the Peking Kuang Ming Jih Pao, 2 *November* 1957:

Venerable deputy dean Chang Hsi-t'i also asked to be sent to the countryside. He said: 'Although I am advanced in years, yet I am still physically strong, and there are many kinds of work like the picking of cotton and the peeling of potatoes which I can take up. I can also help the peasants to learn culture. Provided I am permitted to go, I am willing to leave Peking for anywhere including Tibet.'

In the Peking Institute of Petroleum Engineering, one week after the report was heard on 26 October, one-third of the teachers and employees sent in their pledges and applications. The deans and deputy deans as well as the Party committee secretaries also submitted their names for consideration. Two days ago, the school Party committee approved the applications of seven Party members holding posts of relative responsibility. This inspired and spurred on all the teachers and employees. The Democratic League Branch in this institute also called on members of the League to vie for the remoulding and training of themselves in the countryside. Professor Wu Ch'ih, deputy dean of instruction and responsible member of the Democratic League Branch, indicated that he would fight for his transfer to the countryside.

After the Peking Training College convened its mobilisation rally on 30 October, many teachers and employees submitted their names for consideration the following day. The release of one professor and six lecturers and assistant professors from the political seminar has been approved. Veteran Professor Ning Ch'e-ch'eng, whose release for transfer was approved, said: 'Although I am old, I am capable of tending cattle, breeding hogs and raising garden vegetables, I can remould my thought and train myself physically through labour.'

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THE DESTINIES OF SOCIOLOGY IN POLAND

One of the by-products of the Polish 'spring in October' of 1956 was the rehabilitation of sociology.

Polish academic sociology, resuscitated after the war, survived until 1949. In that year the existing chairs of sociology were transformed into chairs of the History of Social Thought, and the departments and institutes of sociology were liquidated. 'The reason for the re-organisation of the university sociology centres was given in the view that "university sociology coincided with the political attitude of Gomulkaism and revisionism, as well as of social-democratic opportunism." '[1] Another sociologist refers to the period no less bitterly: '*Przeglad Sociologiczny* (*Sociological Review*) ceased publication. The chairs of sociology changed their name and discontinued the training of sociologists. It was expected that historical materialism would effectively replace "bourgeois sociology," as well as the name of sociology itself.'[2]

With the beginning of the 'thaw,' sociology began to show signs of life. Polish sociologists were among the first to add their voice to the mounting protest against the strangulation of intellectual life by the Party.[3] The young sociologists, who after 1949 had camouflaged themselves as philosophers or economists and were still active in various university departments and seminars, became revisionists and were among the most vocal advocates of reform. It was self-evident that reform was to include the restoration of sociology; what they were after was freedom of enquiry into social phenomena.

The change began in 1955.

'Chronologically, the first timid sign of the rehabilitation of the term "sociology" was the creation of the Sociological Section in the Philosophical Society. Born in the early phase of the "thaw" to facilitate organisational and scientific contacts with sociology abroad, the Sociological Section has discreetly taken shelter in the Philosophical Society in order not to provoke the omniscient monopolists of sociological knowledge assembled in the Institute of Social Sciences attached to the Central Committee of the PUWP (*i.e.* the Party High School) and occupying the chairs of historical materialism at the universities and higher educational establishments.'[4]

After the Polish October two academic sociological institutions were officially established: the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, and the Institute of Sociology and the History of Culture of the Polish Academy of Sciences. In 1957 chairs of sociology were re-established in four Polish universities: three in Warsaw, two in Cracow, one in Lodz and one in Wroclaw. Research work has been resumed, and is concentrated at Warsaw and Lodz[5] (where an additional chair has been created). The old *Przeglad Socjologiczny* was re-established, a new, more popular magazine, *Kultura i Spoleczenstwo* (Culture and Society) started, and a new magazine, *Studia Socjologiczno-Polityczne* has appeared.

Contacts with the West were resumed. Not only at the official level, where they are much less stiff and formal than the relations with the Soviet 'sociologists,' but also on the more important level of individual study at Western universities. Polish delegates have attended various international conferences and seminars on sociological problems during the last two

[1] J. Chalasinski, Introduction, *Przeglad Sociologiczny*, Vol. XI, 1957, Lodz, p. 7. The quotation within the quotation is from *Mysl Filozoficzna*, No. 1-2, 1951, pp. 119-20.

[2] S. Nowakowski, 'Sociology and Marxism,' *Nauka Polska*, No. 2-3, 1956, p. 326.

[3] Cf. *Soviet Survey*, No. 11, pp. 7-8.

[4] J. Chalasinski, *Nauka Polska* (Polish Science), No. 4, 1956, p. 203.

[5] The Research Centre for the Theory of Culture and Social Change under Professor S. Ossowski, and the Research Centre for Sociological Studies under Professor J. Szczepanski.

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years, including among others: International conference on the relationship between thought and action, Warsaw, July 1957; UNESCO Anglo-Polish seminar on the social effects of industrialism, London, September 1957; International seminar on family research, Holland, October 1957; Seminar on myth-utopia-ideology, Austria, 1957; UNESCO seminar on public opinion research, Warsaw, September 1958.

The Western participants were struck by the differences in mentality and in approach to sociological problems between the Polish and Soviet social scientists. The Poles kept doctrinal considerations in the background, paid only the most modest tribute to ideology, avoided 'wooden formulas,' and had no difficulty in finding a common language, whatever the subject under discussion. The latter were concerned not with discussing the problem, but with showing Soviet superiority in solving it, or the wisdom of the 'classics of Marxism-Leninism' in formulating some eternal truths about it.

Sociology in Poland today

Perhaps the most important difference between the newly created Soviet sociologists and the rehabilitated Polish sociologists is the fact that the latter have been undertaking all kinds of research which are taboo in the Soviet Union. Statistics published in Poland give information, still kept secret in Russia, on wages, cost of living, etc., and the population census, on which Polish sociologists are collaborating will provide important social statistics. Not only are official statistics more comprehensive than in the USSR; Polish social scientists have been conducting some specific social investigations of a kind which is unique in a communist country (and have unique social material at their disposal).[6]

The unstable character of the post-October situation casts its shadow on the position of sociology. Its rehabilitation was so clearly connected with the general political situation and with revisionist pressures that Gomulka's consolidation of the Party rule and the drive against revisionism seem to signal danger. On the other hand the new position of sociology has found its expression on the institutional level. The new equilibrium is clearly connected with the limits of tolerance of the Gomulka régime and its repercussions within the bloc. There are four main differences between Gomulka's Poland and other countries in the communist bloc: agricultural policy, priority of investment for the consumer goods industries in the new plan, the position of the church, and relatively greater freedom of thought. For sociology it is this last which is important. Freedom of enquiry can obviously endanger the doctrinal legitimation of Party rule and undermine its position. Therefore it has to be restricted. The question is, by how much. At the moment, sociology in Poland provides one exception to the rule in all other communist countries. Its close relation to doctrine makes it particularly vulnerable, and the anti-revisionist campaign adds fuel to the fire. However, there are other factors in the balance sheet. The first is that sociology as such has been formally legitimised in the Soviet Union, so that what can be called in question is the scope of Polish sociology and not its existence. That gives a greater margin for manoeuvre, apart from the general margin which is a function of the degree of Polish independence of the Kremlin. Within this margin, which is narrowing, some local deviations are, at least temporarily, stabilised, while others are threatened. Whether a mixed sociology, paying lip service to the doctrine but in part empirically oriented, can survive as a *differentia specifica* of what was once called 'the Polish road to socialism,' remains to be seen. Polish sociologists prefer to believe that it will. Some base their hopes on the belief that it is of use to the ruling party, an instrument of social research which will prevent it from losing contact with reality, as happened in Stalin's time. For this, so their reasoning goes, the Party needs an autonomous sociology, which will be a more reliable and less distorting source of information on social matters than the Party bureaucracy. The results of research, even when published, reach such a limited audience, that it should present no political danger from the point of view of Party rule. In short, sociologists will play the

[6] On recent Polish research cf.: Jan Szczepanski, 'Sociology in contemporary Poland,' *Polish Perspectives*, No. 1, May 1958, pp. 30-36; *International Social Science Bulletin*, No. 2, 1957, and Cecile Andrieux in *Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie*, Vol. XXIV, 1958, pp. 167-175.

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rôle of the intellectuals at the time of enlightened absolutism, providing their rulers with important analysis and knowledge, without sharing it with the masses.

This optimistic scheme does not emphasise the totalitarian character of the state or the doctrinal legitimation of Party rule in a mass society. Such legitimation involves the identification of the Party with the working class, which is an ideological fiction and not a sociological fact, the historical mission of the Party to establish a classless and stateless society, a doctrinal myth which cannot be subjected to sociological enquiry, and the question of the eschatological opposition of capitalism and socialism, which must prevent any sober analysis of social change. However, such contradictions are not necessarily more potent than pragmatic considerations in the exercise of power. Party rule in Poland in the last two years has been greatly consolidated, both politically and organisationally, but ideological consolidation is still lacking. The myth which was broken with the fallen idol cannot be revived. The ideological elan has gone. Even the older ideological functionaries lack it. The younger people who were to have become the ideological pillars of the régime have undergone the revisionist disillusion. The Party has very few people on whom to rely in its Marxist-Leninist counter-offensive, now being mounted to achieve ideological reconsolidation. The revisionist horse can be brought back to the orthodox Marxist-Leninist pond, but he cannot be made to believe that it is anything but water. Like the rest of the population, the academic people may be forced to compromise, but when they do so, it is on tactical, not ideological grounds.

In such a situation, when the Party rule is based less than ever before on the ideological promptings of the *apparatchiki*, sociology may either succumb to the necessity of reinforcing the missing (ideological) link, or survive in its absence until some further changes occur in the slow erosion of the 'monolithic' dictatorship. Such changes clearly transcend the internal Polish scene.

Sociology and the doctrine

In Poland, where ideological questioning has gone further than in any other communist country, the sociological questions relating to doctrinal assertions were most explicitly posed.

Two events are particularly worth noting in this connection. One was the publication of Professor Stanislaw Ossowski's *The class structure in social consciousness* (Lodz, 1957); the other an article by Andrzej Malewski, 'The empirical meaning of the theory of historical materialism.'[7] Both provoked discussion, which was the more remarkable because it occurred at a time when debate in literary and social weeklies was gradually dying down, as they were again being taken under Party control (like *Nowa Kultura*), or liquidated (like *Po Prostu*). This discussion on fundamentals took place in the columns of the bi-monthly, *Studia Filozoficzne*, edited by the arch-revisionist, Leszek Kolakowski (then abroad) and had repercussions in the official *Polityka* and in the theoretical Party organ, *Nowe Drogi*. By its nature it was limited to a rather narrow audience.

Professor Ossowski's book had been partly written during the previous era of 'errors and distortions' when he was prevented from teaching and isolated as a heretic. He first presented the theses of his book at the inaugural session of the newly created Sociological Section of the Philosophical Society[8] (of which he became the first chairman) in July 1956. Later they were presented to a wider audience in French (*Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie*, Paris, 1956), and in English (*Transactions of the Third World Congress of Sociology*, Amsterdam, 1956).[9] The main interest of the book lies in its attempt to analyse systematically various types of social stratification, to relate them to historical social structures, and to develop a methodology which will make possible a systematic analysis of social stratification, both in its subjective and objective aspect. It is also concerned with the sociology of knowledge; it tries to see how the various types of social stratification were perceived by the societies in question, and why certain criteria were selected as the most important.

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[7] *Studia Filozoficzne*, No. 2, 1957, pp. 58-81.

[8] It became the nucleus of the Polish Sociological Society formed in 1957.

[9] Professor Ossowski's book will soon appear in France. An English edition is contemplated.

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Its interest is, of course, theoretical, and its originality lies not in its subject, which has been widely discussed in the West, but in the historical sweep of its comparative analysis, as well as in the logical precision of its conceptual apparatus. Whatever methodological reservations may be made, it is clear that Ossowski is mainly concerned with the logical and methodological questions of social analysis; the political interest is only indirect, and is related to Party interference with social analysis, to the situation in which the epistemological totalitarians were trying to transform the theory of social knowledge into the practice of social ignorance. This naturally has some bearing on delicate points of the doctrine and on some social facts which are taboo, of which the social stratification in communist countries is the most conspicuous. Ossowski draws a parallel between the Soviet version of Soviet society as a non-egalitarian society with synthetic gradations, and the American vision of American society as one with equal opportunities, also characterised by synthetic gradations based on a functional scheme. He finds the elements of a 'classless' myth in both cases and analyses its social significance, referring fairly openly to the political roots of the semantic confusion in the Stalinist theory of Soviet society. He does not give any new and startling illustrations of the practice of 'classlessness' in such societies, and in this respect his book is not comparable to the one by Djilas. But as a piece of analysis it is incomparably more refined. Djilas' book is interesting as a kind of testimony from inside by an *apparatchik* about social inequalities in a society ruled by the communist party, but its method of analysis is fairly crude. Ossowski's book is not only sociologically sophisticated, but also has behind it the humanistic reading and historical knowledge which are so often lacking in the jargonised elaborations of Western sociologists. Ossowski points out Stalin's methodological deviation from Marx:

'From the point of view of Marx and Lenin "non-antagonistic classes" is a contradiction in terms . . . . The concept of "non-antagonistic classes" arose from certain postulates of Soviet internal policy. The official recognition of the working class and the kolkhoz peasantry as the *only* classes still existing in the Soviet Union, by referring to objective economic criteria, solved for good (in the negative sense) the question of the existence of privileged and under-privileged classes in the new social structure . . . . Soviet ideology uses two concepts of class: the Marxist in respect to other countries, and, in a certain sense, the one of Adam Smith when it comes to its own society . . . . The application of the Marxian scheme of social structure to capitalist societies alone is completely well-founded from the point of view of Marxian assumptions, because the Marxian analysis was concerned solely with the system of classes in an order where class antagonisms were the result of the private ownership of the means of production. Neither Marx nor Engels analysed the structure of a society where the means of production have been nationalised, of a society which did not exist at that time. There is therefore, in the Soviet view of Soviet society, no abandonment of the Marxian theses, despite the introduction of the un-Marxian concept of "non-antagonistic classes." One can only speak of the abandonment of the Marxian methods of sociological analysis. Because of the propagandistic functions of social sciences the Marxian methods, like all methods of sociological analysis which threaten the stereotypes and social fictions, are rarely suitable, from the point of view of the ruling or privileged groups, to the analysis of their own society, but they are a useful weapon against enemies . . . . The concept of a non-egalitarian classless society (the concept, not the term), put into the framework of different theories of social class, is used to describe its own society in the leading country of the socialist world and in the leading country of the capitalist world . . . . This analogy is linked with the wider question of the causal conditioning of various important social phenomena which, despite superficial impressions and theoretical simplifications to the contrary, appear in both contemporary forms of the two opposing economic orders . . . . The 19th century concept of social class, in both its Marxian and liberal interpretations, has lost its actuality in the contemporary world . . . . Where political power can openly and successfully change the class structure, where the most important privileges connected with social status, including the privilege of a larger share of the social income, are conferred by political power, where a large, if not a major part of the population is embraced by a stratification typical of bureaucratic hierarchies, there the 19th century concept of social class becomes more or less an anachronism, and class antagonisms give way to other forms of social conflict . . . . The Marxian doctrine, which had such a powerful revo-

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lutionary dynamic, has been adjusted, in its new form as a state doctrine, to the needs of stabilising the new order and of defending the new privileged strata. In ways that recall the ideology of human rights expressed in the catchword of the French Revolution, or the teaching of the Bible in the Middle Ages, Marxism in the period which has been named after Stalin, split into the revolutionary ideology and the official doctrine, petrified in its thought-content but very flexible in its apologetical applications to current policies.' It would be, of course, wrong to regard these passages as the gist of the book. Ossowski is concerned with the general theory of stratification. The remarks on Soviet social stratification are marginal; but they touch upon sensitive points of the communist ideology and Soviet dogma. Ossowski was criticised by the ideologists of the Gomulka régime dissatisfied with the 'revisionist' aspect of his analysis. (As early as 1947 he had indicated the need for a systematic revision of Marxism. In an article published in *Mysl Wspolczesna* in January 1948, 'The theoretical tasks of Marxism,' he wrote of the necessity of incorporating in it the results of modern scientific research and of the experience of social change over the last century.)

The young sociologist J. Wiatr, who figured prominently in the anti-revisionist discussions, wrote in the semi-official *Polityka* (12 June, 1958), that Kolakowski's ideas as expressed in his article 'The actual and the non-actual notions of Marxism'[10] are derived from earlier articles by Ossowski. The logical and genealogical connection between the ideas of the two was in fact obvious, and Wiatr criticised them both for attributing the 'dogmatic distortions' of Marxism not to the 'cult of the individual' but to the vested interest of the Party.

A more fundamental (though qualified) criticism came from the pen of the Minister of Higher Education, Stefan Zolkiewski. In an article published in the theoretical organ of the Party, *Nowe Drogi* (No. 6, 1958), he admitted that 'the book tries to pose topical and scientific problems' and that 'it would be harmful to use administrative means in such scientific discussions.' Nevertheless the book was harmful: 'It can have a quite definite and unambiguous social and even directly political influence . . . . In the intellectual activity of those who have undertaken to revise Marxism, neo-Kantian tendencies and the old theories of humanitarian socialism are revived again . . . . Revisionists, encountering the obviously inadequate Marxist solutions, do not search for more adequate solutions in accord with the inner consistency of Marxist theory, but turn towards "empirical" analysis. Such a methodological attitude inevitably leads to eclecticism.'

Having censured the revisionists for 'empiricism,' Zolkiewski uses an 'empirical' argument against Ossowski, finding quite inadequate his proof that 'the essential thing today is not the economic power of classes, but the power of the state.' The relatively civilised form of the censure is emphasised by Zolkiewski's asides and qualifications. Polish intellectuals, he says, 'fear that all debate about cultural policy, about scientific policy, all analysis of the class character of science and of some disciplines is a first step on the road back to past errors, to the restriction of discussion, to the control of science, to the pragmatic evaluation of the results of research, and to the reduction of all discussion to questions of the political struggle. To underestimate these dangers may have bad consequences.'

It is interesting to note that some of his remarks, mostly qualifying his censure of Ossowski, were ommitted from the article printed in *Nowe Drogi*. The text published in Zolkiewski's collection of essays, *Culture and Politics* (Warsaw, 1958), contains some passages whose deletion in *Nowe Drogi* was probably not accidental:

'The detailed questions raised by Professor Ossowski have a scientific value, and the subsidiary questions he puts are important: What is the character of the theory of social structure? Are they theories of ideal types or historical theories? . . . . Professor Ossowski asks the essential question. He answers it inadequately, with insufficient arguments . . . . But his book is in no case political agitation. It is an attempt at scientific discussion . . . . The whole book testifies to his subjective tendency to retain a strictly scientific rigour, a strictly scientific attitude' (pp. 201-3).

Zolkiewski does not want to enter 'into a discussion on the merits of the case,' but in another essay admits that 'our faulty policy led unfortunately to a decline of systematic and method-

[10] *Nowa Kultura*, 27 January, 1957.

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ical research into the social processes and changes in class structure of the societies which have undergone a socialist revolution' (p. 174).

More relevant to the present discussion is a review of Ossowski's book which appeared in *Studia Filozoficzne* (No. 4, 1958), written by an ex-contributor to *Po Prostu*, J. Szacki. Szacki thinks that 'the hierarchy of social positions created by deliberate intervention of the state in social life is not the only hierarchy in socialist societies. This requires concrete research.' Referring to Marx' 'Critique of the Gotha Programme,' he pointedly remarks that 'it seems inappropriate to search for the genesis of the concept of "non-egalitarian classlessness" only in the interests of the new privileged groups. The responsibility for its formulation lies elsewhere.' He adds: 'I am not, of course, contending that, for instance, Soviet society is nothing but the realisation of Marx' opinions about the first stage of communism. Such a position would be completely absurd for many reasons.' But he finds the concept of a 'new class' unsatisfactory, which is not surprising since he considers Ossowski's analysis of class too schematic and formal and at the same time stresses 'the striking fact that the creators of Marxism did not leave behind them a homogeneous and systematic theory of social classes.'

Marxism and empirical verification

The anxiety of the young Polish sociologists to check Marxist theories against facts was expressed most strikingly and systematically in an article by A. Malewski on 'The empirical meaning of the theory of historical materialism.[11] Malewski poses the problem squarely:

'Historical materialism . . . . served as the ideology of a mass political movement, an ideology which had to give this movement the certainty of victory and the conviction that its endeavours are supported by the authority of science. But this ideology, pregnant with emotion, contains also a heavy theoretical load. In the first place it contains a series of general sociological propositions. It may be asked which of these propositions have withstood the test of confrontation with the facts and can be incorporated into the social sciences as a permanent achievement recognised by every specialist.'

According to Malewski, the formulation of some of the most fundamental Marxian statements is often either vague, or metaphorical and ambiguous:

'It is necessary to draw attention to the fact that among the basic statements of historical materialism there are many whose empirical verification encounters serious difficulties. We read for instance that "in the last instance economic conditions determine historical development." Can we imagine such observable facts as would persuade us to reject that statement? We have to answer this question negatively. However much our knowledge of the world may increase, however many new facts we discover, nothing can threaten this statement, because the way it is formulated protects it in principle against the possibility of empirical refutation.

Similar remarks come to mind when we read that historical materialism is "that understanding of historical development which regards as the ultimate cause and a decisive force in all important historical events the economic development of society, changes in the methods of production and exchange . . . ." What does an *ultimate* cause mean? What facts have we in mind when we talk about important historical events which are causally connected with changes in the methods of production? What relation of dependence is affirmed here between the explanatory facts and the facts to be explained? The statements quoted often create among the inexperienced a conviction, due to picturesque associations, that they understand them satisfactorily. In fact they are formulated in such an inapprehensible way that to check them empirically is impossible.'

In order to rescue Marx' sociological insights, Malewski reformulates his propositions in a way that makes it possible to recognise what facts may confirm, and what facts disprove them. He presents Marx's sociological ideas as general hypotheses 'which as far as possible are made to comply with the requirements of verifiability.' He discusses three such theories derived from Marx's writings, which are then subdivided into a set of more precisely formulated statements which may be empirically refuted. They are put under three headings: (1) a theory of

[11] The article is an introduction to a wider study undertaken by the Research Centre for the Theory of Culture and Social Change (*Studia Filozoficzne*, No. 2, 1957, p. 58). It was first presented as a paper at a meeting in the Academy of Sciences.

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relationship between the situation in which people live and the behaviour of those people as a mass phenomenon; (2) a theory of society as a system of groups with opposing interests; (3) a theory of changes in the social structure.

Having discussed in detail his set of reformulated Marxist hypotheses, Malewski comes to the conclusion that 'they are applicable in full to all societies with state ownership of factories and central planning known to us,' and not only to capitalist societies. He concludes that general sociological hypotheses, which are not contradictory and supplement one another, can be derived not only from Marx but 'from the works of thinkers propounding theories marked by opposing social ideologies or obviously contradictory philosophical ideas,' such as Pareto and Znaniecki. This process of distillation and refinement of the ideas of classical writers into rigorously formulated sets of hypotheses whose precision makes them empirically verifiable he calls 'continuation analysis.' As to official Marxism, he does not equivocate:

'The official Marxism of the past years, this Marxism which was an official state doctrine imposed on millions of people, contained, I think, many assertions which are strikingly false or devoid of empirical sense; assertions omitted from our paper. We can use as an illustration such theses as that every state where the means of production are privately owned is merely an instrument in the hands of the possessing classes, of capitalists and landlords, for the defence of their class privileges; that every work of art or science serves one of the struggling classes and if it serves one it cannot serve the other; that every class can be represented by only one party; that after the abolition of private ownership in the means of production the exploitation of man by man disappears and the working people acquire a decisive influence on the government of the state, and so on, and so on. The doubt often arises whether the creators of Marxism themselves would have been satisfied with such an interpretation of their formulations. Nevertheless these assertions are somehow related to the formulations of Marx and Engels.'

Malewski's attempt to rescue the rational kernel of Marxism, by stressing the need of empirical verification, was followed by an attempt to rescue its teleological framework in a counter-attack by Wiatr, trying to safeguard the ideological foundations of the Party in the name of a new, Gomulkaist orthodoxy.

The dispute, which included a rejoinder by Malewski and another long counter-attack by Wiatr, was very pointed; the opponents did not pull their punches and, considering the circumstances, were amazingly frank.[12]

Wiatr admits the necessity of making the propositions of historical materialism more precise, he objects to Malewski's 'methods of analysis.' He agrees that 'the dual character of the theory of historical materialism, which is both a sociological system and a form of ideology, often impaired scientific objectivity when the ideological factors came to include the distortions of the "personality cult." This does not mean, however, that the theory of historical materialism as a whole was just a complex of misunderstandings and mystifications, from which only particular true statements can be extracted . . . . The development and precise formulation of Marxist sociology should take place within the theory of historical materialism which, for all its shortcomings and errors, has remained attractive and scientifically up-to-date.' Wiatr claims further that Malewski restricts the applicability of historical materialism under socialism to secondary problems, denies the class character of the state, and rejects some other propositions of Marxist sociology which are correct and important.

In a sharp rejoinder, Malewski accused his critic of using underhand methods of discussion, as all the statements for whose ommision he was criticised, were either false or indefinite in meaning. He concentrated particularly on the meaning of the concept of 'ideology,' deftly used by Wiatr as a stick with which to beat his opponent:

'Another complication connected with ideology as a set of opinions related to ends or values is that the concept of ideology is sometimes enlarged to include not only ends but means. Whenever we deal with competitive ends, and this is what happens as a rule, the acceptance of certain means often implies some assessment of the relative importance of the competitive ends. Therefore it is partly dependent on value-judgments. But it also depends to a high degree on our knowledge of causal connections.

[12] *Studia Filozoficzne*, No. 2, 1957, Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5, 1958.

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Despite Wiatr's opinion, the question whether the dictatorship of the proletariat is in the given circumstances an effective means of building socialism can be resolved on rational grounds, but only if we define beforehand the sense in which the words "socialism" and "dictatorship of the proletariat" are used; whether they are used as Engels used them in 1891, or Lenin in 1917, or Stalin in 1936.'

Malewski's objections to Wiatr's method of discussion transcend the personal aspect of the dispute; they refer to practices used generally by the official ideologists and not by participants in *bona fide* rational debate:

'Wiatr writes all the time in such a way that it is not clear if he is talking in his own name, or in the name of Marx and Engels, or in the name of Professor Schaff, or in the name of the world camp of progress . . . . However, since as far as I know neither Marx, nor Engels, nor their friend Kautsky, nor Lenin ever gave Wiatr any exclusive rights to speak in their name or made him their plenipotentiary, I would like to ask Wiatr humbly to speak in future in his own name only and not to appropriate to himself the monopoly of Marxist tradition.'

Wiatr did not take up this particular point in his reply. He reiterated instead that Marxism is an attempt to create a scientific ideology, that it is wrong to interpret sociology as a collection of separate statements, and to deny the importance of the Marxist sociological system as a whole; it is not to be apprehended as no more than a set of individual hypotheses and general propositions. Such a reduction of sociological problems impoverishes Marxist sociology.

This esoteric discussion in the columns of *Studia Filozoficzne* was taken up in the more popular weekly magazine, the semi-official *Polityka* (1 November 1958). It defined Malewski's attitude unambiguously:

'On first sight it is only a relatively innocent correction. It may seem that the author extracted what is most important in Marx's theory. *In fact, however, when one looks closer, it appears that the inclination to empirical verification leads to the refutation of the fundamental theses of Marxism, of what it has brought to science, and what is its historical achievement.*'

National roads to sociology?

Questions and debates with such a high revisionist potential are bound to have repercussions in the citadel of the guardians of the doctrine and to be reflected in turn in the more orthodox satellites.

It is interesting, however, to note that the 'law of uneven development' applies also to these spheres. It takes quite a time before the orthodox ideological functionaries come to the point, and even more before they feel free to deal with it. In respect to these Polish disputes the time-lag has had some revealing consequences.

In January 1957 Wiatr and Bauman published an article in *Mysl Filozoficzna*[13] entitled 'Marxism and Contemporary Sociology.' The article was written in the flush of October and Wiatr was still very 'revisionist.'

The authors advocated 'a radical revision of attitude towards other than Marxist trends in world sociology.' They declared that 'scientific discussion in sociology, as in other fields of science, is a vital and necessary prerequisite of its development, and should not be crudely treated as a reflection of the struggle of political conceptions. Contemporary society cannot exist without social sciences, without sociology . . . .'

Kolakowski, who was later to be frequently attacked by Wiatr, was then still quoted with approval. The article praised his remark that 'the intellectuals are needed by the Communist party not in order to express their enthusiasm about the wisdom of its decisions but in order to make its decisions wise.'

Wiatr and Bauman were severely censured for the article in *Voprosy Filosofii* (No. 4, 1957, pp. 227-29). They were accused of propagating 'the old revisionist theory of class collaboration, the idea of the reconciliation of the two irreconciliable classes, the petty-bourgeois idea of freedom from party guidance, and finally, the idea of the reconciliation of the two opposed camps in philosophy and sociology: materialism and idealism.'

Wiatr answered the charges in *Polityka* (No. 33, 1957), but that was not the end. In December 1957 the theoretical monthly of the Bulgarian C.P., *Novo Vreme* took up the attack in an article by N. Iribadzhakov, 'Party-ness and social science.' As usual in such cases, the

[13] Later replaced by *Studia Filozoficzne*, a special philosophical magazine, when philosophy and sociology in Poland separated. As can be seen the discussion on Marxist sociology was still conducted in the philosophical magazine.

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Bulgarian article was a crudely re-written version of the Soviet one. Wiatr and Bauman 'want to bury Marxism and replace it by the reactionary recommendations of bourgeois ideologists . . . . The poor knights of revisionism imagine that they can pass as the defenders of Marxism from "Stalinism" while aping bourgeois ideologists.'

In the meantime one of them, Wiatr, had partly changed front and, while the Soviet and satellite press condemned his 'revisionism,' he was attacking his revisionist ex-fellow travellers, and coming more and more to play the part of the young rising star in the Gomulkaist ideological firmament. In his final rejoinder to Malewski, demonstrating the necessity of retaining the ideological content of Marxist sociology, Wiatr complained of Iribadzhakov's article, and charged both his opponents with similar methods of discussion.

But a 'centrist' position is not always the most comfortable. *Voprosy Filosofii* continued to castigate him. There was more than one disparaging reference in its columns to his early article, which clearly became for it one that, together with the writings of Kolakowski, Lukacs, Djilas, Lefebvre, and others, was now regarded as a revisionist manifesto.

In an article on Marxist sociology, *Voprosy Filosofii* wrote that 'the article by J. Wiatr and Z. Bauman apparently has a programmatic character . . . . and has had certain practical results. Its basic demand, the separation of sociology as a concrete science of society from ideology, has already led the editorial board of *Studia Filozoficzne* to announce . . . . that "in connection with sociology having acquired an autonomous status as an independent discipline, this periodical will have a more specifically philosophical character." '

Although in the meantime Wiatr had conducted in its columns an anti-revisionist polemic against Malewski, and the Soviet Sociological Association had been created, *Voprosy Filosofii* (No. 7, 1958, pp. 3-19), again returned to his early article (the autonomous status of sociology is evidently a very sensitive point) in an editorial written by the editor-in-chief, Kammari, under the title 'The revisionist myth of the "liberation" of science from ideology.'

Wiatr's sins are not forgiven, despite his about turn:

'In his article "On the interpretation of historical materialism"[14] Wiatr tries to dissociate himself from revisionism by stressing that in Marxism science and ideology are closely linked. But this emphasis does not change anything in the essential character of his position, as it remains positivistic and directed against the philosophical foundations of Marxism . . . . The positivistic idea of the liberation of science from ideology has logically led Wiatr and Bauman to direct capitulation to bourgeois ideology . . . . to idealism and bourgeois sociology . . . . They have slid down from "using" contemporary "Western sociology" to direct participation in the creation of the "new contemporary sociology" together with bourgeois sociologists. And where has contemporary Marxist sociology gone? According to the authors it has not been created yet and they propose to create it in partnership with contemporary bourgeois sociologists . . . . Wiatr and Bauman regard various non-Marxist trends in sociology much more favourably and uncritically than Gurvitch does.[15] At the third Sociology Congress in Amsterdam Gurvitch criticised the so-called "social stratification" which aspires to replace the Marxian theory of class struggle. It is precisely this theory that Wiatr and Bauman propose to "elaborate". . . . "The question of social stratification under socialism," they write, "cannot be replaced by the exegesis of Stalin's scientifically primitive thesis about the division into two non-antagonistic classes . . . ." It is interesting to note the cowardly manner, characteristic of revisionism, of attacking the foundations of Marxism under the guise of criticising individual representatives of this teaching, and of suppressing its well-known achievements, in this case the fact that it was just the Marxists, including J. V. Stalin, who gave a deep, concrete analysis of the nature not only of the "two basic classes" but of all non-antagonistic formations in a society passing from capitalism to socialism, as well as of the various intermediate social strata and groups within the classes.

The appeal to liberate science from ideology leads logically to attacks on the principle of the Communist *partiinost* of Marxist philosophy and sociology.'

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[14] *Studia Filozoficzne*, No. 1, 1958. This was the first of Wiatr's attacks on the anti-Marxist heresy of Malewski.

[15] Professor Gurvitch has been recently engaged in a dispute on Marxism in *Annals of Law Department of the University of Belgrade*, July—September 1958.

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Sociological perspectives and the perspectives of sociology

From these disputes on sociology in the post-1956 Communist world some points stand out which indicate the character of the change it is undergoing, the problems it has to face in the adjustment of doctrine to reality, and the limitations which political necessities impose upon this process. In general the prospects of sociology under communism are a corollary of the vulnerability of the doctrine to empirical recognition. On the other hand the growing complexity of the economic system, the changing social structure, and the new problems resulting from it (as well as from the international situation) make increasing demands on the Party to approach them more rationally, to recognise realities at the peril of losing control of the process. In their positivistic enthusiasm some Polish sociologists tend to attribute too great a pragmatic rôle to sociology as the necessary instrument for bringing the rulers nearer to reality. It can hardly pretend to do so in the West; even less can it aspire to this rôle in the East. From the point of view of Party rule the fundamental thing is that the recognition should come from the Party itself. This leaves room, as a corollary to the 'revolution from above,' for sociology 'from above' only. Freedom of enquiry (*i.e.* sociology 'from below') immediately starts all the deviationist skeletons in the cupboards rattling. After all, they found themselves there in the first place precisely because they were tampering with sensitive areas of the doctrine. The process of recognition thus has to be gradual (if possible imperceptible), so as not to undermine the legitimacy of the Party. But the process is also uneven, as the disputes described here so clearly show. The monolithic Stalinist facade has given way to a scheme of synthetic gradations, to use Professor Ossowski's term. It would be imprudent to exaggerate its significance but it would be foolish not to recognise its importance. More than elsewhere, in the Communist world *la verité est dans les nuances.*

The picture is complex. The margin of freedom provided by political developments in Poland was sufficient to re-establish sociology. Now it is facing growing dangers. The new decree on universities will restrict academic freedom, temporarily reconquered. The Marxist offensive in the universities may reintroduce some of the lecturers in Marxism-Leninism dismissed after October and subdue the heretical spirit of the others. But it is unlikely to change their minds. There is an uneasy balance in which not only the tormented academicians but the tormenting *apparatchiki* have to make tactical compromises. This leaves some margin for manoeuvre and the continuance of research.

In Russia, while sociology has been recognised, it is unlikely that it will provide much information on the Soviet social scene. Even if some research is done, its results are not published. Indeed, surreptitious research may well become the next step in the painstaking progress of Soviet sociology. In China 'bourgeois' sociologists, headed by Fei Hsiao-tung, became early victims of the anti-flower campaign.

The destinies of sociology under Communism and its doctrinal legitimation are inextricably mixed. But they exist within a social matrix and are subject to social change. The new social problems arising from industrialisation, from the replacement of the Stalinist generation by a new one less apt to ascribe its prospects of advance to revolutionary merit, and, perhaps, from the restriction of terror, may gradually erode some of the resistance to sociological research and even demonstrate its necessity. But this is clearly a long-term affair, and there are no precedents to show how a totalitarian Party adjusts itself to the slow process of *embourgeoisement.* Nor is it yet clear how the *routinisation of charisma* in Soviet society will be affected by the post-revolutionary dynamic of Chinese Communism.

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IDEOLOGY AND THE TRANSITION TO COMMUNISM

*Erich Goldhagen**

THE vision of the good society, of the stateless commonwealth of the free and the equal which Lenin set out to realise, has never been fully extinguished in the totalitarian Leviathan. It has remained an item of doctrine included in every textbook on government and economics. It is the refrain of every Party document and pronouncement. It shouts down from the ubiquitous slogans adorning the Soviet landscape. Soviet leaders have never ceased to profess their commitment to the achieving of utopia. Amid the most ruthless terror, the most violent degradation of the individual, amid the nightmare of political and intellectual conformity, the Soviet dictatorship continued to affirm that these are but the prelude to the kingdom of freedom.

It would be easy to dismiss such utterances as cynical *arcana dominationis*, clever propaganda devices calculated to fulfil the function that Marxism assigns to the hereafter in supernatural religions—an opiate to soften the hardships and the sufferings of the present, a legitimation of the dictatorship. But even if it is granted that the leadership uses the futuristic elements of Marxist ideology cynically, this does not exhaust their manifold rôle. It must be remembered that through incessant repetition they have penetrated the minds of millions of Soviet citizens and have invested the collective endeavour of Soviet society with hope and purpose.

Unlike the religious hereafter, whose existence no living man could verify, and the eschaton of Christianity of the remote and unspecified future beyond the horizon of history, the society towards which the Communist leadership claims to lead the people has been spelled out in concrete terms, to be realised on this side of the grave, within history and under certain specified conditions. Sometimes even a specific date is set. 'The age group of people who were 15 or 20 years old in 1920 will live to see the communist society. This is the happy and proud generation which personally participates in the building up of the two phases of communism.'[1] Economic prosperity is to be accompanied by the gradual reduction of inequalities of income and the realisation of the principle 'from each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs,' and the state as an instrument of coercion is to die away. To be sure, according to Stalin the state would remain even under communism and will die away only after the capitalistic encirclement will have receded; in the meantime it would guard society against the 'machinations' of its enemies. But even this revision of the doctrine held out the promise of the ultimate disappearance of the state.

To Soviet citizens such promises spelt in concrete terms their fervent hopes: the end of the nightmare of terror, the improvement of their material lot, and the reduction of the glaring inequalities of which Stalinism boasted. Time and again such hopes would be expressed *sub rosa* through the legitimate invocation of canonised doctrine. Freedom and plenty would be *in Gedanken erlebt*. Have we not reached a level of prosperity allowing a more equitable distribution of income? Are we not powerful enough to dispense with many of the punitive functions of the state? Why cannot the state begin to wither away? It was especially in Poland and in Hungary that the old libertarian slogans of Marxism were inscribed on the banners of revolt raised by 'revisionists' against the terroristic dictatorship. In Russia, also, similar sentiments were voiced. Khrushchev, in his speech to the 20th Party congress, denounced 'leading workers who interpret gradual transition from socialism to communism as a signal for the implementation of communist society already at the present stage. Some hotheads

* *The author is indebted for assistance to the Russian Research Center of Harvard University.*

[1] A. Stepanyan in *O Sovetskom sotsialisticheskom obshchestve* (Moscow, 1948), p. 542.

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decided that the construction of socialism had already been completed and they began to compile a detailed timetable for the transition to communism. On the basis of such utopian views a negligent attitude towards the socialist principle of material incentives began to take root .... The Party duly rebuffed these attempts to minimise the results achieved in socialist construction and corrected the authors of these extravagant projects and the pipe dreamers who, divorced from reality, introduced harmful confusion in fundamental issues of socialist economic development.'[2] If *uravnilovka* (equality-mongering) has reared its head among 'leading workers,' who, being of a higher income level, are unlikely to be actuated by self-interest, all the more strongly must the theme of equality persist among the grass roots.

IN an article in the theoretical organ of the Party the prevailing inequalities of incomes are defended against 'some readers who propose that (the differences of income) be abolished and payments equalised.' Such proposals are rejected as premature. They contradict 'the objective economic laws of socialism. Their adoption would liquidate the material stimuli for raising productivity. They would impede the transition to communism and .... worsen the economic conditions of the workers.'[3] Others, infected by 'revisionism' of the Yugoslav variety, 'hasten to sing a farewell song to the state' and think 'that the working masses could substitute themselves for the Party or its leadership and become a force directly determining the system of government.'[4] Shades of the workers' opposition in the early twenties! Lenin's denunciation of this opposition and the fate meted out to it are recalled as a warning to those harbouring these views. Still others maintain that as the 'consciousness of the workers has greatly risen and their understanding of societal interests has grown, and as the administrative functions of the government would shrink with the advance towards communism, the Party, as the leading force in the system of socialist government, would correspondingly weaken.' This is curtly dismissed as an incorrect conclusion.[5]

These ideas, innocently voiced through the medium of the official doctrine, bear witness to the tenacious survival of the libertarian conviction in the ruling party itself. Some take the promises of liberty and equality seriously and ask: Has not the time come at least to work towards their fulfilment? It was perhaps the East German 'revisionist,' Ernst Bloch, who gave the most eloquent expression to these demands in his book significantly entitled *Das Prinzip Hoffnung*, afterwards condemned as heretical. 'Revolutions realise the oldest hopes of mankind .... It is for this reason that they imply and demand the ever more precise concretisation of what is meant by the realm of freedom and the uninterrupted journey towards it .... Until its possible fulfilment this intention is a daydream-world on the road. No partial payment can make one forget it. No premonition rendered absolute should make us forget the memory of this intention .... The highest degree of consciousness of this memory is expressed in the psalm: may my right hand wither if I forget thee, O Jerusalem' (Vol. 1, p. 206).

These multiplying voices, emboldened by the relaxation of the post-Stalinist dispensation to demand the fulfilment of the long delayed daydream, were perhaps one of the reasons why the official ideologues are now reemphasising the doctrine of the withering away of the state and the transition to communism, as if to reassure the faithful that the leadership has not lost sight of the vision so widely cherished. But in doing this they give it a fresh interpretation which, while reaffirming economic egalitarianism, robs the libertarian elements of their substantive content.

But this appears to be only one, and not the most important reason for the current reiteration

[2] *Pravda*, 15 February, 1956.

[3] A. Sobolev, 'O Protivorechiyakh sotsialiticheskovo obshchestva i putyakh ikh preodeleniya,' *Kommunist*, 1958, 2, p. 24. See also the discussion at a philosophical seminar on how 'the remnants of bourgeois rights in the realm of the distribution of material goods' is to be overcome. 'Na filosofskom kruzhke,' *Voprosy Filosofii*, 1956, 4, p. 173. See also pp. 168 and 170.

[4] S. R. Gershberg, 'Borba V. I. Lenina za Demokraticheskii Tsentralizm,' *Voprosy Istorii*, 3, 1957, pp. 66-67.

[5] G. Shitarev, 'Povyshenie rukovodyashchey roli partii,' *Kommunist*, 1958, 12, p. 11.

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of the doctrine of the withering away of the state. Khrushchev's current policies in industry and agriculture are proclaimed to be the beginning of the communist stage. The current uses to which this doctrine is put must be related to some of the functions that ideology performs in communism.

COMMUNISTS tend to define all social problems in doctrinal terms. Solutions pragmatically arrived at are clad in doctrinal garb. Even when no specific item of ideology is applicable to the problem at hand, relevant scholia will be found from which the solution would be claimed to be derived. This is a practice familiar from other ideologies. A course of action could only be legitimised if proven to be in accord with the canon and an opponent overawed through the impact of the quotational shock treatment. Thus the debate of 1954 between the protagonists of heavy industry and light industry was saturated with quotations from the Marxist classics, though their relevance to this purely empirical question was rather remote. This does not mean that *Realpolitik* always cynically clothes itself in the raiment of ideology, although this may often be the case. A generation steeped in Marxist thought would almost involuntarily view the world through Marxist lenses.[6] A Jesuit and a Marxist, confronting the same set of phenomena, would perceive them in different lights, detect different relationships and adopt different approaches. Although ideology may sometimes be the handmaid of political pragmatism, it is also an autonomous source of reality-testing and an inspiration for action.

Khrushchev needed doctrinal sanction for his policies of decentralising the economy, of transferring the MTS to the collective farms, and of strengthening the trade unions within the factories,[7] not in order to increase their autonomy but as countervailing forces, in the service of the dictatorship. An ideological legitimation was all the more urgent in view of the resistance that Khrushchev's scheme encountered within the Party on ideological grounds, a resistance to which he himself testified. Decentralisation of industry was regarded as a departure from the allegedly cardinal tenet of Marxism that a planned economy must be highly centralised. It was feared that decentralisation would produce disruptive tendencies jeopardising the monopolistic control of the Party. The transfer of the MTS to the collective farms also appeared in the eyes of Khrushchev's critics as a step backward from the professed goal of abolishing the differences between town and country, that is, of nationalising the collective farms and converting the peasants into wage earners. Faced with such opposition, and himself mindful of the dangers with which these policies are fraught, Khrushchev invoked the doctrine of the withering away of the state. The new economic policies are proclaimed to mark the beginning of the transition to communism and the gradual decline of the state; and the pseudo-democratic reactivation of the trade unions as the beginning of the transfer of functions hitherto performed by the state to 'public organisations.' Khrushchev was anxious to underline that his plans for the reorganisation of the economy were 'not only of extraordinary practical economic importance, but also of great *theoretical importance* (my italics—E.G.) for the solution of the problems of the gradual transition to Communism.'[8] Earlier he had declared in an interview with L. Shapiro, the UP correspondent, that 'the withering away of the state is already in progress.'[9] He returned to

[6] An observer of the East German scene writes: 'There is no point in blaming ourselves for the fact that Marxism —however diluted, individually transmuted and wilfully interpreted—constitutes a spiritual force in the (East German) zone, a force which even its professed and covert enemies cannot easily escape. One thinks here differently from "yonder."' E. R. Allemann, 'Gespraeche am anderem Ufer,' *Der Monat*, October 1956, p. 7.

[7] This measure attracted little attention in the West. The December 1957 Plenum of the Central Committee called for 'the realisation of the Leninist idea of the direct participation of the workers in the management of industry.' For an analysis of the significance of this decision see S. Shvarts, 'Rostki Khozyastvennoi Demokratii,' *Sotsialisticheskii Vestnik*, September 1958 pp. 160-167.

[8] N. Khrushchev, 'O dalneishem razvitii kolkhoznovo stroya i reorganizatsii mashinotraktornykh stantsii,' *Pravda*, 28 March, 1958.

[9] *Pravda*, 19 November, 1957.

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this theme in many of his major pronouncements: 'We say that under communism the state will die away. Which organs will then be preserved? Public organs! Whether they will be called Komsomol, trade unions, or some other name, they will all be public organs through which society will regulate its relations. We now have to prepare the way for this and teach people to develop the habits for these functions';[10] and he admonished the members of the Komsomol not to rely on the police for protection of their meetings against hooligans because there would be no police in the communist society.

The propagandists were quick to echo the first oracle of the Party. Mitin, whom a Titoist source describes as the best philosopher among MVD men and the best MVD man among philosophers, assured the readers of *Pravda* that 'there was no doubt' that the 'trade unions and other public organisations are growing in importance' and that they are taking over to an increasing extent various functions of the state. However, 'the dialectic of life' consists in this process proceeding alongside the 'strengthening of the state organs' (*sic*).[11]

THIS heralding of the consignment of the state to the museum of antiquities is, however, accompanied by the propagation of a novel doctrine: The everlasting nature of the Party. This truly 'creative innovation' of Marxism was propounded by Khrushchev in an interview with the correspondent of the *Times*, A. I. Macdonald. The relevant passages deserve to be quoted:

> Macdonald: Would Mr. Khrushchev be kind enough to explain what seemed to be the greater importance gained by the Central Committee?
>
> Khrushchev: You understand the question correctly. Indeed the changes of which you speak testify to the ever growing rôle of the Communist party [the version in *The Times* has Central Committee] and that rôle will further grow. A certain loosening of the administrative ties between rayons, regions, and republics is now taking place here. At the same time the ideological ties between regions and republics and the unity of the Soviet peoples are being strengthened. The Communist party plays an important part and this will grow stronger . . . . Changes in the functions of the state are also taking place. This process of change in these functions derives from our conceptions, from the theoretical principles of Marxism-Leninism on the state. When the conditions for the transition to Communism have been created in our country, many administrative organs of the state will gradually die away. The courts may be destined for a longer existence than the army and other administrative organs. The courts will indeed continue to exist in some modified form, since there will arise conflicts of various kinds between individuals and some third organ will have to adjudicate them.[12] I shall not deal here with prognostications about the long-term changes in our society. But even now the life of society is developing in the direction derived from the theoretical foundation of Marxism-Leninism. In these circumstances, the rôle of the Communist party is growing in order to utilise correctly the material and other resources. *The Party has stronger foundations than the state organs. It arose and exists not as a result of obligations of a legal order. Its development was called for by circumstances derived from political concepts, and mankind will always be in need of moral factors* (my italics—E.G.).[13]

[10] Speech to the 13th Congress of Komsomol. *Molodoi Kommunist*, 1958, 5, p. 20.

[11] M. Mitin, 'Sotsializm i Demokratiya,' *Pravda*, 11 February, 1958. For other articles on the same theme see: *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, 1957, 11, p. 26; *Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo*, 1958, 3.

[12] Khrushchev is less sanguine than Max Adler who, in a polemic with Kelsen, denied that conflicts serious enough to require settlement by a special organ of society would arise in the society to come. There would be no 'Lebensgegensaetze,' only 'Meinungsverschiedenheiten.' Involuntarily one is reminded of Goethe's *Faust;* 'Mit Worten laesst sich trefflich streiten'.

[13] *Pravda*, 16 February, 1958.

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The state withers away, but the party as a moral factor will exist forever. The state and the army are 'mortal Gods,' only the party is immortal.[14]

One writer, G. Shitarev, in *Kommunist* (1958, 2, p. 12) seemed to contradict Khrushchev: 'Of course, the party will not exist forever. Marxism-Leninism teaches that when the party will have achieved the construction of the higher phase of communism, and this phase will cease to be an objective to be struggled for, only then will the party as a political organisation no longer be indispensable . . . . But this is a matter of the remote future.' However, closer reading of this quotation and the rest of the article shows that this contradiction is only apparent. Khrushchev spoke of the rôle of the party as a 'moral factor' while Shitarev speaks of the transient rôle of the party as a 'political organisation.' In the paragraph preceding this quotation he writes that in its relation to non-party people the party has 'no other methods but those of persuasion, no other sanctions except moral censure and the force of public opinion; and this sanction is a truly communist one; *it will be retained under communism*' (my italics—E.G.).

This equivocation of stating categorically 'that the party would not exist forever' and the half-veiled assertion that it would after all remain even under communism, reflects the embarrassment sometimes attending such ideological acrobatics.

IF those are right who, with Boris Nikolaevski, view the triumph of Khrushchev over his opponents, especially over Malenkov, as the victory of the party *apparat* over the *managerial bureaucracy*, the elevation of the party to immortality and the announcement that the decentralisation of the economy marks the beginning of the withering away of the state acquire added significance. Having defeated the governmental bureaucracy and the real or imaginary Bonapartist challenge from Zhukov, the *apparatchiki* proceeded to canonise themselves as destined for eternal life. The army and the state are finite beings, they seem to proclaim, mere creatures 'of the obligations of an ephemeral legal order.' We, however, derive our authority from 'the political views of men' (the power of words!). We are the fountainhead of morality, the wardens, tutors, and moral guides of humanity from now to eternity.

Be that as it may, it is clear that the present ideological campaign about the transition to communism is to serve as a justification for Khrushchev's policies: to make ideologically palatable the reorganisation of industry and agriculture by depicting it as the dismantling of the state apparatus, to foster pseudo-democracy by mobilising the trade unions and other 'public organisations,' such as the neighbourhood courts, against parasitism, in the service of the dictatorship, and finally, to fortify the authority of the party by proclaiming it immortal.

The party is not only to survive the state; it will also grow in scope and power. 'What does it mean that the rôle of the party will grow in Soviet society?' *Kommunist* asks rhetorically. 'Why, the party even now enjoys enormous authority among the masses and the boundless confidence of the people.' Indeed, what rôle would be added to it beyond its present function of mentor-cum-policeman, whose power over society is truly 'boundless?' The reply to this rhetorical question reveals the true significance of Khrushchev's new version of the withering away of the state parallel to the growth of the party. 'The leading rôle of the party grows with the introduction of the new system of managing industry . . . . the new system has great positive significance. But in its functioning it may encounter some difficulties, in particular localistic tendencies. To be sure, the national economic plan places obstacles in the way of such tendencies. But the enormous rôle of eradicating localistic tendencies falls to the party. It educated the cadres in the spirit of observing national interests, in the strictest state discipline and in the discipline of observing the plan.'[15] (The state withers away but the party remains to enforce state discipline!) 'The same applies to

[14] It is true that Leninist theory rarely dwelt expressly on the withering away of the Party; this was thought a corollary of the withering away of the state, although occasionally it was stated that 'the necessity for a political party of the proletariat ceases only with the complete abolition of classes.' *Kommunisticheskii Internatsional v Dokumentakh* (Moscow, 1933), p. 109.

[15] *Kommunist*, 1958, 5, p. 13.

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the reorganisation of the MTS.' Here, too, there is the danger of the emergence of 'anti-state tendencies' and again it is the party through its 'ideological influence' that guides the collective farms 'on the road to the correct coordination of the interests of each collective farm with the national interest.'

But the present ideological campaign is more than a mere pragmatic device; it expresses and reveals the image of the ideal society nourished by the *apparatchiki*—their dream of utopia. Marx's vision of the association of free individuals has been corrupted in their minds into a dream of a Brave New World in which they, as moral guides, will rule a populace trained to unswerving obedience, in whom every dissenting impulse has been extinguished. The application of coercion would then become superfluous. The ideal towards which all dictators strive is to convert, in Rousseau's words, 'Might into Right and obedience into duty,' to rule, not by terror—an incalculable instrument inevitably embracing the dictator himself—but to implant in the hearts and minds of the subjects, love and loyalty to the ruler. The multiplying references to the growing 'consciousness of the masses,' to their understanding of societal interests lessening the need for coercion, as well as the references to the increasing rôle of the party as an agency for 'organising and educating' the masses, reflect these visions. The party has perhaps derived a measure of encouragement for this prospect from the fact that, having half-detached itself from the Stalinist legacy, and reduced the terror, it gained a greater degree of voluntary consent and struck firmer roots among its subjects. The charge that a society in which intellectual and social conformity is enforced, even if only through moral suasion (read 'indoctrination'), is a totalitarian one, is met with an extraordinarily revealing argument: 'To accuse Soviet people of totalitarian thinking on the ground that they repudiate the perverted idealistic conception of reality and adopt the scientific, dialectic materialistic view of the world, is like accusing the whole of the educated part of contemporary mankind of conformity because instead of accepting alchemy it recognises chemistry.'[16]

[16] M. Selector, 'Sotsialisticheskaya Demokratiya i Lichnost,' *Voprosy Filosofii*, 1958, 9, p. 30.

The party arrogates to itself the right to inculcate and enforce its 'truth' because it is as scientific as the truths of chemistry. In the future society a dissenter would be treated for insanity, because who but a mentally deranged person would believe in alchemy?[17]

THIS transmutation of the Marxist dream into an Orwellesque nightmare is perennially disturbed by the ghost of the young Marx angering and irritating the *apparatchiki* through his numerous spokesmen in the communist world.

The *Philosophical Economic Manuscripts* of the young Marx, discovered in the early thirties, have never occupied a prominent place in Soviet Marxism. In a country in which every word of Marx is revered as part of Holy Writ, this was a strange omission. It was not until 1956 that a full Russian translation was published.[18] While Western Marxists hailed the discovery as an invaluable contribution to their doctrine, confirming and elaborating the deep humanism underlying Marxist philosophy, communist ideologues treated it with eloquent silence. The humanism and concern for 'man' informing the manuscripts was not a welcome addition to the Stalinist version of Marxism tailored to suit the totalitarian realities. Interest in the young Marx was re-awakened after the second World War by socialists in the West who, finding that their old battle-cries against poverty and exploitation sounded hollow in the welfare state, shifted their critique of capitalism from the economic to the humanistic plane. Not man's physical poverty, but his spiritual poverty, not planning to overcome capitalistic anarchy, but the fate of man in an economy planned by an impersonal bureaucracy, have now become the centre of preoccupation. The danger to man's personal integrity in mass society was now to be the overriding concern of socialism. *Sozialismus ist Menschlichkeit* was the motto of the last congress of the Socialist party of Austria.

[17] In the twenties Soviet jurists (Pashukanis, Reisner) predicted that under communism criminal behaviour would spring only from mental imbalance and be treated as such.

[18] K. Marx, F. Engels, *Iz rannykh proizvedenii*, (Moscow, 1956).

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In the communist world the clamour for freedom implied a call for a return to the young Marx. An editorial in *Po Prostu* after the Gomulka upheaval summoned the Polish communist youth organisation to return to the young Marx, 'to realise humanistic communism which will be a complicated matter.'[19] Another Polish writer accused the Soviets of 'making light' of the *Manuscripts* in an effort to gloss over in Marxism 'the problems of humanism and the liberation of man.'[20] And in East Germany, where Marxist theory remained on a more sophisticated level than anywhere else in the communist world, the cry to return to the young Marx was sounded by Harich, Bloch, and his disciples Gunther Zehm and Richard Lorenz. The party is acutely aware that this is a highly vulnerable spot, because these demands to redeem what it has been promising and preaching carry the weight and authority of the infallible fountainhead! 'We know from antiquity the legend of the hero Achilles with his vulnerable heel . . . . I would like to speak of our Achilles heel, that is, of the spot where we are vulnerable. This spot is what is commonly called humanistic or ethical socialism.'[21]

Kommunist condemned 'speculation on the early writings of Marx, especially on the *Philosophic Economic Manuscripts* of 1844,' as an 'attempt to disrupt Marxism from within, to castrate it of its revolutionary soul.' Herbert Marcuse, Rubel, Landshut and Mayer and Thier, all in the West, are mentioned among the practitioners of this 'ideological diversion.' Thier is charged with propounding, in his introduction to the Cologne edition of the manuscripts, the 'reactionary conception' that the *Manuscripts* provide the clue to the later writings of Marx and that in the centre of Marxism stands, not the doctrine of class struggle, of the revolution, and of the dictatorship of the proletariat, but 'man and his vital essence . . . . Behind the panegyrics of the *Manuscripts* lies hidden the attempt to prove that what is most important and essential in Marx was already created in 1844, and that the subsequent development of the doctrine is a movement on a descending line. What attracts the enemies of Marxism to the *Manuscripts* is the absence from them of even a word on the revolution of the oppressed and exploited classes, on the dictatorship of the proletariat. By artificially stressing the separate, still immature thought of Marx, the falsifiers seek to shift the centre of gravity of the understanding of Marxism.' One must remember that 'the manuscripts are not the product of the mature accomplished Marx' and that one can still find in them, alongside 'excellent formulations,' also 'immature thoughts' bearing the imprint of the theoretical sources 'which served Marx as a point of departure.'[22]

THUS the Young Marx is to be read with reserve lest he lead one to the revisionist heresy of demanding the fulfilment of 'humanism,' 'genuine democracy,' 'ethical socialism,' and generally to a concern with individual man. But such humanistic concern runs counter to the official 'proletarian' conception of humanism, preached by the party, which, in contrast to the 'hypocritical' bourgeois and revisionist conceptions, must be suffused with fiery 'hatred of the capitalists and their lackeys.' Proletarian

[19] 'Co robic daley?' *Po Prostu*, 25 November, 1956.

[20] Z. Kuderowicz, 'Polemika w Sprawie Pogladow Filosoficznych Mlodego Marksa,' *Mysl Filosoficzna*, 1957, 3 (29), p. 218.

[21] Heinrich Schwartze, 'Die Illusion vom Dritten Weg,' *Neues Deutschland*, 15 October, 1957.

[22] L. Pazhitnov, 'U Istokov revoliutsionnovo perevorota v filosofii,' *Kommunist*, 1958, 2, p. 88.

It is interesting to note that this author, whose general comprehension of Marxism and level of theoretical discourse is above the usual hackneyed and declamatory style of Soviet theorising, drew upon himself a rebuke from *Kommunist* for his contribution to a symposium on aesthetics (G. Nedoshivina, *Voprosy Estetiki*, 1958), entitled 'The Problems of Aesthetics in the Economic Philosophic Manuscripts of K. Marx.' Here he wrote that the subjective attitude of the individual to society is of the essence of art and that the 'artist's mode of perceiving reality is akin to the religious experience' (pp. 131-2). This was condemned as an attempt 'to justify the subjective arbitrariness of the writer.' Ya. Elsberg, 'Pisatel i Zhizn Naroda,' *Kommunist*, 1958, 12, p. 48.

Was he anxious, in his attack on the revisionist interpretation of the Young Marx, to 'reinsure' himself?

The attacks on the 'bourgeois distortions' of the *Manuscripts* bear the marks of a concerted effort. See 'Voprosy Formirovanii filosofskikh Vzglyadov Marksa,' *Voprosy Filosofii*, 1956, 3; M. Klein, 'Karl Marx als Humanist, Denker und Revolutionaer,' *Deutsche Zeitschrift Fuer Philosophie*, Vol. VI, 2, pp. 180-181; see also *Vestnik Moskovskovo Universiteta*, 1958, 1, p. 42.

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humanism does not speak in 'resounding and sweet words of love for man.'[23]

The collective must remain the first object of man's allegiance and one must not allow concern with man to over-ride this primary duty. Bloch's deviation is derived from his 'world outlook' which 'rests on man,' writes Otto Gropp. 'This lends to his philosophy its basic character and distinguishes it from dialectical materialism.'[24] One might add that this distinguishes 'dialectical materialism' from Marxism. For Bloch merely paraphrased Marx, according to whom 'the highest being for man is man himself' and 'the categorical imperative' is 'to overthrow all relationships in which man is humbled, enslaved, abandoned, despised.'[25] Small wonder that 'humanism' has become the terror of the *apparatchiki*. Their conception of the ideal society stands in the same relation to the vision of the free and unalienated world of the Young Marx as the ideals of the Grand Inquisitor to those of Christ. They look into the face of the Young Marx reproachfully: Why have you come back to disturb us? But as long as they have not forsworn Marxism—well nigh an impossibility—they are condemned to breed, in spite of themselves, heresies in their midst. The seeds of heresy are contained in every Marxist text, and they will never be able to lay to rest the spectre of the humanist Marx who will be a perpetual source of inspiration to champion the rights of the 'humbled, enslaved, abandoned, and despised man.'

[23] *Kratkii Filosofskii slovar*, Moscow, 1952.

[24] Quoted in J. Ruehle, 'Die Dämmerung Nach Vorne,' *Der Monat*, September 1958, p. 57.

[25] Quoted in A. G. Meyer, *Marxism* (Harvard, 1954), p. 51.

(*Continued from page 24*)

closest control maintained by the Party leadership. The political surface is once more unruffled by the gales of political controversy.

But what of the future? It is doubtful whether the North Vietnamese communists appreciate the full implications of their action in sending out large numbers of hostile intellectuals to work beside the peasants, soldiers, and factory workers. One of the terms regularly applied to these intellectuals by the communists is 'weeds', and it would hardly seem to be good gardening to plant weeds among the flower beds in the hope of turning them into flowers. The influence which any intelligent, educated man can exercise over uneducated peasants and workers is very great indeed, and it may be assumed that the dissatisfied North Vietnamese intellectuals are using this influence to underline the shortcomings and the injustices of the regime to their fellow toilers. The present period of outward calm may well be one in which the 'weeds' are putting down roots and establishing themselves. When this stage is completed, the first shower may start a prolific and, from the point of view of the Party leadership, unexpected harvest in the flowerbeds of North Vietnam.

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A Semantic Dilemma?

FREUD AND PAVLOV

Emanuel Miller

ANY indication that Freudian theory is receiving attention in Russian scientific circles is to be welcomed. Schisms in science can be as bitter and destructive as any theological arguments. S. V. Bassin's article on 'Freud in the light of contemporary scientific discussion' (reproduced in the previous issue of *Soviet Survey*) would appear on cursory examination to be a sign of growing appreciation of Freud's work. It is nothing of the kind. It is, however, a sign of the beginning of fear, a fear that Freudism has not only made world-wide progress but that its principles might be not altogether at variance with neurological foundation concepts, and therefore may prove a competitor at both levels.

Soviet physiologists have unearthed the Project in which in 1895 Freud put forward a carefully worked out system of mental dynamics in terms of the prevailing neuro-physiology. As Ernest Jones says in his biography of Freud, 'It is indeed remarkable how closely the Project already unites the two opposite sides of Freud's nature, the conservative and the freely imaginative.' In it are many ideas which bear a singular and prophetic resemblance to the writings of later neuro-physiologists. But Freud threw up the endeavour as unproductive, and thus a germinal attempt at synthesis was unfortunately abandoned. It is at this point, fruitful for psychology, that the Soviet psychologist felt that Freudian 'degradation' started. It is worth examining this accusation.

It must be conceded that as long as we consider the nervous system as the organ of behaviour, the highest levels of conduct must take their place on the foundation of neural activity, both of men and of animals. We would go further and include the changing chemical balance in all the tissues which through the hormones or metabolic messengers affect the nervous system, and therefore conduct. But this admission does not demand that we must limit our vocabulary to biochemistry and neurology. For even the most ardent Pavlovian neurologists know that through the highest activities the environment is recognised, selected, and acted upon at all levels of neural integration. When the organism faces its environment it does, on the basis of past experience, respond in ways in conformity with the already established patterns laid down by conditioning.

Up to this point neurology and psychology, at least in the behavioural sense of the latter, have no quarrel.

From here onwards, however, the divergence takes place, certainly as far as man is concerned. The responses we make are not confined to isolated item-stimuli, but to stimuli in a complex context. This is even true at animal levels. Experiments on choice reactions in rats shew clearly that the doctrine of reflex conditioning does not suffice to explain alternate reactions which animals shew in, for example, so-called pain-induced choice of alternate routes for escape. These experiments illustrate some of the principles of gestalt psychology. Now such a psychology is not anti-materialistic, nor does it necessarily carry the degrading insignia idealism. The emergence of relational responses can indeed be expressed in terms of the scanning mechanisms of the electronic animal constructed by Grey Walters and others to explain complex forms of recognition, but in the final reduction a psychological universe of discourse seems necessary to describe them in their dynamic relationships. No sooner do we find ourselves confronted by responses which are clearly due to the recognition of relations rather than to isolated stimuli, to patterns rather than to the units of a pattern, then we require a language, a universe of discourse which sometimes is symbolic; i.e. a particular will stand for a group of facts or for a whole trend. For at this stage objects may be recognised in terms of other prior experiences for which they stand. Bassin admits that the unit of the displacement

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phenomena implied in any conditioning experiments, such as the bell or tuning fork in Pavlov's classical experiment, now stands for or displaces the food stimulus until experiments are used to obliterate the effectiveness of the displacing stimulus.

With the overall phenomena of excitation and inhibition, the hypnotic state has been taken by Pavlovian workers as an illustration of an inhibitory or sub-inhibitory state related to sleep and catalepsy. Here is an example of the risky application of animal experiments to man. Researches outside the Pavlov laboratory shew that sleep and hypnosis are not interchangable terms—nor is the latter a modified form of the total cortical radiation of inhibition which is sleep to the Pavlovian. Hull, who has excellent credentials as an experimenter and thinker in the field of Hypnosis, Training, and Learning, does not rest satisfied with conditioned inhibition in this narrow sense as a full description of Hypnosis. What is applicable to Hypnosis is applicable to Hysteria, the phenomena of which sometimes can be produced by, and obliterated through, the hypnotic state. Hysterical phenomena in the simplest forms do bear a striking resemblance to elementary forms of conditioned conduct. These forms occur in what might be called critical biological situations, panic, war, earthquake, insult, and the like, in persons either highly suggestible by nature, the extrovert type of Eysenck, or rendered extrovert-like by extreme stress conditions. The well known *period of meditation* which occurs after prolonged stress and *before* the hysterical state supervenes, calls for an explanation which Pavlovian reflexology does not give.

WHEN we move from these elementary forms of Hysteria to the Hysterical personality, to obsessional neurosis and compulsive neurosis with childhood aetiology elaborated by later cultural expression, we find the dynamics of conditioned reflexes inadequate to cover the complex conduct which these conditions exhibit.

Dr Bassin does not entirely dispense with the term Unconscious, although he clearly means it to imply below the threshold, or the unverbalised in Freud's sense, which he even mentions. It is true (and many non-mechanistic psychiatrists agree) that the term Unconscious is a term which has an unfortunate spatial connation, as if it were a submerged region. These spatial terms have led some philosophical psychologists who aim at unity to prefer a simple neuro-psychology to explain it, that is, that the Unconscious is the subcortical, that the affective tone which usually accompanies the emergence of abreacted memories is the action of the lower brain—the thalamic system. This of course is very naive, and may well excuse the neuro-physiologists of the Pavlov tradition when they accuse the more recent Freudian endeavour to found analytic concepts on a healthy neurological substrate.

Clearly, this attempt to create a one-to-one correspondence between the mental and physical is a reawakening of the old psycho-physical parallelism, as old as Descartes and even resuscitated by Wundt. We ought, as a preparatory measure in co-ordinating psychologically formulated processes with neural process, to restate the concept of the Unconscious. This system Uncs, as the Freudians abbreviate it, is not a region but a system of relationships set up by the inhibitory effects of repression on the foundations of the never conscious basic processes, otherwise termed the Id, the reservoir of Instinctual forces. The system Uncs is a pattern—a changing kaleidoscopic pattern, of some permanence, which is created by the life of the organism in its attempt to maintain a working equilibrium in order that certain cultural responses should be possible. The repressive or inhibitory forces are both autonomous, i.e., vested in the so-called Super Ego—the internal regulator of responses, child-culture determined —and heteronymous, or related to external environmental demands, which change in shape and function from childhood to adulthood. Situations which have led to the retention of childhood response patterns are productive of neurosis. (The psychoses or 'Insanities' introduce other factors, such as genetic ones or acquired organic factors, which do not concern us here.)

Is there any reason why a restatement of Freudian basic ideas should be alien to the concept of 'conditioning on a neural level of Pavlovian psychology'? It would appear, particularly on examining Bassin's view of the

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Non scholae sed vitae . . .

KHRUSHCHEV'S EDUCATIONAL REFORM

S. V. Utechin

THE educational reform now being implemented in the Soviet Union has aroused a great deal of comment abroad. Yet most commentators were wide of the mark in their conclusions, and this for a very obvious reason. They were attempting to assess the significance of the reform from an analysis of the text of Khrushchev's Memorandum to the Presidium of the Party Central Committee. The limitations of such a procedure and the dangers of misinterpretation are apparent: this applies to any official party document, and much more so when the party is a communist one. To put the Memorandum in its true perspective, we must take into account both the historical background, and the public discussion of school reform that took place both before and after its publication.

What we are witnessing now is the third reformation of the educational system in Russia since 1917. The first was initiated immediately after the Bolsheviks seized power, and was characterised throughout all its phases (from 1917 to 1930) by a revolutionary fervour and the desire to replace the old educated classes by a new generation of collectivist-minded proletarians. It was largely influenced, not by the Leninist, but by the Bogdanovist brand of Bolshevism, which sought to supplement traditional Marxism with modernistic ideas.[1] Indiscriminate application of the absurdly exaggerated ideas of free education, together with the notion of the 'withering away of the school' under communism, resulted in all but complete disorganisation and incredibly low standards of achievement. This brought about a revulsion, and for two decades (1932-52) the spirit of modernistic experimentation was replaced by that of restoration. Under the watchful eye of Zhdanov the schools were brought back almost to their position before 1917; indeed, in some respects to the 1880s, when they were under the Procurator of the Most Holy Synod, Pobedonostsev. His insistence on Orthodoxy as the mainstay of education and thus as a bulwark of the established order had its equivalent in the idea of 'partyness', which was to permeate the whole educational process. The re-established secondary school was again regarded primarily as preparing for higher education, and access to both full secondary and to higher education was (from 1940) virtually limited to children of the well-to-do. Academic standards rose sharply and the schools produced the specialists without whom the technical progress of the 1950s would have been impossible. As for achieving conformity, the Zhdanov system fared no better than Pobedonostsev's.

The third reformation began immediately after Zhdanov's death, in the 1949/50 school year, when the policy of expanding full secondary education was first introduced, although it was not officially proclaimed until the 19th Party congress in 1952, when the aim was set of achieving universal secondary education by 1960. This policy was energetically pursued until 1956 and ten-class secondary school was made compulsory in several hundred large towns. But as the number of vacancies in higher educational establishments hardly increased at all, and no adequate provision was made for finding employment for the large numbers of young people with full secondary education, Soviet society was faced with the unfamiliar phenomenon of large-scale juvenile unemployment.[2] It was the more difficult to tackle since the other change proclaimed at the 19th congress —the return to the idea of polytechnical education current in the 1920s—remained almost a dead letter, and the secondary school leavers had no practical qualifications of any kind.

[1] On Bogdanovism, see S. V. Utechin, 'Bolsheviks and Their Allies after 1917: The Ideological Pattern', *Soviet Studies*, October 1958.

[2] Cf. Anthony Maxwell, 'Juvenile Unemployment in the USSR', *Soviet Survey*, Oct.-Dec. 1958.

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CONTINUOUS changes in the school curriculum, intended to implement polytechnicalisation, partly at the expense of the humanities, undermined the very concept of a stable curriculum which had been one of the main features of the Zhdanov period. Another disturbing factor was the growing burden on the school children resulting from the introduction of the polytechnical subjects. Piecemeal adjustments and experimentation without a clear aim (such as the introduction of boarding schools) left everyone dissatisfied, and the idea emerged that the whole school system needed a thorough overhauling. It was first voiced in educational circles, and during 1957 a discussion developed in the professional press. By the spring of 1958 the question came to the attention of Khrushchev, who, apparently always on the look-out for something to reform, gave the green light for a full-scale public discussion. It was in full and free swing throughout the summer, so that in some places local authorities were talking not merely about the desirability of certain changes, but of their intention to introduce them locally. The majority of those whose views appeared in print came out in favour of a universal eight-year school instead of compulsory secondary education. On what should follow this opinion differed: the most interesting and reasonable view was embodied in the scheme worked out by the RSFSR Academy of Pedagogical Sciences, which more or less envisaged a return to the pre-1950 system with two important modifications—some element of 'polytechnicalisation' and alternative streams of specialisation in the humanities, physical sciences and technology, and biology and agriculture. It is interesting to note that throughout the discussion no-one suggested any drastic changes in higher education, either in its content or teaching methods. It was hoped in academic and educational circles that the work of reform would continue in this careful and responsible manner, and particularly that no rash decisions would be taken in higher quarters.

However, on 6 September 1958 *Pravda* carried an article by I. A. Kairov, President of the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences, on the forthcoming reform in which, without any reference to the Academy's previous plan, he produced a new plan which virtually abolished the upper classes of the general secondary school. On 12 September a similar article dealing with higher education was published in *Pravda* by the Minister of Higher Education, V. P. Yelyutin. The reason for this about turn became apparent a few days later, when, on 21 September, the newspapers published a Memorandum by Khrushchev with the title 'On Strengthening the Connection of School with Life and on Further Development of the System of Public Education in the Country', said to have been submitted to the Presidium of the Communist Party's Central Committee and approved by that body.

KHRUSHCHEV started by saying that the educational system was the subject of much comment and that his conversations with various Party secretaries, 'other comrades', and 'many citizens' had revealed a serious dissatisfaction with the state of affairs. The fundamental defect of secondary and higher education was its divorce from life; despite repeated criticism the situation was in fact scarcely changing. He then gave a fairly comprehensive picture of the discrepancy between the secondary school syllabus, regarded by parents and pupils as preparation for higher education, and the limited number of vacancies in higher educational establishments now and in the foreseeable future. The results of this discrepancy were juvenile unemployment, and pressure upon school teachers and the heads of higher educational establishments by influential parents to secure places for their children. That was both undemocratic, and contrary to the basic communist tenets, which hold all kinds of labour, physical or mental, to be equally valuable.

As a remedy, Khrushchev proposed to abandon the idea of introducing universal secondary education and to limit compulsory education to eight or even seven years. At this stage the school syllabus should be uniform throughout the country, with a strong element of polytechnical training and an emphasis on the value of manual work. It was necessary also to consider the functions of women in society and therefore to train girls in child care, household management, needlework, and cookery.

As to further education, Khrushchev envisaged several possibilities, describing them in a rather

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confused and occasionally contradictory manner. There could be two or three further years of more or less compulsory schooling, with the emphasis on vocational training, industrial in the towns and agricultural in the countryside; but more appropriate, in his view, was a system under which all children went straight into productive work after finishing eight-year school. That would involve finding two to three-and-a-half million jobs yearly—a difficult task, Khrushchev admitted, but one that would have to be solved by planning and compulsory allocation of quotas of school-leavers. The necessary skills would be acquired either through apprenticeship or in one or two year courses in special trade schools. But, Khrushchev declared, it was necessary to ensure to every young man and girl an opportunity of receiving full secondary education, and this could best be done at evening or part-time schools, or by correspondence courses during normal work in industry, agriculture, or offices. The combination of education with productive work was necessary under socialism and had been advocated by Lenin and Marx. The evening and correspondence courses should not only prepare for higher education but also give further practical training. Certain concessions would be in order for those satisfactorily combining 'socially useful' work with further education—they might be given two or even three days a week free for study.

Having suggested this system, and clearly favouring it himself, Khrushchev then asked whether there should be a complete change-over to the proposed system, or whether, as some thought, a few existing secondary schools should be retained, though with increased teaching of trade skills and with pupils' participation in productive work. In this case two years practical work in industry or agriculture would be required from the school-leavers before they could apply for higher education. In any case, a certain number of the existing secondary schools would have to be retained for the transitional period (3-4 years) in order not to interrupt the supply of entrants to higher educational establishments. Despite the emphasis on the need for all children to go into productive work after eight classes, Khrushchev said that under the new system special provision would have to be made for children particularly gifted in e.g. mathematics, music, and the visual arts, in the form of secondary schools preparing for the appropriate higher educational establishments; he also indicated that such special schools might be appropriate for children who showed special talents in physics, biology, technical drawing, etc.

This was followed by proposals for a radical reform of the higher educational system, which had not previously been considered in need of any fundamental change. The main fault of the present system was that young people who entered higher educational establishments at 17 and finished at 22 or 23 were insufficiently prepared for practical work. Another fault was that at present too few students came from working class and *kolkhoz* families (for example, in Moscow 30 to 40 per cent), while actual workers or peasants could be counted one by one. Khrushchev suggested that in the majority of higher educational establishments students in their first two or three years should study part-time or by correspondence while engaged in productive work; they would be admitted on the basis of merit, inclination, and a certificate of worthiness from trade union or Komsomol organisations. In their third year students could be freed from work for three days a week, and during the last two years it might be found advisable to exempt them completely from work. Teaching at these establishments, including the universities, should be closely connected with practical affairs. Such a reform of higher education would, Khrushchev thought, among other benefits improve the study of the social sciences and ideological education. Professional secondary education was also to be reorganised on the same lines as higher education.

THE publication of the Memorandum produced a marked change in the discussion of educational reform. The newspapers were obviously instructed to take it as a directive, and no dissension appeared in editorial comment. *Komsomolskaya Pravda* enjoined Komsomol workers to explain to young people that the reorganisation was for their benefit. The diversity of the earlier discussion disappeared and most published contributions simply supported Khrushchev's proposals, at best amplifying them. There were, however, some dissenting

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voices urging considerable modifications, and revealing a very different approach.

Their chief aim was to preserve the specific nature of the secondary school as leading to higher education, higher education itself as an academic pursuit distinct from advanced technical training, and the continuity between the two. Thus, for example, the Director of the Leningrad Polytechnical Institute, V. S. Smirnov, said at a meeting of teachers in higher educational establishments held in Moscow on 22-24 September, that the combination of part-time and full-time study as envisaged by Khrushchev was unsuitable for his and similar Institutes, since it threatened to lower the theoretical level of studies whereas the need was to raise them. Besides, in the interest of scientific advance, it was desirable to have large numbers of full-time students and to enter higher education at an early age.[3] The Rector of Voronezh University reported as the considered opinion of his staff that full-time study at the university should be the rule throughout the five-year course.[4] Academician N. N. Semenov, Nobel Prize winner in Chemistry, suggested that there should be two kinds of higher education in science and technology: one intended to produce workshop engineers and technologists for routine production processes, the other for pure scientists, research workers, and advanced designers. Entrants to the former would be recruited from the factories, as Khrushchev had suggested, but to the latter direct from secondary school, since youth and continuity of study were essential for creative scientific work.[5] In other words, he wanted to re-establish the distinction, blurred in the Soviet Union, between institutions of university level and all the rest.

Defence of the secondary school took three forms. The first was exemplified in an article by A. A. Shibanov, of the Institute of Teaching Methods of the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences, who insisted on a general polytechnical education rather than training for specific trades in the secondary schools;[6] the second by Academician Semenov, who, while accepting Khrushchev's proposal for special schools for exceptionally gifted children, rejected two assumptions implicit in Khrushchev's reasoning, namely that scientific ability was similar to artistic ability and that these two were the only abilities relevant to the problem. He specifically mentioned the gift for languages, and technical and organisational abilities, stressing that these become apparent later than artistic abilities.[7]

The third defence of the secondary school was based upon recognition of the value of the humanities, which had been entirely ignored by Khrushchev. This line was not permitted to appear prominently in the press, but it must have been strongly advanced in discussion. For example, at a meeting called by the editorial board of *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, A. Dun, a specialist on teaching methods in the Administration of Labour Reserves, drew the same distinction between science and technology as did Academician Semenov, and suggested that the humanities as a whole required full-time university level education following directly upon full secondary education.[8] Even Kairov found it necessary to say that the reform should not diminish the role of the humanities.

On the particular problem of schools in the national republics, it was suggested that because of the need to teach the local language and literature as well as Russian, compulsory schooling should last for nine years instead of seven or eight.

THE next stage in shaping a new educational system opened with the publication on 16 November of the 'Theses' of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Council of Ministers—a more systematic outline of the projected reform, made public for discussion prior to its formal consideration by the Supreme Soviet.

The Theses embodied the substance of Khrushchev's proposals, but contained a number of significant points reflecting the discussion both before and after the Memorandum. It was stated that compulsory schooling should last for 8 rather than 7 years; that while the evening school should be the main form of post-compulsory schooling there should also be full

[3] *Vestnik Vysshei Shkoly*, No. 11, 1958.

[4] *Ibid.*

[5] *Pravda*, 17 October 1958.

[6] *Sovetskaya Pedagogika*, No. 11, 1958.

[7] *Loc. cit.*

[8] *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, 21 October 1958.

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secondary schools providing general education and special training for work in one of the branches of the national economy or culture, and professional secondary schools; that the general education level should be raised above that of the existing ten-class school (particular stress was laid on the need for radical improvement in the teaching of foreign languages); that the reorganisation should on no account result in the diminution or weakening of the humanities; and that physical and aesthetic training should no longer be neglected.

The problem of the national schools was solved in an unexpected way, namely that parents should have the right to decide what language—Russian or local—should be the medium of instruction for their children; the language not chosen should be an optional subject if there was sufficient demand for it.

On higher education several concessions were made to opponents of Khrushchev's original scheme. Probably the most important was a general provision that the concrete forms of combining study with practical work were to be decided in accordance with particular circumstances—thus giving the institutes considerable scope for manoeuvre. Admission to higher education no longer required prior employment for a number of years, though such applicants should be accepted first. The specific nature of university education was explicitly recognised, and the practical work envisaged for university students was of an academic character. The attitude towards the teaching of the humanities at university level was ambivalent; although the importance of the humanities was said to be growing, and greater attention to them was recommended, students of humanities—unlike science students—were to spend their first one or two years as part-time or correspondence students.

WITH the publication of the 'Theses' the general discussion of school reform flared up again. Nobody defended the seven-year compulsory school—all agreed that eight years was the essential minimum (some suggesting nine), while in the national republics there was an almost unanimous demand for a nine-year school. There was also some agitation for raising the compulsory age for starting school from 7 to 8; a variety of arguments was put forward for this, but the real reason seems to be the anxiety of both teachers and parents that children should not have to start work too young.[9] The educational grounds, at least, for such a move were rejected at a meeting of the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences, where several members advocated lowering the age to six.

The greatest controversy was over the post-compulsory secondary education. There was a good deal of opposition to the idea that evening or correspondence schools should be the main medium of full secondary education. It is interesting to note that the most comprehensive case against this was put forward by two evening school teachers from Leningrad. They argued on the basis of their experience that adolescents of 14-15 are not yet ready for full-time employment, and that such half measures as a shortened working day or two or three free days a week for study, besides being difficult to implement, cannot eliminate the well-known evils inherent in the evening school system; at present 25-30 per cent. of evening school pupils leave each year without completing their course.[10] The need for continuing full-time education after the compulsory eight-year school was particularly stressed for rural areas, where it was especially likely that, once having left school, the young people would find it difficult to receive full secondary education.

As for the full secondary schools themselves, the debate was concentrated on two questions. Although some support was forthcoming for separate schools for oustandingly talented children, opinion was overwhelmingly against them, both on educational and social grounds. The arguments against separate schools were put most forcefully by Academician M. A. Lavrentiev, much publicised in recent years as Chairman of the Siberian Division of the Academy of Sciences which was set up on his initiative,[11] and supported by the President of the Academy of Sciences, A. N. Nesmeyanov.[12] Some of those who rejected separate schools for gifted children suggested differentiation of

[9] Cf. *Izvestiya*, 10 and 21 December 1958.

[10] *Ibid.*, 21 December 1958.

[11] *Pravda*, 25 November 1958.

[12] *Lit. Gaz.*, 20 December 1958.

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another kind—to introduce after the basic eight-year school different streams emphasising particular groups of subjects; four such groups were usually suggested—physics and technology, chemistry and technology, biology and agronomy, and the humanities. This suggestion, which amounted to a revival of the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences' original plan, was most insistently canvassed by members of the Academy, including its Vice-President, N. Goncharov,[13] and was clearly designed, at any rate in part, to strengthen the position of the humanities. Another obvious motive was concern for adequate standards for university entrance,[14] which also prompted the suggestion that the most able pupils should be selected at the end of their full secondary education for one or two year courses which would prepare them for higher education.[15] But a far more interesting and practicable proposal, with much emphasis on flexibility, was made by Professor A. D. Aleksandrov, Rector of Leningrad University; his plan was that the secondary school in general should no longer consider its purpose to be preparation for higher education, but that in their last year or two those pupils who wished to proceed to higher education should be given the opportunity of additional study in a number of related subjects, somewhat on the lines of sixth form work in English schools.[16]

The most comprehensive statement of opposition to Khrushchev's plan for higher education came from the highest-ranking representative of the academic world, Nesmeyanov himself.[17] The only concession he made (if it can be called a concession) was to say that some engineering or agricultural institutes should perhaps establish close contact with factories or *sovkhozes* and admit chiefly people who have already had some connection with production. But he insisted that a period of practical work was of scarcely any value for university students. Referring to the physiology of the brain, he contented that for every stage of education there was a most appropriate age, and for higher education, according to his experience, that age was from 17 to 22 or 23. He pointed out that since the average working life after higher education was only about 30 years, every year of delay in completing it meant a loss of 3 per cent, which the state could ill afford. Secondly, he stressed the need for continuity of learning at all stages. And thirdly, as against Khrushchev's insistence on evening and correspondence study, Nesmeyanov felt obliged to emphasise the rather obvious point that the morning is preferable to the evening; he therefore suggested that where it was necessary to work and study simultaneously, the mornings should be devoted to study.

Another famous scientist, Academician A. N. Kolmogorov, took it upon himself to refute Khrushchev's explanation of the preponderance among students of children from educated families. Describing the present system of selection for institutions of university level, which he thought should be retained, he said that its only 'undemocratic' feature was that the entrance examinations were very difficult and could as a rule only be passed by pupils of the few best schools; since these schools are mostly attended by children of the intelligentsia it was inevitable that they should form a high and growing proportion of university entrants.

THIS was the state of public discussion when the Supreme Soviet met at the end of December. Three separate reports were submitted on the subject of educational reform: by Kairov on the secondary school, by the head of the Chief Administration of Labour Reserves, Zelenko, on trade schools, and by Yelyutin on higher education. They adhered strictly to the Theses and explicitly rejected some of the main alternative proposals. Yelyutin's report, in addition, showed great concern about ideological non-conformism among the students. The formal debate that followed was a rather watered-down version of the previous public discussion.

The law that finally emerged differed at first sight very little from the Theses, and it appeared that little attention had been paid to the public

[13] *Pravda*, *Uchitelskaya Gazeta*, 29 November 1958, *Izvestiya*, 7 and 9 December 1958. It was also supported by the President of the Academy of Medical Sciences, A. N. Bakulev, *Vestnik Vysshei Shkoly*, No. 12, 1958.

[14] Cf. Academician Kolmogorov, *Trud*, 10 December 1958.

[15] Professor Arzhanikov, *Pravda*, 21 November 1958.

[16] *Izvestiya*, 10 December 1958.

[17] *Loc. cit.*

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discussion. In fact, however, a number of changes were introduced which may affect substantially the actual course that educational reform will take. On secondary education, evening schools are not, after all, to be the main form but are to be on an equal footing with normal 3-year secondary schools, and there is no mention of secondary correspondence courses. To the statement in the Theses that full secondary schools might prepare for work in the cultural sphere as well as in the national economy, there is added a provision for transforming the upper classes of the existing ten-year schools into *different types* of general secondary schools, thus strengthening the possibility of specialisation in the humanities. The proposal for separate schools for specially gifted children appears to have been dropped, as do the proposals in the Theses on languages in the national republic schools.

Similarly, the section referring to the universities merely states that students should acquire skills in their particular field, and that those studying the humanities should also have a certain experience in 'socially useful' work; thus the scientists appear to be altogether absolved from any work unrelated to their own field, while for the humanists there is at least a good chance of work in journalism, publishing, translating, etc. being accepted as 'socially useful'. Admission is to be based on competitive examinations, although preferential treatment is to be given to applicants who have done practical work, and recommendations of the Communist party, Komsomol, or trade union must be taken into consideration.

THE reform is to be carried out during the next four or five years, and it is too early to forecast its outcome. Laws and government policies are not the only factors shaping the course of events, even in the Soviet Union. Developments up to the present point can be summed up as follows:

The need for a school reform was obvious. It was clearly inconceivable that the secondary schools should continue to turn out millions of unprepared and reluctant manual workers with higher ambitions. Apart from that, overburdening of the pupils and lack of specialisation in the upper forms were strong educational reasons for a reform.

But Khrushchev's sudden intrusion produced a threat to the very existence of systematic secondary and higher education. His Memorandum clearly reflected his impulsive personality, his demagogic tactics, his anti-intellectual prejudices, and his political aims. The ostensible purpose of Khrushchev's proposals was to eliminate the lack of contact between school and life, to which no one can object. But in fact he reduces life to material production, and the educational system he proposed would have directed the mental and physical energies of the young generation towards material production to the exclusion of almost all other human activities and interests, except the exact sciences, music, and the visual arts.

The opposition on academic, educational, and social grounds to this attempt has been very strong, stronger, it would appear, than to any other of Khrushchev's reorganisation plans, and his opponents have won concessions which may well prove to be important. But Khrushchev's main objective has not been abandoned (as the 21st party congress has shown) and the battle will no doubt continue.

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DIE MACHT IM VORDERGRUND, OR, THE SOCIOLOGY OF COMMUNISM DESOPHISTICATED

Peter Wiles

I. Political Power versus Social Forces—General

'SOMEDAY someone is going to create a stir by proposing a radical new tool for the study of people. It will be called the face-value technique. It will be based on the premise that people often do what they do for the reasons they think they do. The use of this technique would lead to many pitfalls, for it is undeniably true that people do not always act logically or say what they mean. But I wonder if it would produce findings any more unscientific than the opposite course.'[1]

The purpose of this article is to refound the sociology of the Soviet Union by looking for its dynamic in the right place: the mind of Khrushchev.

The instinctive approach of any sociologist is to look for mass forces spontaneously arising out of, say, technical necessity or educational progress or the decline of religion or what not; and to try to evaluate them and predict the result of clashes between them. Society is seen as the product of large but almost unconscious dynamisms that operate like natural laws. When first applied to Western democracies or to underdeveloped countries with weak autocracies, this approach wrought a revolution in man's understanding of and attitude to himself; it is one of the great achievements of the human mind, and much of the credit for it must go to Marx himself. Twentieth century totalitarianism is precisely the reaction of power-hungry people to this discovery, and their determination to use this knowledge of the "laws of motion" of society to defeat them.

Now admittedly a totalitarian government arises out of a given social situation, and its advent to power is the product of mass forces over which it has little control. A good totalitarian idea is not enough to take power with; you need also a happy conjuncture of mass forces (e.g. the defeat of the government in war). But once you are in the saddle you have less to worry about. In fact you need only:

(*a*) moderate success in some of your overt aims;
(*b*) to pay the police punctually;
(*c*) to keep the ideology in *sufficient* repair to satisfy the shallow heart-searchings of the ambitious and unscrupulous who will form your élite; and
(*d*) adequate sociological insight into the mass forces still at work among the subject population, the police and the élite; some of these can be used, others must be resisted.

It is (*d*) that concerns us here.

I am very far from suggesting that there are no mass forces autonomously at work in totalitarian states. I only point out that they are subject to conscious control and resistance, and that the government is often stronger than they. In particular my thesis is that the purity and revolutionary dynamism of the Soviet élite is *not* threatened by the growth of other élite-worthy groups, that the degree of sociological insight in Moscow has risen very greatly since Stalin's death, and that Khrushchev is an excellent practical sociologist, a sort of police-state Lloyd George. But we may first look at a few non-Soviet cases very briefly. Have our four criteria always been respected?

Hitler, in the short period available to him, demonstrated all four capacities to a high degree. Only war brought him down: I can detect no seeds of internal decay. The Polish and Hungarian Communists before October 1956 failed on all counts but (*b*). Especially, by failing to liquidate the pre-communist intelligentsia, they had a very difficult row to hoe in (*c*), and notably failed to hoe it.

[1] W. H. Whyte, *The Organization Man* (Anchor edn.), p. 44.

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Milovan Djilas' view, that communist countries are governed by *a* New Class, is excessively *simpliste*, and more narrowly a generalisation from purely Yugoslav experience than the universality of that lively mind would lead us to expect. For in that country there were indeed very few other mass forces at work when Djilas wrote. The technical intelligentsia was small; the officer corps were communist partisans; on Djilas' own advice the economic bureaucracy had been liquidated and a free market substituted; the disaffection of students was only beginning; the pre-war humanistic intelligentsia had never been big and largely lived in emigration. That left only peasants, priests, and writers, but none of these are members of the élite in any communist country. So truly in the Yugoslavia of 1950-4 there was *a* New Class—the communist bosses; and no group rivalled it.

II. Political Power and Social Forces—USSR

How different at that time were even the satellites; which aside from Bulgaria had still to digest their pre-war humanistic intelligentsia; which had more industry and so a larger technical intelligentsia; a large economic bureaucracy owing to central planning; and an unreliable officer corps. More different still was the USSR, where the economic bureaucracy, the technical intelligentsia and the student body were larger still, and there was a well established if formally communist officer corps, and a quasi-independent police with long traditions. For Stalin had heedlessly permitted all these to grow and form esprits de corps, while rather demoting the pure Party *apparatchiki*. Of course it was all very well for him: the different monastic orders merely reflect a more varied glory upon the Pope. But he was laying up terrible trouble for his successors.

It is a commonplace that Soviet history since Stalin's death is the history of the subjugation of these groups by Khrushchev and the party *apparatchiki;* so that Djilas' analysis has *become* applicable, since there is now only one New Class. Now for the police and the officer corps the facts are very well known, and highlighted by the personal fates of Beria and Zhukov. Moreover, traditional Marxist sociology is not without the insights to perceive and the concepts to explain such obvious phenomena as overweening policemen and soldiers. For the French Revolution is the great Set Topic or Special Period of the Marxist syllabus; and Fouché and Bonaparte are central figures. Nor was Stalin's own rise to power unclouded by Fouchés and Bonapartes: he was in fact seriously resisted by Yagoda and Tukhachevsky (albeit only after it was too late, and only when their special domains were invaded). All living Soviet leaders are old enough to remember Yagoda and Tukhachevsky personally; none of them, therefore, would have any difficulty in recognising an imitator.

But it is not on such forces that certain deviant Marxists and Western sociologists have based their optimism as to the future of Soviet society, however often and unequivocally history confirms that armed force and secret plots can alter its whole course. The kind of observer I have in mind thinks this sort of talk intellectually unrespectable: illiberal, lowbrow, or both. So, averting his gaze from such possibilities, he has focused on the *un*armed potential élites of Soviet society. Here is more congenial matter : it is no longer a question of why Beria's bodyguard didn't shoot first or whether Zhukov would have won if he hadn't gone to Albania at the crucial moment—we have instead statistics, ideas, the inevitability of gradualness, the sort of thing that doesn't make the headlines but you can write about it in the monthlies.

I have no wish to dogmatise. These things are important, and indeed recently they have been much more important. The balance between shooting and sociology is a shifting one. What I wish to point out is that just as the Fouchés and the Bonapartes have been mastered, so now have the social forces. They have been recognised for what they are, understood, and beaten. Now there is nothing in Marxism to encourage the study of autonomous social change in a socialist society, and Stalinism makes it outright heresy. Nor has any published communist work (except Djilas') much contributed to the increased communist understanding of these things. Whence, then, comes it?

Most of it is due to events. One of our mass forces is the economic bureaucracy. It has been clamorous for power and on one occasion brought off what must be described as a peace-

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ful coup d'état. Then there are the students, who on one occasion made it impossible for Khrushchev to speak by their unbroken applause. Moreover, outside the USSR itself, there have been the Polish/Hungarian October and the Hundred Flowers in Vietnam and China. Undoubtedly the inquest on these catastrophes has been bloc-wide, and rival analyses have had to contend. Partly, too, I think Western sovietology is responsible. We talk so very openly of the forces at work in Soviet society, and it is known that our work is read. And finally the new Soviet leader is a man of the subtlest perceptions and the purest Party loyalty. He must be seen as, within his society, a great tribune of the people, a man with mud on his boots and the common touch, a great radical in the line of W. J. Bryan, Lloyd George, MacCarthy and Poujade; fundamentalist, intolerant, empirical, shrewd. He is just what the CPSU needed for the diagnosis and destruction of the rival élite-worthy groups.

Some readers may remember Prof. Daniel Bell's admirable 'Ten Theories in Search of Reality,' in which ten ways are distinguished of interpreting the Soviet Union, ranging from the characterological to the Slavistic.[2] For which theory does the present writer stand? He inclines to classify himself as an out-and-out Kremlinologist: carrying the war deep into enemy territory with the new claim that the Kremlin itself has taken up sociology. Soviet sociology is indeed important, but it is becoming more and more a mere branch of Kremlinology. Malenkov, too, made a sociological analysis and backed it: he thought the economic bureaucracy would come out on top, and did many things to please it. He was wrong, but he was still a sociologist. It is really to destroying the autonomy of sociology that this article is dedicated.

III. The Technical Intelligentsia

Passing, then, from the armed forces and the police we come to the more 'sociological' groups. By technical intelligentsia is meant engineers, chemists and such, and *not* managers or planners. The distinction is important, since the former, so far from being a menace, are probably the only really contented class in the Soviet Union. Why not? They get plenty of funds for research, and stand very high in the income scale. Attempts to dictate what they shall think or discover ceased more or less with Stalin's death.[3] They are honoured, they are necessary, they know it.

Have they any complaints? A few. The new educational reforms hurt their children, as shown below, and Khrushchev, in his hostility to city slickers, has moved many of their research institutes out of the main cities. But by and large they are *the* group which the Soviet system is most able to satisfy, after the Party *apparatchiki* themselves.

Technical progress makes it inevitable that they should increase, absorbing eventually nearly all the workers and peasants. This is a far cry from Marx's prophecy of indefinite proletarian rule, and a great ideological embarrassment. But even the ideological problem can be overcome, in view of the Marxian doctrine of Man Under Full Communism (see VIII); and practically it is all to the good for any régime that its manual labourers should have prospects of promotion.

IV. The Economic Bureaucracy

The managers and planners are an altogether different problem. The fate of the economic bureaucracy has often enough been discussed, and we may here be brief. Its chief function is to be an administrative substitute for a free market. With typical Marxist fundamentalism the Yugoslavs thought, after the 1948 schism, that it had been the *fons et origo mali* of Stalinism. They abolished it, and claimed thereby to be abolishing the state itself. They found themselves thereby compelled to abolish central planning and introduce a free market, and in this have certainly deviated from the central Marxist tradition. This was and is that only the police, the courts, and the army wither away, while central planning remains part of the essence of socialism, so that the economic bureaucracy also remains. 'We have passed

[2] *World Politics*, April 1958.

[3] In December 1958, however, Lysenko began again to receive serious party support. Should this trend continue the technical intelligentsia would be gravely alienated, as under Stalin. But it is early yet to say.

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from the governance of persons to the administration of things,' said St. Simon; Marx and Engels quoted him with approval, and so did Lenin, and in Moscow it is still orthodox. In Belgrade, however, while they have stopped administering things, they talk as if they were not governing persons.

Nevertheless, the economic bureaucracy *is* a serious claimant for power in the USSR, and to this extent the Yugoslav analysis was right. It is the hero of the ex-Marxists James Burnham[4] and Hermann Achminow.[5] In December 1956 it even threw Khrushchev and his henchmen, weakened by Poland and Hungary, from the seats of economic power; replacing the presidium as manager of the economy by an Inner Cabinet of technocrats, dependent more on the State than the Party for their power. This Inner Cabinet, called the *Gosekonomkommissiya*, contained neither Khrushchev nor any member of the Party Secretariat, but at least two Ministers he had publicly criticised.

His riposte was, when he had regained his Central Committee majority, to abolish the *Gosekonomkommissiya* out of hand, and with it 27 of the central ministries, substituting 102 local economic authorities, the *sovnarkhozy;* each in its *area* having the administrative powers previously possessed by a ministry over an *industry*. Economically a small change, and at that for the worse, the *sovnarkhozy* are nevertheless extremely important. They were the first sociological counter-attack of the Party élite against a recognised social enemy.

For the institution of the *sovnarkhoz* abolishes the Ministers, the powerful and well paid heads of the economic bureaucracy who were stronger than and thought differently from the Party *apparatchiki*. Now the chief economic bureaucrat is the *sovnarkhoz* chairman: a lesser person than the local Party Secretary. Enterprise managers can no longer appeal to senior State officials over the latter's head. And the *sovnarkhoz* chairman *no longer lives in Moscow*, and thus cannot contribute to the political atmosphere in the capital. At receptions, where he stood vodka in hand, chatting to some member of the Central Committee of the Party, the latter now stands alone, his ideological dynamism and purity uncontaminated by the facts of life. Far now from the fleshpots, the *sovnarkhoz* chairman seldom meets colleagues of equal rank. His *sovnarkhoz* is coterminous with the local Party unit, the oblast. The oblast Party secretary is his direct boss, in a way no single Party man ever was the boss of the old minister. The actual enterprise managers of course remain: a powerful group with somewhat different interests from the planners.

This, then, was a very subtle move; its manifest economic disadvantages[6] did not outweigh the gain for the pure Party élite in whose name Khrushchev fought the battle. A similar willingness to accept economic loss for social gain is manifested in the treatment of higher education, to which we now turn.

V. Youth and Students

Occasionally in human society youth is a separate class, of fixed and special attitudes, constantly recruiting from adolescence reinforcements to replace the members it loses to maturity. The attitudes of the members of this 'class' are 'inherited' from older members of it and not from parents, teachers or preachers. Soviet youth is at present such a class. Not that all members think alike. Quite the contrary; the mass is quiet and moderate, and three sub-classes stand out. These are the *stilyagi* (children of rich parents, aping the dress, manners, and morals of Teddy Boys or American semi-delinquents—with whom they share the single quality of recent enrichment), the *guligany* (young proletarian roughs, more than semi-delinquent), and the disaffected students, who concern us most.

The *guligan* (hooligan) has been treated as in other societies. The attention of the police and the youth movement, new laws, penal experiments, pious platitudes in the papers: we have seen it all in the West, and it seems to have had the same qualified success. The *stilyaga* (style-monger) is partly a product of the economic

[4] *The Managerial Revolution.*

[5] *Die Macht im Hintergrund* (Ulm, 1950). This book distinguishes, as Burnham fails to do, between the Party and the economic bureaucracy. As it happens Mr. Achminow puts his money on the latter. But that hardly lessens the force of what he says.

[6] See my article, 'The Economics of Decentralisation,' *Soviet Survey*, No. 27.

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bureaucracy: he may even be the Minister's prodigal son. The *sovnarkhozy* must have eased this problem: drain-pipe trousers look odd in Yakutsk. But though shading off into 'guliganism' in his bad moments, the *stilyaga* is also related to the student; indeed he is only a particular sort of disaffected student, and his Teddy-boy clothes, American[7] slang, and interest in jazz have strong political overtones. Thus the reorganisation of higher education hits *stilyaga* and disaffected student alike; the particular sorts of political disaffection (revisionist, true Leninist, 'bourgeois nationalist,' etc.) do not concern us here.

My thesis here is that, perceiving the political dangers of student opposition in 1956, Khrushchev has decided on the *liquidation of the students as a class,* by a switch from universities to correspondence and evening courses. These courses are to the student what the *kolkhoz* is to the peasant, the social mechanism whereby he quits the stage of history. Indeed at this point a little preliminary history is necessary.

VI. Soviet Education: a Historical Excursus

As in other countries, Soviet education tends to reflect the rulers' social ideals, but only very imperfectly since they are pre-occupied with other affairs, and must bow to technical necessity and the resistance of the masses. Before Stalin education was a political backwater, only partially under Leninist control. Its presiding spirit is called, by Mr. Utechin in his admirable article,[8] Bogdanovite: i.e. a desire to marry orthodox Marxism with all the latest progressive and futurist ideas. In this case the ideas were pupil control of school government, and teaching by the Dalton Plan and the 'complex' or 'project' methods: the pupils elect to do some 'project', such as to put on a play, and the teacher guides them through this venture, all the instruction arising naturally out of it. Meanwhile, at the level of higher education, the immediate demands of the economy were paramount, and quality was sacrificed to quantity as regards both technical qualification and general culture. Engineers were graduated without basic scientific knowledge, especially during the first five-year plan.

Methods so anarchic and uninstructive in elementary education, and so superficial in higher education, were not to Stalin's taste. He put in Zhdanov to restore order in 1934, and until Stalin's death or later it is Zhdanov's personal spirit that dominated. Discipline, hard learning, the Russian grammar school tradition, and Russian values, language, and history (especially for minorities) formed a complete contrast with the previous progressivism. There was even a classical, rather than a technical, bias; the sexes were separated, the teachers obeyed, the children marched about in crocodiles. Marxism, of course, and the party line received their full due, but the whole system was a surprising one for a communist country. It corresponded to Stalin's more general line of a hark-back to Russian nationalism and historical pride; a step he took in 1934 and accelerated during the war.

In 1952 came the first break with Zhdanovism: an increased emphasis on low-level but general technology, known as the 'polytechnisation' of the school. The 'arty-crafty' excesses of the initial period had got polytechnisation, though an old Marxist concept, a bad name for a time: hence the humanistic bias of the intervening period. Co-education, too, came back in 1954.

But even so Zhdanovism persisted in Khrushchev's amazing proposal to convert all schools to boarding schools (February 1956), with its explicit hark-back to Tsarist traditions. There was also (1954) the introduction of uniforms in many schools, a revival of an order first made in 1936 but then abandoned presumably for lack of funds.

How did social classes fare through all these changes (of which only the major ones have been described)? The Bogdanovite phase stood of course for 'parity of esteem,' and the 'project' method in particular made discrimination

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[7] Disaffected American youth plays it the same way: after the Sputnik the Beat Generation began to call themselves Beatniks. They are of course as far from being Communists as Stilyagi are from being capitalists: both aim only to annoy. Indeed transfer the Beatnik to a poor economy where most people are Beat anyway, and he will become a Stilyaga instead. The object of both is to express total opposition by life-style, not ideology.

[8] *Soviet Studies,* October 1958. Cf. also the same author in *Soviet Survey,* February 1957, and *Political Quarterly,* October-December 1958.

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on social, intellectual, or indeed any grounds impossible. It coincided with, and had of course to accommodate, strong official discouragement of the higher education of children of ex-bourgeois. The Zhdanovite phase insisted dogmatically that all Soviet children were hereditarily equal, and set up the aim of a traditional grammar school education for all. Special schools and psychological testing systems were abolished. But as part of general state policy the children of ex-bourgeois were allowed higher education again from 1934, and the new Soviet intelligentsia also began to form.

The last posthumous flower of educational Zhdanovism, the boarding schools, did not imply any favour for the children of the intelligentsia. This is a very common misunderstanding. In all the voluminous reports, official and otherwise, about these schools, there is no trace of such a thing in intention or fact. The purpose of the boarding schools was evidently to take children (*all* children, when the transformation was complete) away from their families; hence the fantastically short holidays proposed—one month a year. The boarding school was Khrushchev's first tentative response to the disaffection of youth. The assumption that boarding schools are upper class is natural in a Platonic scholar or an Englishman; but the Soviet boarding schools have not developed in this way. They have rather the quite indeterminate social status of, for instance, the rare boarding schools in the English *state* system. Neither U nor non-U, these schools simply exist to serve orphans, the children of soldiers and *divorcés*, etc.; while within the state system high social status goes to the best central non-resident grammar schools of the biggest towns: e.g. Manchester, Bradford, and Bristol grammar schools. These schools develop an almost purely intellectual tradition which draws the best teachers and boys, and they exist also in the USSR. It is to these established schools, and not to the new boarding schools, that the intelligentsia try to send their children, using every kind of pressure; and it is against them that the latest scheme is aimed.

But this is of course an entirely unsought phenomenon: the Zhdanov period brought only a few measures that one could call deliberately pro-intelligentsia. The chief of these was the introduction of school fees for sixth formers and above in 1940. Immediately, this measure was a war preparation: people must be got into production quickly, and the budget balanced. But it undoubtedly favoured the rich, and it was accompanied by special schools for children of Army officers and MVD officials, etc., who also received quite explicit and formalised preference for entry to the universities. Thus in 1940-53 Stalin was indeed permitting hereditary sub-élites to form, as we have already mentioned; and that this policy was conscious and deliberate is demonstrated beyond any doubt by these events in the sphere of education. Whether this was Zhdanov's personal policy or something imposed on him by Stalin it is impossible to say.

In the long run this kind of thing was out of tune with the whole of Soviet policy, which is to keep a rapid social turnover and prevent the formation of a hereditary élite. It is no surprise, then, that fees were abolished in 1956. True, fees are retained for boarding schools, but they are carefully graded according to parental income, and never exceed one-third of the total cost; whereas the essence of the hereditary élite boarding school is of course the high flat fee. But in any case the boarding schools have been found to be too expensive, and their construction is very much slower than was originally planned. In 1958 there were only 180,000 children in these schools, or 0·6 per cent. of all schoolchildren.

VII. The Politics of Khrushchev's Reform

This survey has perforce omitted the whole economic side of educational policy, which is of course equally important. We have concentrated only on the social and political intentions of the régime, and the counter-pressures from below. One of the most original and 'positive' features of Khrushchev's reform is the careful quantitative dovetailing of the crafts taught and of the proportions between the various school-leaving ages with the precise demands of the economy. Under him, perhaps for the first time, education takes its proper part in the planned economy.

Khrushchev has three closely connected social and political aims. The first is to stop the overproduction of humanistically trained sixth-

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formers. These have latterly been a perfect nuisance. Zhdanov's aim of 'every child a sixth-former' (though not achieved), released yearly upon the labour market thousands of adolescents with a contempt for manual work, yet too numerous to get into higher education. They would kick their heels in their parents' homes, pretending to study for the next year's entrance exams.; or take casual, blind-alley jobs. Higher education produced much more exactly what the economy needed; the need was to do away with the grammar school *beloruchka* or white-handed one, hanging about and refusing to believe he was condemned to manual labour. This aim, then, has been met by polytechnisation: secondary schools must not be all grammar schools, but—by a typical Soviet wholehoggery—all 'technical' or 'modern,' to use British terminology.

But if there are to be no grammar schools, what is to happen to higher education? In all Khrushchev's pronouncements, suspicion of higher education appears like a cloven hoof, and here we come to his second aim, described above hyperbolically as the 'liquidation of the students as a class.' Originally he wanted everyone to enter production after secondary school, there to pursue a specialised technical or a higher education after hours, by correspondence. This went even for first and second year undergraduates, who moreover were not even to begin their correspondence courses until after two years in production. The only children to remain in full-time education were to be musicians, painters, and theoretical scientists. Full-time education, of course, is what makes students a class: abolish that, and they have no corporate feeling. In other words Khrushchev threatened his country with unmitigated intellectual catastrophe. Just as post-sputnik America was awakening to the vices of pragmatism, life-adjustment, and the neglect of the gifted child, the country whose educational system had brought about this change of heart was preparing to abandon it.

Here more than anywhere else Soviet educationists fought back, and the gifted child has been partly saved from a fatal interruption in his education. The final legislation is by no means so anti-intellectual as the initial proposals. If Admiral Rickover, the originator of the atomic submarine, can stand for American eggheads' resistance to Columbia Teachers' College, Academician Nesmeyanov has played the same role against Khrushchev. Not that the gifted child is a popular cause, in either country, or indeed anywhere (let him who doubts it attend a parent-teacher meeting). Certainly Khrushchev's anti-intellectual egalitarianism won him majority support in Party circles, and certainly most gifted children have parents in the intelligentsia. So long as the family survives at all, an educational system that favours the gifted child makes wealth hereditary. But the needs of the economy are obvious and paramount, and Khrushchev has had to compromise.

VIII. The Merging of Physical and Intellectual Labour

Khrushchev's third aim deserves a heading to itself, as it represents no temporary reaction to a practical need or threat but grows from the very roots of communism and embodies some of its noblest ideals.

In a sense Marx and Engels foresaw the threat of a New Class arising, and that the threat of social differentiation was not for ever exorcised by the revolutionary establishment of a classless society. Right from the *Communist Manifesto* they demanded and predicted that intellectual and physical labour cease to be the specialities of different people; and, in the same vein, the abolition of the difference between town and country. There was to be one type only of communist man: dreamer and empiricist, scientist and worker, humanist, artist, huntsman, fitter, tinker, tailor and all—replete with Socialist Consciousness of course, and working for the joy of it alone.

Now all over the Communist bloc except in Poland and Yugoslavia it has recently been realised (a) that a New (non-Party) Class is a danger; (b) that this ancient doctrine of the Admirable Communist is the perfect Marxian answer to it, and should therefore be taken far more seriously than hitherto; and (c) that the school is the place where he is formed. The Chinese, of course, have taken it furthest, and they are being imitated in the two next most Stalinist countries, Albania and Bulgaria. Not only are schools being polytechnicalised, and universities switched to correspondence

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courses, and technical training prolonged and diluted with ordinary labour; in these three countries middle-aged officials have to do a month's manual labour a year.

IX. Conclusion

Each Communist leader imagines the final Communist Man in his own preferred image. Engels imagined himself. Zhdanov thought of a communised Russian grammar school-boy—he was one himself. Stalin dreamed of 200 million Molotovs—they are so interchangeable and easy to manage. Khrushchev wants 200 million Khrushchevs: practical all-rounders with as little formal education as he had. But these are differences of emphasis only. They all, except possibly Stalin, actively strove and strive for a single human type impervious to social differentiation. For a long time they rejected Western charges that there is social differentiation. Now these charges are tacitly admitted, and the result is that so far from accepting this incipient differentiation there is a bloc-wide campaign against it of unparalleled ferocity. Nepotism in the narrower sense, say of enterprise managers finding jobs for their relatives within the enterprise, the regimes have always strongly resisted. Western advocates of 'New Class' type theories might have paid more attention to this obvious fact. Moreover at élite level the same is true. Lenin's wife reached the Central Committee and Molotov's has been a candidate member, but that is all. If the worst that ever happened was that Stalin's son became a Major-General, must we not conclude that the communists take their professions of classlessness seriously?

The communists certainly cannot do without a technical intelligentsia, selected and separately educated to be just that, and so long as the family is allowed to exist this class will be in some measure hereditary. But it is not a revolutionary or even very much a reforming class, while against the really revolutionary new classes adequate measures have been taken. An agriculture without peasants is of course on the way. A literature without writers, a command economy without bureaucrats, and universities without students are at any rate possible in a Pickwickian sense. The classless society is not such a mirage as we think.

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historic 'deterioration' of Freud's early quasi-neurological view upon which he spends so much effort, that the real conflict is not over the basic mechanisms of Freud, but arises because they emanate from a bourgeois ethic, because they are the product of a corrupt Viennese society; that a materialistic-conditioned society on communist lines would not have produced or needed such a psychological pattern. It may well be that the conditioning of child life in an ordered society would produce a difference of design, but the end result would merely be a different ethos. Even communists speak a language in every day commerce which is not neurological.

It does not matter whether the society is ordered on so-called materialistic lines or on lines of so-called bourgeois individualism. Each has its own final common paths of expression. But, admitting their differences, the social-political orientation of groups should make no difference to the trans-national language of science. Bassin does not hesitate to meet Freud on the ground of the higher functions, and finally asks quite pertinently why Freud fails to explore more deeply his basic therapeutic thesis by explaining why exactly the restoration of a suppressed impulse to consciousness should have a healing effect. It is true this is a defect in Freud's doctrine, but he does not, as Bassin states, ignore the fact that becoming conscious of the suppressed impulse means inevitably including it in a definite system of attitude to reality. This surely is what Freud does do, albeit in a more complex manner which cannot be gone into here.

Finally the issue resolves itself into a non-existent dichotomy, except in a semantic sense, between the neurological substrate language and the language of psychological discourse which is the cultural heritage of man in all social regions. Restated in these terms, even the vexed concept of Instinct as a basic drive pattern will be more easily understood, if not wholly removed from the discussion. A theory of conditioning is of course a Godsend to a communist society. It eliminates constitution, and makes all reactions that are desirable, possible.

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Having swum for 30 minutes, the Chairman went back to the boat. There he had a light chat with several athletes. He said smilingly, "One can swim all year round in this place." He then asked their names and inquired about their working conditions. One comrade said in reply, "My first name is Liang, and my second name Cheng." The Chairman asked, "Which Cheng?" The comrade replied, "The one that means 'correct'." Thereupon, the Chairman asked jokingly, "Are you as correct as that? Have you never done anything wrong in your life?" This remark aroused a great deal of laughter. The words sounded like an alarm bell which echoed in our minds. We seemed to have been asked, "Have you been serving the people sincerely and honestly?" Our respected Chairman very often wakes us up by such casual remarks.

Comrade Liang Shu-mei, the athlete who won the second prize in the swimming contest across the Yang-tze River, said to the Chairman, "Chairman Mao, you swim very well. The news of your crossing the Yang-tze River has reached the whole world." The Chairman quickly replied, "You swim better than I do. You are athletes, whereas I swim for the sake of exercise." The Chairman then asked Liang Shu-mei, "Why did you not win the first prize?" Liang replied, "I did not master the direction well. I made a detour." Thereupon, the Chairman said, "Direction is indeed extremely important." This remark set me thinking for a long time.

Beloved Chairman Mao, we will always remember your instructions and guidance . . . .

One autumn morning in 1952, the Chairman, together with Minister Lo Jui-ch'ing and Minister T'eng Tai-yuan visited a village in the rural area of Kaifeng, Honan. The villagers were busy drying grain in the sun. They gathered round when they saw Chairman Mao. Men and women, the young and the old, formed a circle around him, and their eyes, beaming with excitement, watched him. The Chairman asked, "How is your harvest? Did you have to give much of your grain to the treasury?" The villagers gladly replied, "We have a bumper harvest this year. Peas and corn are plentiful. And we had to give very little to the treasury." The Chairman then asked in great detail about the yield of all types of crops. Several children stood close to the Chairman, and warm sunlight fell on their naive and smiling faces. They all raised their small faces, their eyes fixed on Chairman Mao's face without blinking, and their small arms around the Chairman's legs. The Chairman caressed them and the children were extremely happy . . . .

Wherever Chairman Mao goes the masses are enthusiastic, and the people have the happiest moment in their life. Wherever he goes, he leaves a renewed spirit to fight hard and harder still, to leap forward and forward again!

Chairman Mao makes use of his spare time, however short it may be, for reading books, newspapers, and magazines. On the wooden bed on which he sleeps, he has managed to read several hundred books. These books are changed regularly. Our great leader, Chairman Mao, wants to "learn a little more" during every minute and every second he can spare. One of the characteristics of the Chairman is that he reads quickly and well, which enables him to read many books though he does not have much time to spare. He has an exceptionally good memory.

The Chairman went out on a visit one day. At midnight he had his meal in the car. He was reading a book at the same time. He rapidly read through several pages, seemed to have discovered something, read over these pages again, and then finished his half bowl of noodles.

Once, while he was visiting a certain place, the Chairman was reading the Ch'u Odes at midnight. The light was turned out for anti-air raid purposes, but this did not stop him. He lit a candle and went on reading.

Chairman Mao, now 65 years old, is still studying foreign languages. Though he has litte time to spend on this, he does so every day. Even while resting after swimming, he will read a few pages and memorise a few sentences.

The great wisdom of our beloved leader, Chairman Mao, and his amazing talent are acquired bit by bit in the mass revolutionary struggles and through the immutable habit of studying hard.'

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